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STRANGE BEDFELLOWS: CORPORATE
FIDUCIARIES AND THE GENERAL LAW
COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION IN SECTION
2.01(a) OF THE AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE'S PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GO VERNANCE
Patrick J. Ryan*
Abstract Business and corporate crime is a controversial social problem. Less well
known is the extent to which corporate legal doctrine permits derivative litigation against
corporate officials arising from deviance episodes. In this Article, Professor Ryan exam-
ines both the traditional applications of fiduciary obligation to corporate deviance and the
American Law Institute's revised formulations in the still-unfinished Principles of Corpo-
rate Governance. His findings reveal the difficulties encountered in trying to enforce gen-
eral legal obligations by means of corporate governance mechanisms. He predicts that the
ex ante effects of the ALI provisions will be two in nature. First, fiduciary obligation and
its enforcement by derivative litigation could have a deterrent effect on corporate deviance,
but only if judges commit themselves to the Principles' notion that fiduciary responsibility
for corporate law violations is the most significant component of the duty of care. This
commitment would be measured by judges' reluctance to grant easy and routine dismissals
in corporate deviance cases, even when dismissal is recommended by a special litigation
committee. Second, the Principles' general law compliance obligation can have a horta-
tory effect on managers in particular situations. The Principles' general law compliance
obligation thus works to reinforce managers' preexisting socialization toward law
compliance.
I. INTRODUCTION .................................... 415
II. CORPORATE DEVIANCE AND FIDUCIARY
DUTY ................................................ 427
A. A Sketch of Corporate Deviance ................... 427
1. Corporate Deviance as Distinct Behavior ....... 428
2. Structural Factors ............................. 432
3. Sociological Insights ........................... 435
4. Neoclassical Economics and Corporate
Deviance ...................................... 436
5. Hidden Causes and Consequences .............. 440
* Associate Professor, Rutgers University School of Law, Camden. B.A., 1976, Loyola
Marymount; M.A., 1977, Loyola Marymount; J.D., 1980, Loyola Law School; LL.M., 1987,
Columbia. This Article was submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Science of Law, in the Faculty of Law, Columbia University. I am grateful for the
advice and encouragement received from Curtis J. Berger, Harvey J. Goldschmid, and John C.
Coffee, Jr., who serve as my dissertation committee at Columbia. I am also thankful for helpful
comments and criticism from Roger J. Dennis, Jay M. Feinman, and Dennis R. Honabach. Able
research assistance was provided by Eleanor Heck and Juan Burgos.
413
Washington Law Review
6. Sum m ary ...................................... 441
B. Corporate Fiduciary Doctrine ...................... 442
1. The Business Judgment Rule ................... 444
2. Fiduciary Duties ............................... 445
C. The Caselaw of Corporate Deviance as Fiduciary
Breach ............................................ 447
1. The Business Judgment Rule in Corporate
Deviance Cases ................................ 448
2. Procedural Restraints on Corporate Deviance
Suits .......................................... 451
a. Proof of the Underlying Violation ........... 451
b. Pleading and Proving Corporate Loss ....... 452
c. Directors' Power to Control Corporate
Litigation .................................. 458
3. Are Direct Involvement Cases Different From
Failure-to-Supervise Cases? ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 462
D . Sum m ary ......................................... 465
III. FIDUCIARY DUTY AND GENERAL LAW
COMPLIANCE UNDER THE ALI PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ........................ 466
A. The General Statement: Section 2.01(a)'s Corporate
O bligation ........................................ 466
B. Fiduciary Law Compliance Obligations Under the
A LI Principles .................................... 469
C. The ALI's Net-Loss Rule in Fiduciary Litigation... 472
D. Power to Dismiss ................................. 475
E. Summary: The Corporate Deviance Derivative Suit
Under the ALI Principles of Corporate
Governance ........................................ 479
1. Choosing a Winnable Deviance Case ........... 479
2. Responding to Demand for Corporate Action... 481
a. Possible Recommendations in Direct
Involvement Cases .......................... 482
b. Possible Recommendations in Failure-to-
Supervise Cases ............................ 484
3. The Litigation Pattern Under the Principles ..... 485
IV. JUSTIFYING A CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
APPROACH TO GENERAL LAW COMPLIANCE ... 487
A. Reconstructing the ALI's Consensus About General
Law Compliance as a Standard of Corporate
C onduct .......................................... 489
414
Vol. 66:413, 1991
Principles of Corporate Governance
B. Fiduciary Obligation and Shareholder Enforcement. 492
1. Reasons to Discount Shareholder Enforcement of
General Law Compliance by Corporate Actors . 492
2. Reasons to Retain Some Possibility of Share-
holder Enforcement of General Law Compliance
by Corporate Actors ........................... 494
C. Interpreting the ALI's Law Compliance "Text" .... 496
V. CONCLUSION ........................................ 500
I. INTRODUCTION
Major business scandals seem to occur just frequently enough to
help keep alive American popular distrust of the business community
in general and of large corporate organizations in particular. Wide-
spread price-fixing,' domestic and foreign political payments,2 and
abuses in connection with government contracting and regulatory
decisionmaking 3 throw business community deviance from legal
1. Some of the most famous price-fixing episodes (involving heavy electrical equipment,
pharmaceuticals, and plumbing fixtures) are discussed, with references, in M. CLINARD & P.
YEAGER, CORPORATE CRIME (1980). The electrical equipment episodes were among the first
instances in which major corporate executives received jail terms, and are also detailed in chapter
7 of J. BROOKS, BUSINESS ADVENTURES (1969); see also R. MOKHIBER, CORPORATE CRIME
AND VIOLENCE 213-20 (1989); Smith, The Incredible Electrical Conspiracy, FORTUNE, May
1961, at 161; id. April 1961, at 132.
2. The mid-1970s revelations about questionable payments generated much comment. A
brief and useful history is provided in Coffee, Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical
View of Corporate Misconduct and An Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099, 1115-27
(1977).
3. These episodes dot the governmental landscape. Recently, charges of influence peddling to
obtain federal subsidies for housing projects have plagued the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD). Most of the alleged improprieties occurred under former HUD Secretary
Samuel R. Pierce, Jr. See Winerip, Builders Helped by H. U.D. Aide Hired Him After He Left
Agency, N.Y. Times, July 29, 1989 at 1, col. 4; Shenon, Bush Consultant Peddled Influence at
H. U.D., He Says, N.Y. Times, June 21, 1989, at Al, col. 6. Similar problems may have occurred
during the Bush Administration. See Shenon, Housing Dept. Opens an Inquiry On Contracts to
Ex-Reagan Aides, N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 1990, at A7, col. 5.
The attempted federal bailout of troubled savings and loan institutions has brought to light a
mix of serious allegations, from improper political payments to managerial opportunism and
regulatory incompetence. See J. ADAMS, THE BIG FIX: INSIDE THE S & L SCANDAL-HoW AN
UNHOLY ALLIANCE OF POLITICS AND MONEY DESTROYED AMERICA'S BANKING SYSTEM
(1990). These charges included allegations that five United States Senators acted improperly to
assist Charles H. Keating, Jr., and his Lincoln Savings and Loan despite regulatory efforts to
close down or curtail his operations. These senators were labelled "The Keating Five." Neither
Mr. Keating's problems, nor President Bush's son Neil's involvement with Silverado Banking
Savings and Loan Association should overshadow the breadth of the savings and loan scandal.
In mid-summer of 1990, the federal Office of Thrift Supervision provided a list of 100 firms to the
415
Washington Law Review Vol. 66:413, 1991
norms into high relief. Stock trading violations,' consumer fraud,5
and environmental disasters6 also contribute to perceptions of business
lawlessness. Although not all firms engage in questionable or illegal
Justice Department for "top-priority" prosecution. Johnston, S. & L Criminal Inquiries
Confirmed, N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1990, at D4, col. 1.
In 1985, the federal government announced a criminal investigation dubbed "Operation Ill
Wind," which extended to 45 of the largest 100 military contractors. See W. KNEPPER & D.
BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS 231 (4th ed. 1988); Pasztor,
Galvin Admits That He Bribed Pentagon Aides, Wall St. J., Mar. 29, 1990, at A14, col. 4. By
early spring of 1990, 35 individuals and companies had been convicted or had pleaded guilty in
this long-running investigation of defense procurement misconduct that included bribes to high
government officials. See Wines, Guilty Plea in Pentagon Fraud Case, N.Y. Times, March 29,
1990, at Dl, col. 3. The convicted companies include Hazeltine, Teledyne, Boeing, Loral, RCA
(now part of General Electric), Hughes Aircraft, Grumman and Raytheon. See Smart & Payne,
Look What Il Wind Is Blowing In, Bus. WK., Apr. 16, 1990, at 27. Unisys (successor to Sperry
Corp.) and United Technologies are the most prominent among the remaining targets. See id.
4. Trading violations include stock manipulation and insider trading. Opportunities for these
types of violations increased during the financial hyperactivity accompanying the 1980s' takeover
wave. GAF Corporation was fined $2 million for manipulating Union Carbide stock during two
days in 1986 in an attempt to profit further from GAF's pre-bid 10% beachhead in Union
Carbide stock. GAF had acquired much of this stock during its unsuccessful bid to acquire
Union Carbide. GAF's vice chairman received a six month prison term in connection with the
misconduct. Labaton, GAFFined; Executive Sentenced, N.Y. Times, March 31, 1990, at 31, col.
6. The insider trading scandals linking Dennis Levine and Ivan Boesky confirmed some people's
suspicions that parts of the "takeover game" were rigged. See Dennis, This Little Piggy Went to
Market: The Regulation of Risk Arbitrage after Boesky, 52 ALB. L. REV. 841, 841 nn. 1-2 (1988).
Michael Milken's advocacy of low-grade debt made Drexel Burnham Lambert a major financial
player; its own reliance on debt eventually drove it to financial illegalities, and then to the
bankruptcy courts as regulators closed in. Drexel's imminent and eventual collapse probably
contributed to the drastic curtailment of the junk bond and takeover markets during the latter
half of 1989 and early 1990. The bond market softening may have significant effects for many
firms in need of additional financing as earlier restructuring obligations come due in the early
1990s. See Light & Nathans, The Junk-Bond Time Bombs Could Go Off, Bus. WK., Apr. 9,
1990, at 68. The slowdown in the control market may create problems in corporate governance,
at least to the extent that an active market for corporate control had become a substantial goad
to satisfy shareholder interests. See Bartlett, Life in the Executive Suite After Drexel, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 18, 1990, § 3, at 1, col. 4.
5. Perhaps the most publicized recent example of consumer fraud by a major corporation was
Beech-Nut's decision to sell ersatz apple juice in its baby-food line. See Welles, What Led Beech-
Nut Down the Road to Disgrace, Bus. WK., Feb. 22, 1988, at 124; Traub, Into the Mouths of
Babes, N.Y. Times, July 24, 1988, § 7 (Magazine), at 18.
6. In 1989 and 1990, Exxon's oil operations in Alaska and New Jersey were plagued by
several major oil spills. The tanker Valdez's grounding and its environmental consequences
received particularly extensive coverage. See, e.g., Wells & Sullivan, Stuck in Alaska: Exxon's
ArmyScrubs The Beaches, But They Don't Stay Cleaned, Wall. St. J., July 27, 1989, at Al, col. 6.
Nearly a year after the Alaskan accident, some analysts began to attribute part of Exxon's
problems to its mid-1980s' restructuring efforts. See Sullivan, Stretched Thin: Exxon's
Restructuring In the Past Is Blamed for Recent Accidents, Wall St. J., March 16, 1990, at A 1, col.
6.
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practices,7 enough do that business deviance is regarded as a serious
and persistent problem.'
Illegal behavior by corporate9 actors constitutes a significant part of
the business deviance problem, if for no other reason than the corpo-
rate form's preeminent role in the national economy. Like other disfa-
vored behavior, corporate deviance is imperfectly regulated by social
controls, which range from the family, schools, workplace, and reli-
gious groups through market mechanisms to explicit criminal sanc-
tions, and back again. Although no one social control is sufficient to
prevent deviant behavior, each has some effect. For particular individ-
uals and groups, some forms of social control may be more effective
than others; t° one mechanism's results can vary as well across differ-
ent types of disfavored conduct." In any event, controlling deviant
behavior, corporate or otherwise, is a complex social phenomenon
involving several overlapping systems to shape human behavior.
In the abstract, at least, corporate governance doctrine itself could
operate as one of the social controls on corporate deviance. Corporate
governance doctrine is that body of legal rules concerned with the
internal relationships between shareholders and corporate manage-
ment. 12 These governance rules allocate powers between shareholders
7. See M. CLINARD, CORPORATE ETHICS AND CRIME: THE ROLE OF MIDDLE
MANAGEMENT 16 (1983). For example, even during the widespread "questionable payments"
scandals of the mid-1970s, approximately 40% of the Fortune 500 companies were not charged
with any law violations by any of the 25 federal enforcement agencies operating at that time. Id
So as not to bear false witness with statistics, it should be pointed out that this figure also means
that approximately 60% of the Fortune 500 companies were charged with some sort of violation
by one or more federal agencies.
8. Id. at 14-15.
9. As used in this Article, "corporation" refers to a publicly-held corporation unless the
context otherwise indicates. For the modem typology of firms doing business under the
corporate form, see W. KLEIN & J. COFFEE, BusiNEss ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE-LEGAL
AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 97-103 (4th ed. 1990).
10. For some actors, socialization by family, schools, and religious groups may be sufficient to
prevent undesirable conduct, so that these actors niay conform to socially acceptable behavior
without internal reference to explicit criminal sanctions. Thus, some individuals may respect
persons or property because they have been taught by parents or religious authority figures that
to do otherwise is "wrong;" internally, these people conform to social expectations because of the
social controls provided by family or religious groups, rather than from a desire to avoid criminal
prosecution for assault or theft. Of course, mixed motives of varying proportions would be a
substantial possibility; but the existence of mixed motives would preclude any attempts to
champion one control as determinative.
11. It is possible to imagine, for instance, that home, school, or religious training might be
more effective in training against physical assault or murder than in reducing drunken driving or
tax evasion.
12. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRucTUiiE: RESTATEMENT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1982) xxiii-xxv [hereinafter Draft No. 1]. Draft No. I
has been superseded by later drafts that have not included its introductory statements.
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and managers, and impose supervisory and fiduciary duties upon man-
agement. Governance rules become deviance controls when cast to
include powers and obligations regarding general law obedience. For
example, corporate governance rules could be employed to police cor-
porate deviance by defining managerial fiduciary duties as including
two distinct obligations: obedience by management itself to general
legal standards,13 and supervision of corporate activities to insure gen-
eral law compliance by all corporate actors, including employees. 14 In
a traditional corporate governance framework, shareholders enforce
these managerial duties through derivative suits brought in the corpo-
rate name against directors and officers who breach their law compli-
ance obligations.15
The American Law Institute's (the AL's) Principles of Corporate
Governance (the Principles) directly implicate the relationship between
corporate governance and corporate deviance. For more than a dec-
ade, the ALI's Corporate Governance Project has worked to generate
the Principles, 16 which are the ALI's attempt to preserve and refurbish
Consequently, Draft No. l's introductory language is unapproved; however, the final version
probably will include a revised general introduction drawing in part upon it. Something like this
definition of corporate governance most likely will appear in the final document.
13. As used throughout this Article, "general legal standards" refers to legal standards other
than those provided by corporate governance.
14. Explicit inclusion of law compliance obligations is not inherent in corporate relationships.
Alternative corporate governance arrangements are possible. For example, corporate
governance rules could omit entirely any managerial obligation to comply with general legal
obligations, or to supervise such compliance. This formulation would eliminate corporate
shareholders as enforcers of general legal obligations. Instead, law compliance by corporate
actors would be left to external enforcers, such as governmental regulators, criminal prosecutors,
and tort plaintiffs. Some middle ground between the extremes of explicit inclusion and exclusion
of law compliance obligations could be reached by permitting corporations to opt out of the
obligation.
15. In reality, much shareholder litigation is brought by attorneys specializing in derivative
litigation who make temporary alliances with small-stake shareholders so that particular suits
may be brought. See infra notes 29, 301-03 and accompanying text. See generally W. KLEIN &
J. COFFEE, supra note 9, at 178-83.
16. Specific discussions of the Principles can be found in Baysinger & Butler, Race for the
Bottom v. Climb to the Top: The American Law Institute Project and Uniformity in Corporate
Law, 10 J. CORP. L. 431 (1985); Branson, The American Law Institute Principles of Corporate
Governance and the Derivative Action: A View From the Other Side, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
399 (1986); Branson, Countertrends in Corporation Law: Model Business Corporations Act
Revision, British Company Law Reform, and Principles of Corporate Governance and Structure,
68 MINN. L. REV. 53 (1983); Carney, Section 4.01 of the ALI's Corporate Governance Project:
Restatement or Misstatement?, 66 WASH. U.L.Q. 239 (1988); Cox, Searching for the
Corporation's Voice in Derivative Suit Litigation: A Critique of Zapata and the ALI Project, 1982
DUKE L.J. 959; Eisenberg, The American Law Institute's Corporate Governance Project, 52 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 495 (1984); Fine, The Corporate Governance Debate and the ALI Proposals:
Reform or Restatement?, 40 VAND. L. REV. 693 (1987); Fischel, The Corporate Governance
Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259 (1982); Hansen, The ALl Corporate Governance Project: Of
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fundamental corporate law doctrines. The ALI has tentatively
approved almost all the corporate governance provisions, subject to
revision by the Reporters and final reconsideration. Among these is
the ALI's declaration of the fundamental corporate objective, which
explicitly articulates an obligation to comply with general legal
provisions:
§ 2.01 The Objective and Conduct of the Business Corporation
A business corporation should have as its objective the conduct of
business activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and share-
holder gain, except that, whether or not corporate profit and share-
holder gain are thereby enhanced, the corporation, in the conduct of its
business (a) is obliged, to the same extent as a natural person, to act
within the boundaries set by law .... 17
the Duty of Due Care and the Business Judgment Rule: A Commentary, 41 Bus. LAw. 1237
(1986); Mofsky & Rubin, A Symposium on The American Law Institute Corporate Governance
Project, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 169 (1983); Perkins, The American Law Institute Corporate
Governance Project In Midstream, 41 Bus. LAw. 1195 (1986); Ribstein, Edited Transcript of
Proceedings of the Business Roundtable: Emory University Law and Economics Center Conference
on Remedies Under the ALI Proposals: Law and Economics (New Orleans, Louisiana, May 2-5,
1985), 71 CORNELL L. REv. 357 (1986); Seligman, A Sheep in Wolfs Clothing: The American
Law Institute Principles of Corporate Governance Project, 55 GEO. WASH L. REv. 325 (1987);
Schwartz, The ALI Corporate Governance Project, 14 INST. ON SEC. REG. 173 (1983); Scott,
Corporation Law and the American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project, 35 STAN. L.
REV. 927 (1983); Subak, A Snapshot of the Law Being Carved In Stone, 42 Bus. LAW. 761
(1987); Titus, Limiting Directors' Liability: The Case For A More Balanced Approach-The
Corporate Governance Project Alternativ 11 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 1 (1989); Veasey & Seitz,
The Business Judgment Rule in the Revised Model Act, the Trans Union Case, and the ALI
Project-A Strange Porridge, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1483 (1985); Weiss, Economic Analysis, Corporate
Law and the American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 1
(1984); Werner, Corporation Law In Search of Its Future, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1611 (1981);
Symposium on Corporate Governance, 8 CARDOZO L. REv. 657 (1987); The ALI's Corporate
Governance Project: Law and Economics, 9 DEL. J. CORP L. 513 (1984). The cited symposia
include articles by many of the most prominent corporate legal scholars. See also Note,
Corporate Ethics and Corporate Governance: A Critique of the ALI Statement on Corporate
Governance Section 2 01(b), 71 CALIF. L. REv. 994 (1983); Note, When Opportunity Knocks: An
Analysis of the Brudney & Clark and ALI Principles of Corporate Governance Proposals For
Deciding Corporate Opportunity Claims, 11 J. CORP. L. 255 (1986); Note, The Proposed
Restatement of Corporate Governance.: Is Reform Really Necessary?, 11 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 499
(1984).
17. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Tent.
Draft No. 2 1984), § 2.01, at 25 [hereinafter Draft No. 2]. Section 2.01(a)'s obligation to comply
with the general law can be illustrated hypothetically. Imagine that the managers of a chemical
corporation undertake a thorough costs analysis, and discover that illegal dumping of toxic waste
would increase significantly the corporation's annual net profits relative to the net profit level
obtained when complying with regulatory standards for hazardous waste disposal. The
traditional corporate law consensus, echoed by the Principles' commentary to § 2.01(a), is that
the managers would have acted improperly if they ordered their waste disposal employees to
419
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Section 2.01(a)'s law compliance obligation is not limited solely to
obedience to state and federal regulations embodied in corporate doc-
trine and securities regulations, but extends to general legal prohibi-
tions. 8 Section 2.01(a) does not create a unique status for corporate
actors, however, who are neither more nor less obligated to obey the
law than non-corporate actors.' 9
Although the Principles have been among the most controversial
developments in the recent history of corporate legal doctrine,2 ° little
direct attention has been paid to section 2.01(a)'s general law compli-
ance obligation. 21  Section 2.01(a) has remained non-controversial
dump the toxic byproducts in violation of applicable law, even if the result would be greater
corporate profitability. Id. at 32-36 (especially illustration 10).
Section 2.01 further shapes the fundamental corporate objective of profit and gain by
permitting the corporation to "take into account ethical considerations that are reasonably
regarded as appropriate to the responsible conduct of business," and to "devote a reasonable
amount of resources to public welfare, humanitarian, educational, and philanthropic purposes."
See id. at 25, § 2.01(b) & (c).
Section 2.01 has provoked some discussion about corporate profit-making and shareholder
gain as primary corporate objectives, and about the ethical and charitable permissive provisions
in subsections (b) and (c); these discussions occurred both during the ALI's plenary
consideration of § 2.01 and in the legal literature. These discussions reflect little authentic
disagreement about the fundamental corporate objective, however, especially when compared to
the heated debates that have taken place over other sections of the Principles. For a reaction to
the debates over § 2.01(b) & (c), see White, How Should We Talk About Corporations? The
Language of Economics and of Citizenship, 94 YALE L.J. 1416 (1985). See generally Seligman,
supra note 16, at 325.
The ALI has tentatively approved § 2.01(a), subject to revision by the Reporters. See 61
A.L.I. PROC. 511 (1985). Although not yet promulgated after redrafting, it appears that this
section will be modified only slightly, and with no substantive changes regarding the obligation to
act within the boundaries of the law. Id. at 465-67; see also Schwartz, Defining the Corporate
Objective: Section 201 of the ALI's Principles, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV 511, 511-12 & n.4.
18. See Draft No. 2, supra note 17, at 34.
19. See id. at 33.
20. See generally Seligman, supra note 16, at 325.
21. Id. at 351-54. Professor Seligman's encapsulation of the debate over § 2.01 accurately
reflects the content of the ALI debates, and the scholarly commentary. The only commentary
that raises a question about § 2.01(a)'s general law compliance obligation is Fischel, The
Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1271 (1982). After acknowledging a
general law compliance obligation to obey "restriction[s] on corporate conduct... embodied in a
statute," Fischel goes on to suggest summarily that "[a] firm may also find it advantageous to
violate a law deliberately and pay the penalty for the same reason that an individual in some
cases may prefer to breach a contract and pay damages." Id. A commentator with a decidedly
different political stance has made a similar observation as a criticism of corporate criminal
punishment. See J. BRAITHWAITHE, CORPORATE CRIME IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
331 (1984) ("Fines as they currently operate are justifiably criticised as licence fees to break the
law.").
Fischel makes no attempt in this observation to distinguish between § 2.01(a)'s aspirational
effect and the problems attending any derivative enforcement mechanism. See infra notes 216,
318-23 and accompanying text. Fischel's relatively undeveloped observation fundamentally
disagrees with the Reporters' own commentary to § 2.01(a):
420
Principles of Corporate Governance
even as the ALI membership considered and tentatively approved
later sections, some of which provide or suggest shareholder enforce-
ment mechanisms for corporate violations of general law.22 This
combination of obligation and enforcement in the Principles means
that the ALI envisions some role for corporate governance rules in
policing corporate deviance. This vision and its implications have
never been isolated and explored, although some commentators have
provided tantalizing glimpses of the problem during more general dis-
cussions of fiduciary duty and shareholder litigation.23
It is sometimes maintained that whether a corporation should adhere to a given legal rule
may properly depend on a kind of cost-benefit analysis, in which probable corporate gains
are weighed against either probable social costs, measured by the dollar liability imposed for
engaging in such conduct, or probable corporate losses, measured by potential dollar
liability discounted for likelihood of detection. Section 2.01 does not adopt this position.
With few exceptions, dollar liability is not a "price" that can properly be paid for the
privilege of engaging in legally wrongful conduct.
Draft No. 2, supra note 17, at 32 (emphasis added). One Reporter believes that Fischel funda-
mentally mistakes the nature of legislative command. See Coffee, Litigation and Corporate Gov-
ernance: An Essay on Steering Between Scylla and Charybdis, 52 GEo. WASH. L. Rnv. 789, 794
n. 11 (1984). Neither the reporters nor Fischel are able to give any hard and fast guidelines for
ascertaining when departures from legal norms, for profit, would be tolerable, although the com-
ments to § 2.01(a) do suggest that corporate actors may breach contracts and pay damages with-
out incurring additional liability under § 2.01 or its enforcement provisions. See Draft No. 2,
supra note 17, at 34. To some extent, judicial standards for dismissing corporate deviance deriva-
tive suits may eventually declare the limits of "tolerable" crime, from a corporate law perspec-
tive.
In other contexts, general law compliance has been treated as a fundamental component of
corporate governance. See Brudney, The Role of the Board of Directors: The ALI and Its Critics,
37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 223, 239 (1983) ("[Ihe most significant role that [independent directors]
can play is in the matter of encouraging corporate compliance with law."); Brudney, The
Independent Director-Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95 HARv. L. REv. 597, 656-58
(1982) (law compliance is most critical aspect of the director's duty of care); see also Engel, An
Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility, 32 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1979) (general law is so funda-
mental to modern corporate governance that it displaces a large portion of what might otherwise
be called "corporate social responsibility"); Ryan, Corporate Directors and the "Social Costs" of
Takeovers--Reflections on the Tin Parachute, 64 TUL. L. R v. 3, 62 (1989). The shift to general
law provisions to regulate undesirable social consequences of business activity has worked to
moot Adolf Berle's "corporate constitutionalism." See Draft No. 1, supra note 12, at xxv; see
also Ryan, supra, at 41-42 n.125.
22. See infra notes 219-32 and accompanying text.
23. See Coffee, supra note 21; Cox, Compensation, Deterrence, and the Market as Boundaries
for Derivative Suit Procedures 52 GEo. WASH. L. Rnv. 745 (1984); Phillips, Principles of
Corporate Governance: A Critique of Part IV 52 GEo. WASH. L. Rnv. 653 (1984).
Professor Phillips offers brief comments on the problems of using fiduciary duty to enforce
general law compliance as part of his critique of early drafts of Part IV. See id. at 687-92. Most
helpful among his comments is his recognition of the possibility that general law compliance
enforcement may have more to do with general social protection than with traditional corporate
governance objectives per se. Id. at 688-89.
Professor Cox analyzes the corporate deviance fiduciary cases in his article on the relative
importance of compensation and deterrence interests in shareholder derivative litigation. See
Cox, supra, at 763-66. Professor Cox's use of these cases is sophisticated and somewhat
421
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Recent events24 suggest that it may be time to attempt a specific dis-
cussion of corporate governance and corporate deviance.
One aspect of the problem has to do with the nature of "corporate
deviance" itself. Scholars and scientists have extensively studied ille-
complex. His thesis is that derivative suits may be more effective if their compensation aspects
are emphasized over their deterrent capacity. The corporate deviance fiduciary breach cases, see
infra notes 128-77 and accompanying text, also tend to be leading examples of deterrence, and he
attempts to discount their impact by reading them as if they "really" enforced a compensation
interest. See Cox, supra, at 763-64. One consequence of this reading is Cox's clear statement
that corporate fiduciary duties may have no place in enforcing societal expectations of general
law compliance if the underlying conduct was profitable to the corporation; he attributes this
doctrinal disability to the derivative suit's limited capacities as a general law enforcement
mechanism. Id. at 765. The net-loss rule's formulation is important to Professor Cox's
compensation thesis; he takes a somewhat monolithic approach to provable corporate loss, in an
understandably hurried treatment of the problem. Id. at 764 & n.92 and accompanying text.
The problem of proving corporate loss is discussed infra at notes 156-77 and accompanying text.
One of Professor Cox's criticisms of the Principles is that they might encourage too much
derivative litigation over general law compliance issues, providing doubtful public interest
enforcement at the expense of the corporate treasury. See Cox, supra, at 778-83.
Professor Coffee's response to Professor Cox, and others, is especially significant because
Coffee is the Reporter for Part VII of the Principles, which governs the derivative suit. This
symposium article is in particular a defense of his work on Part VII, but builds on positions he
has taken elsewhere. Professor Coffee acknowledges the limitations of the derivative suit as a
corporate governance device, but argues that it should be redesigned and retained because of the
"common recognition of the need for an effective litigation remedy as part of an overall system of
corporate accountability. The dispute ... is limited to the subsidiary question of what duties
should be so enforced and to what extent." Coffee, supra note 21, at 826. While Professor Coffee
recommends that duty of care liability should be reduced for managerial negligence, he argues
that the duty of care should be retained as a liability standard in one situation: the duty to
monitor corporate law compliance. Id. at 803. The law compliance component of the duty of
care is special, Coffee argues, because fiduciary protest can influence a knowing board decision to
violate the law far more powerfully than ordinary disagreement would affect ordinary business
planning. Id. at 801, 803. Because such dissent is powerful, fiduciaries can act effectively to
reduce corporate deviance. Fiduciaries thus would be appropriate cost-avoiders if the costs of
corporate misconduct are wholly or partially shifted to them by the possibility of litigation over
law compliance. Id. at 803. Greater risk-aversion by fiduciaries, as compared to shareholders, is
a virtue where law compliance is involved. Id. Also, because law violations frequently are "one-
shot" incidents of corporate misconduct, market discounting and penalties are less efficacious as
social controls: the markets can process the information about the violation only after it happens,
and significant discounting would occur only if there was a likelihood of repetition. Id.
However, Professor Coffee does not propose that continuing an ex post liability standard for
corporate deviance should be a "license to litigate." Id. at 815-17. Instead, a crucial aspect of
designing this governance mechanism is articulating standards by which judges can decide when
to let duty of care litigation proceed in corporate deviance situations. Id. Finally, Professor
Coffee clearly envisions both the general duty of care and the law compliance obligation to have
considerable significance as aspirational standards. Id. at 792, 796-99.
24. These events are the recent spate of significant business deviance problems, see supra notes
3-6, and the recurring difficulties in finding an acceptable system of corporate criminal
punishment, see Etzioni, Going Soft on Corporate Crime, Wash. Post, Apr. 1, 1990, at C3, col. I
(discussing recent struggles over federal sentencing guidelines for corporate crime). The relative
currency of the Principles makes timely some inquiry into the extent to which corporate
governance rules can play a part in reducing corporate deviance.
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gal conduct by corporate actors as an identifiable social phenome-
non.2" By describing and analyzing corporate deviance, these studies
25. The most accessible collection of references to this literature may be that provided by
CORPORATIONS AS CRIMINALS 33-37, 66-68, 83-84, 101-02, 128-30, 144-45, 163-65 (E.
Hochstedler ed. 1984). Complementary additional references may be found in D. VAUGHAN,
CONTROLLING UNLAWFUL ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR: SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND
CORPORATE MISCONDUCT 159-68 (1983). A representative sample of the legal academic
literature on the subject includes R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 684-88 (1986); R. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 397-99 (3d ed. 1986); C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS (1975);
Braithwaite, Enforced Self-Regulation: A New Strategy for Corporate Crime Control, 80 MICH. L.
REV. 1466 (1982); Coffee, Gruner & Stone, Standards for Organizational Probation.A Proposal to
the United States Sentencing Commission, 10 WHITTIER L. REV. 77 (1988); Coffee, "No Soul to
Damn. No Body to Kick" An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment,
79 MICH. L. REV. 386 (1981) [hereinafter Coffee, No Soul to Damn]; Coffee, Corporate Crime
and Punishment: A Non-Chicago View of the Economics of Criminal Sanctions, 17 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 419 (1980) [hereinafter Coffee, A Non-Chicago View]; Coffee, Making the Punishment Fit
the Corporation: The Problems of Finding an Optimal Corporation Criminal Sanction, I N. ILL.
L. REV. 3 (1980); Coffee, Rebutta" The Individual or the Firm? Focusing the Threat of Criminal
Liabilit, I N. ILL. L. REV. 48 (1980); Coffee, supra note 2; Crane, Commentary: The Due
Process Considerations in the Imposition of Corporate Liability, I N. ILL. L. REv. 39 (1980);
Emerson, The Director As Corporate Legal Monitor: Environmental Legislation and Pandora's
Boy, 15 SETON HALL L. REV. 593 (1985); Fischel, supra note 21, at 1271-72 (1982); Fisse,
Community Service as a Sanction Against Corporations, 1981 WIs. L. REV. 970; Glasbeek, Why
Corporate Deviance Is Not Treated As A Crime-The Need to Make "Profits" A Dirty Word, 22
OSGOODE HALL L.J 393 (1984); Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal
Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857 (1984); Leigh, The Criminal Liability of Corporations and Other
Groups: A Comparative View, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1508 (1982); Moore, Corporate Officer &
Director Liability: Is Corporate Behavior Beyond the Control of Our Legal System?, 10 CAP. U.L.
REV. 69 (1980); Morris, Commentary: The Interplay Between Corporate Liability and the
Liability of Corporate Officers, I N. ILL. L. REv. 36 (1980); Nagel & Hagan, The Sentencing of
White-Collar Criminals in Federal Courts: A Socio-Legal Exploration of Disparity, 80 MICH. L.
REv. 1427 (1982); Stone, The Place of Enterprise Liability in the Control of Corporate Conduct,
90 YALE L.J. 1 (1980); Vaughan, Toward Understanding Unlawful Organizational Behavior, 80
MICH. L. REv. 1377 (1982); Weiss, Social Regulation of Business Activity: Reforming the
Corporate Governance System to Resolve an Institutional Impasse, 28 UCLA L. REV. 343 (1981);
Wheeler & Rothman, The Organization as Weapon in White-Collar Crime, 80 MICH. L. REV.
1403 (1982).
The problem of appropriate sanctions in particular has been of considerable interest. See
Brickey, Rethinking Corporate Liability Under the Model Penal Code, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 593
(1988); Brickey, Criminal Liability of Corporate Officers for Strict Liability Offenses-Another
View, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1337 (1982); Brickey, Corporate Criminal Accountability: A Brief
History and An Observation, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 393 (1982); Fisse, Reconstructing Corporate
Criminal Law: Deterrence, Retribution, Fault, and Sanctions, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1141 (1983);
Hamilton, Corporate Criminal Liability in Texas, 47 TEx. L. REv. 60 (1968); McAdams, The
Appropriate Sanctions For Corporate Criminal Liability: An Eclectic Alternative, 46 U. CIN. L.
REV. 989 (1978); Mueller, Mens Rea and the Corporation-A Study of the Model Penal Code
Position on Corporate Criminal Liability, 19 U. Prrr. L. REV. 21 (1957); Posner, Optimal
Sentences for White-Collar Criminals, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 409 (1980); Note, Corporate
Criminal Liability for Acts in Violation of Company Policy, 50 GEo. L.J. 547 (1962); Note,
Indemnification of the Corporate Official for Fines and Expenses Resulting from Criminal
Antitrust Litigation, 50 GEo. L.J. 566 (1962); Developments in the Law--Corporate Crime:
Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARv. L. REV. 1227 (1979);
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help to determine whether corporate governance rules can be effective
in regulating deviance, or in ameliorating its effects. "Corporate devi-
ance" thus is worth some exploration, if only to aid in understanding
the Principles' provisions that attempt to address it.
Traditional corporate governance patterns of fiduciary duty and
derivative litigation present other difficulties. In and of itself, the
shareholder derivative suit is one of the most controversial topics in
corporate governance doctrine.2 6 The complications multiply when
derivative litigation is applied to the problem of corporate deviance.
For example, section 2.01(a)'s clear declaration that corporate actors
must obey the law in the conduct of their business, regardless of profit,
raises special problems if the primary method of fiduciary duty
enforcement will be the shareholder derivative suit. If all legal disobe-
dience can be the basis for fiduciary liability, corporate funds would be
expended in derivative litigation even if the violated legal provision
were a relatively minor one, such as a traffic regulation.27
More crucial is that section 2.01(a)'s language raises the possibility
that fiduciaries may be liable to the corporation for illegal corporate
activities even when the corporation has made a profit from the illegal-
ity.2" Recovery for profitable deviance could mean a windfall to the
corporation, which would be able to recover from fiduciaries for profit-
able misconduct while keeping the profits originally obtained from the
illegal activities. Perhaps more accurately, fiduciary liability for prof-
itable illegal acts could be a windfall to the plaintiffs' corporate bar,
which is the engine that drives'shareholder litigation.29 On the other
Comment, Limits on Individual Accountability For Corporate Crimes, 67 MARQ. L. REV. 604
(1984). See generally Professor Coffee's articles, supra; Etzioni, supra note 24.
26. See generally articles cited supra note 23.
27. See Draft No. 2, supra note 17, at 36, illustration 10, which declares that a hypothetical
trucking firm's knowing policy of violating highway speed limits to obtain higher profits violates
the law obedience principle recounted in § 2.01(a).
28. Section 2.01 "serves, indirectly, as a general guide for the conduct of corporate officials,
and as a foundation for provisions in Parts IV (Duty of Care and the Business Judgment Rule)
... that set out specific standards of conduct for such officials and govern liability for conduct
that falls below those standards." Id.
29. The "real party in interest" on the plaintiffs' side in derivative suits is the plaintiffs'
attorney. See W. KLEIN & J. COFFEE, supra note 9, at 179; Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff's
Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class
and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669 (1986); Coffee, The Unfaithful Champion: The
Plaintiff As Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (Summer 1985).
Little would be gained by recapitulating the literature on this question, and the central role of the
plaintiffs' bar simply is assumed in much of the following discussion.
See infra notes 158, 164-76 and accompanying text for a discussion of the windfall problem;
see infra notes 301-03 and accompanying text for a brief discussion of the role of the plaintiffs'
corporate bar in shareholder litigation.
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hand, absolute prohibition of shareholder litigation when corporate
deviance has been profitable might tend to give the impression that
corporate law is willing to tolerate crime, as long as it pays.3 0 Avoid-
ing corporate windfalls without appearing to condone criminal activity
is a central challenge in designing corporate governance rules about
general law compliance. No arrangement of corporate doctrinal rules,
however, is likely to remove all the tension between these two goals.3"
Another unavoidable problem with corporate deviance derivative
suits is that section 2.01(a) enforcement inescapably becomes part of
the recent dispute over managerial power to dismiss derivative litiga-
tion after determining that a particular suit is "not in the corporation's
best interests."32 Whether the deviance was profitable or not, this
managerial power, left unrestrained, could of its own operation com-
pletely eliminate any meaningful derivative enforcement. Conse-
quently, the Principles' formulation of this managerial power would
determine whether section 2.01(a) actually is enforceable. If section
2.01(a) is to have any deterrent or compensatory effect, the Principles
must articulate particular deviance litigation situations in which man-
agerial power to dismiss could be overridden.33
A different issue under section 2.01(a) and related provisions is
whether the fiduciary liability provisions ought to distinguish between
corporate illegal acts in which fiduciaries are personally involved in
the decision to disregard the law, and those situations in which the
illegality takes place partially as a result of the fiduciaries' failure to
adequately supervise corporate employees. A corporate compensation
interest is at least part of the reason for recognizing fiduciary liability
for illegal activities that cause losses. From a compensation perspec-
tive, the fiduciaries' relative moral culpability does not appear to mat-
30. See Cox, supra note 23, at 765.
31. Critics of derivative litigation traditionally have labelled it a "strike suit," a device by
which a nominal shareholder sues to coerce management into a favorable settlement. More
sophisticated modem analysts point to the existence of the plaintiffs' bar and to the possibility of
a "collusive settlement," in which the corporation takes a low recovery, or agrees to procedural
reforms, and pays substantial attorneys' fees to the derivative plaintiffs' representative. See
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Tent. Draft
No. 8 1988) at 5, Introductory Note to Part VII [hereinafter Draft No. 8]. From this modem
perspective, the existence of fiduciary indemnification and insurance, combined with derivative
litigation, makes shareholder enforcement of fiduciary duty a particularly roundabout form of
corporate cost-spreading. See Coffee, supra note 21, at 805-06. Trying to articulate a unified
rationale for derivative litigation also is difficult. Draft No. 8 refuses to elect either a deterrence
or a compensation rationale. See Draft No. 8, supra, at 11-15. Instead, Draft No. 8 treats the
compensation interest as a limitation on the deterrence rationale. See Coffee, supra note 21, at
807-08.
32. See infra notes 180-93 and accompanying text.
33. See Coffee, supra note 21, at 815-17.
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ter. However, corporate compensation is not the only possible
justification for fiduciary law compliance duties: derivative suit
enforcement of law compliance duties also might serve to deter illegal
misconduct. Making it harder to punish fiduciaries who fail to super-
vise thus could impair deterrence by creating perverse incentives for
fiduciaries to "look the other way" instead of attempting to intervene
when other corporate actors first broach the possibility of an illegal
course of conduct. And inadequate supervision may deserve greater
fiduciary liability than direct involvement, if other social controls are
considered. Direct involvement carries the risk of independent crimi-
nal liability for the fiduciary, so the threat of criminal liability might
provide sufficient deterrence in direct involvement situations. In con-
trast, because criminal liability is far less likely when supervisory fail-
ures cause corporate criminal conduct,34 civil liability could provide
an additional deterrent to keep ordinary corporate activity from
breaking the law.
These technical issues introduce much of the problem of corporate
deviance and corporate governance.35 The problem is not merely
technical, however. Fiduciary liability for corporate illegality tests the
limits of corporate governance doctrine. Although from a perspective
external to corporate governance, society as a whole might expect that
corporate governance would include a reliable mechanism to assist in
law enforcement, it is not at all clear that such an arrangement is nec-
essary from an internal, purely corporate governance point of view.36
34. Respondeat superior types of criminal liability are relatively rare. Recent insider trading
legislation creates enhanced civil liability when trading firms fail to supervise and prevent inside
trading by firm employees. This liability runs to civil regulatory penalties as well as private
damages. See Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
704, § 3, 102 Stat. 4677 (adding section 21A, to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1); see also Lavoie,
The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, 22 REV. SEC. &
COMMODITIES REG. 1 (1989). Earlier attempts to use trading firms' supervisory powers as
regulatory surrogates were well established before this. See McLucas & Morse, Liability of a
Branch Office Manager for Failure to Supervise, 23 REv. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 1 (1990).
These are relatively specific regulatory devices, however, and do not have the broad application
of general corporate governance doctrine.
35. This introduction excludes some interesting corporate governance issues that arise from
the general law compliance duty. For example, fiduciary breaches of the law compliance duty
could be used by insurgents as one key issue in proxy fights during annual or special director
elections, even serving to justify removal for cause. Moreover, if governance doctrine makes law
compliance a corporate duty as well as a fiduciary duty-as the Principles do in § 2.01(a)-then
shareholders may be able to sue the corporation, as well as the fiduciaries, for injunctive or other
equitable relief to stop or limit the consequences of the illegal activity. Except for sporadic
references to equitable relief, this Article does not discuss these possibilities. It concentrates
instead on the general law compliance obligation and its relationship to the fiduciary duty of care
and derivative suit procedures.
36. See Phillips, supra note 23, at 687-92. But see Coffee, supra note 21, at 794.
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It is possible to imagine a set of corporate governance rules that are
relatively neutral on the question of corporate deviance. Those rules,
while not encouraging law violations, would provide no special
enforcement mechanism in deviance situations. It is therefore possible
to ask why, ultimately, the Principles' include general law compliance
as part of corporate and fiduciary obligations.
This Article explores the ALI's approach to corporate deviance as a
corporate governance problem. Part II briefly presents corporate devi-
ance as a distinct subject of study, and discusses past judicial interpre-
tations of corporate fiduciary duties in deviance cases. Part III
describes the ALI's provisions designed to address corporate deviance
and attempts to predict their application to and impact on shareholder
litigation over corporate deviance. Part IV evaluates the ALI's deci-
sion to include a general law compliance obligation in its reworking of
corporate governance doctrine.
The ALI's Principles adjust traditional doctrine to permit more
effective use of derivative litigation against corporate fiduciaries after
especially egregious episodes of corporate lawbreaking; otherwise, the
Principles adopt aspirational standards to influence managers tempted
to profit by deviance. This approach combines deterrence and com-
pensation mechanisms with hortatory language and is significantly
more coherent than the scattered case law from which it is derived.
The Principles rely heavily, however, on judicial willingness to censure
corporate actors for extreme violations, and on the less-than-precise
effect of aspirational values in persuading managers to forego corpo-
rate profit from illegal acts. Ultimately, the Principles' approach to
corporate deviance may say as much about the limits of corporate doc-
trine as it does about the substantive problem of corporate law
compliance.
II. CORPORATE DEVIANCE AND FIDUCIARY DUTY
A. A Sketch of Corporate Deviance
For this Article's purposes, "corporate deviance" means behavior
by corporate actors that violates a "general" legal obligation, which is
an obligation other than one arising from specific regulation of the
corporate form. This definition thus excludes failures to comply with
capital surplus rules relating to dividends, for example,37 but includes,
among other things, horizontal price-fixing, bribery, and illicit dump-
37. See, eg., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170 (1989); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 510 (McKinney
1989). For a brief discussion of derivative litigation over violations of corporate regulations, see
Coffee, supra note 21, at 816.
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ing of toxic waste.38 So defined, "corporate deviance" functions as a
convenient label for conduct that would violate the obligation to com-
ply with legal norms of section 2.01(a).
The corporate deviance literature collects many theoretical and
empirical observations about legal noncompliance by corporate
actors, 39 although it is difficult to make generalizations about the raw
"amount" of corporate misconduct for several reasons. By the very
nature of the offense, price-fixing scandals are market specific' and
arguably narrow in relation to the national economy; other patterns of
violations, such as questionable payments, have seemed more wide-
spread.41 Another factor complicating any evaluation of this problem
is that compliance expectations and regulatory obligations have
increased markedly during the post-World War II era. None of the
major scandals has involved trivial numbers, however. In addition to
documenting the corporate deviance phenomenon, positive science has
endeavored to understand its causes. The individual "white collar"
criminal was the earliest object of study.42 These studies continue, but
recent investigations also examine the social and organizational
frameworks in which law violations occur.4 3" What follows are brief
samples of corporate deviance studies.
1. Corporate Deviance as Distinct Behavior
Corporate deviance is not a unitary set of behaviors, indistinguish-
able from other forms of prohibited conduct except for its location in
38. Another key to understanding a general legal obligation is that its prohibitions normally
would apply to actors whether or not their actions involve business activities under the corporate
form.
39. The most accessible introductions to corporate deviance may be found in M. CLINARD,
supra note 7; M. ERMANN & R. LUNDMAN, CORPORATE DEVIANCE (1982) [hereinafter
ERMANN & LUNDMAN 1]; M. ERMANN & R. LUNDMAN, CORPORATE AND GOVERNMENTAL
DEVIANCE: PROBLEMS OF ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2d ed.
1982) [hereinafter ERMANN & LUNDMAN II]; and D. VAUGHAN, CONTROLLING UNLAWFUL
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR: SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND CORPORATE MISCONDUCT (1983); see
also J. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 21; M. CLINARD & P. YEAGER, supra note 1; N. FRANK & M.
LOMBNESS, CONTROLLING CORPORATE ILLEGALITY: THE REGULATORY JUSTICE SYSTEM
(1988); CORPORATIONS AS CRIMINALS (E. Hochstedler ed. 1984); D. SIMON & D. EITZEN,
ELITE DEVIANCE (1982).
40. Price-fixing necessarily implies that one market is involved where competitors agree to set
prices. Perhaps the best known episode was the electrical conspiracy, in which 29 companies,
including General Electric and Westinghouse, and 45 company executives were convicted of
violations in the sale of heavy electrical equipment. See M. CLINARD & P. YEAGER, supra note
1, at 6. Price-fixing in the pharmaceutical industry and in the manufacture of plumbing fixtures
also were "single market" offenses. Id.
41. See Coffee, supra note 2, at 1115-25.
42. See M. CLINARD, supra note 7, at 10-11.
43. Id. at 11-12.
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legitimate businesses. Rather, corporate deviance is special precisely
because of its location. To a considerable extent, corporate deviance is
possible because of corporate complexity itself. The fundamental task
in a large business organization like a corporation' is to coordinate
various individuals and groups into a common endeavor or series of
endeavors so that a net gain results for the organization. Accordingly,
one way to understand corporate deviance is to consider its relation-
ship to the problems of coordinating a complex firm.
If corporate deviance is treated in coordination terms, three funda-
mental types of deviance can be identified.4" One of these is deviance
that is a result of limited information and responsibility.46 Production
can be broken down into discrete tasks, with a substantial increase in
total output and efficiency.47 In a large organization, however, spe-
cialization may reduce individual or small group information to such a
degree that an unlawful act results, or that the risk of such an act
increases significantly. Consider as a hypothetical example the prohib-
ited release of radioactive contaminants from a nuclear power plant
owned and operated by Little Power Co.4" The illicit emission
occurred as plant operators were responding to a crisis situation in the
reactor control room. On later investigation, it turned out that the
emission was avoidable. Plant safety engineers had known about
prior, similar crises at other reactors and had designed operating pro-
cedures to respond to such situations. In these circumstances, the
eventual regulatory sanctions would be attributable to limited infor-
mation resulting from specialization because the operating team did
not know of the safety engineers' solution. The organizational lapse
described in this hypothetical is miscoordination. Although Little
Power Co. obtained efficiencies by fragmenting the tasks of running a
44. Many of the organizational characteristics described in the next several pages could be
present in any large firm, corporate or otherwise. Because so many of the largest firms do
employ the corporate form, corporate status will be assumed in the following discussion unless
otherwise apparent from the context.
45. These three types are those identified by Ermarm and Lundman, although the labels they
use have been modified to emphasize coordination aspects. See ERMANN & LUNDMAN I, supra
note 39, at 9-11.
46. Under Ermann and Lundman's typology, these behaviors are "acts traceable to the
complexity of corporation positions." Id at 9.
47. This is the point of Adam Smith's famous pin factory. See A. SMrrH, THE WEALTH OF
NATiONS (1776).
48. This example is based on ERMANN & LUNDMAN I, supra note 39, at 9-10, which itself
borrows completely from C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS 51-52 (1975). Organizational
theory suggests that "innocent" complexity may not simply unmask the law's preoccupation
with individual acts; this complexity also creates incentives to block information flows, making
discovery and control more difficult. See infra notes 54-68 and accompanying text.
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nuclear power plant, the company failed to establish and maintain
information flows between the operating group and the safety engi-
neering group. These increased information flows would have tended
to offset the informational isolation resulting from specialization.
Another fundamental type of corporate deviance is an unintended
result of attempted coordination.4 9 When corporate senior managers
set performance goals in general terms but, as they must, delegate
implementation of those goals within the organization, there remains a
risk that line employees may violate legal prohibitions in an attempt to
meet those goals. Assume that senior management of Airbreak, Inc.,
an aircraft brake manufacturer, proclaims that one very important
short-term corporate objective is to obtain a particular government
subcontract for the brakes on a new fighter aircraft. Without consult-
ing anyone, a member of the engineering technical support staff
approaches a friend employed by the Defense Department's procure-
ment division and asks that the specifications of Airbreak's standard
light brake assembly be written into the contract specifications. In
exchange, Airbreak's employee offers his friend a lump sum cash pay-
ment and lifetime employment with Airbreak on departure from gov-
ernment service. The procurement employee defers, calls the FBI, and
wears a recording device at a later meeting where the lump sum is paid
and the "deal" concluded. As a consequence of this attempted bribe,
Airbreak is decertified from eligibility for government contracts. This
hypothetical situation represents another coordination failure (not the
least part of which is the obvious accounting control problem
presented by a relatively low-level employee's ability to obtain funds
sufficient to make a credible bribe). Senior managers established a
legitimate organizational objective (the new subcontract), but did so
without effective policies or internal controls against bribery under-
taken in furtherance of the corporate interest.50
Finally, corporate deviance may be a deliberate act by members of
the control group. 1 Senior managers are capable of prohibited con-
duct as they try to cut costs, limit losses, or protect market share, all
of which are legitimate corporate objectives. Imagine that the United
States passenger airline industry is dominated by two large carriers,
49. This behavior is identical to Ermann & Lundman's "deviance indirectly traceable to
organizational elites." See ERMANN & LUNDMAN I, supra note 39, at 10.
50. An effective policy could include the aspirational and educational efforts typical of most
compliance programs, see infra notes 199-200; accounting and negotiation controls also would
be necessary to make it less easy for one corporate actor to use corporate resources to pay bribes.
51. For Ermann and Lundman, these are "acts directly traceable to corporate elites." See
ERMANN & LUNDMAN I, supra note 39, at 10-11.
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Western Flight and Eastern Transport. Both firms have suffered
inroads in their market shares as a result of increased competition
from several strong regional airlines. Western and Eastern are direct
competitors, but their chief executive officers meet secretly at the
Bohemian Club and agree to divide the domestic market into two
exclusive service regions of roughly equal size. 2 Each company will
direct its activities in accordance with this agreement. The arrange-
ment is discovered, and both companies are prosecuted and fined for
antitrust violations. In this last example, the corporate actors respon-
sible for coordination have themselves chosen prohibited conduct (an
agreement not to compete between horizontal competitors) to accom-
plish the legitimate corporate objective of consolidating market share.
These examples show how coordination analysis brings into focus
senior management's role in directing corporate conduct. Managerial
decisions that organize business subunits can contribute to corporate
deviance when informational isolation between subunits is not supple-
mented by supervisory coordination and results in prohibited conduct.
Other managerial decisions that set organizational goals can create
deviance opportunities when goal implementation is delegated but is
undersupervised, and subordinates pursue illicit means to obtain law-
ful corporate ends. Finally, senior managers themselves are able to
commit illegal acts in furtherance of corporate goals. A managerial
focus is helpful in understanding how corporate fiduciary duties might
function as corporate deviance controls because it emphasizes the
organizational role of senior management and, less directly, the board
of directors. These directors and officers are the corporate players
subjected to traditional corporate fiduciary obligations.53 Under coor-
dination analysis, it can be said -that corporate deviance results from
corporate fiduciaries' direct involvement in prohibited conduct, or
from their failures to adequately supervise corporate operations,
whether these failures are caused by over-compartmentalization with-
52. This hypothetical presents horizontal market allocation between direct competitors,
which arguably is a per se antitrust violation. Those who are unconvinced that such conduct
constitutes a per se violation should assume further that no integration benefits can be obtained
from the horizontal market allocation.
53. See infra Part II.B. This traditional fiduciary focus on senior officers and directors,
however, does not necessarily foreclose the possibility that other corporate employees might owe
law compliance obligations to their corporate employers. Traditionally, these obligations would
lie in agency or employment law rather than in corporate governance doctrine. Shareholders
could attempt derivative suit enforcement of claims against corporate actors other than directors
or officers, but would be unable to challenge a decision by the board to forego prosecution of such
claims. See Draft No. 8, supra note 31, at 110, § 7.07(1), comment a ("all other subordinate
corporate personnel" may be subjected to corporate claims, but the board has virtually absolute
business discretion to refuse to prosecute such claims).
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out supplementary information flows, or by insufficient guidance to
subordinates charged with implementing policy. Coordination analy-
sis illuminates the basic corporate deviance patterns; its managerialist
bias suggests why corporate governance is willing to apply fiduciary
doctrine to corporate deviance. It should be kept in mind as subse-
quent sections describe the doctrinal developments at common law
and under the ALI Principles.
2. Structural Factors
Organizational theory fills in the picture provided by coordination
analysis and has supported particularly rich studies of corporate devi-
ance.54 Taking partial inspiration from the Berle and Means" obser-
vation about the separation of ownership and control in the large
public corporation, organizational theorists have identified several
characteristics which can cause or facilitate corporate misconduct in
large firms.
Because of decentralization, corporate managers are subject to
"authority leakage," a progressive loss of control over subordinate
units as the organization expands in size and the distance increases
between those units and top management.56 Moreover, as subordinate
units multiply in number, lower-level managers will compete with one
another in "subgoal pursuit," a rational strategy of subunit self-preser-
vation, even when the subunit's goals are contrary to overall welfare
maximization for the firm." The organization's information flow fur-
ther complicates these control difficulties. This flow is serial in
nature-all employees report to an immediate supervisor, who in turn
reports to an immediate supervisor, and so on. As information flows
upwards to management, the quality of that information deteriorates
because of the (conscious and unconscious) human proclivity to sup-
press negative information. 8 In organizations with many manage-
ment levels, each stage of the informational relay also adds "noise" to
54. Among modern corporate legal scholars, Professor Coffee has made the most extensive
use of organizational theory. For organizational theory applications to corporate deviance
problems, see especially Coffee, supra note 2; A Non-Chicago View, supra note 25; Coffee, No Soul
to Damn, supra note 25. For a summary of the differences among organizational theorists, see
Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1,
25-40 (1986).
55. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
56. Coffee, supra note 2, at 1136-37. For ease of reference, organization theory citations will
be limited to this one source, though Professor Coffee also discusses these problems in No Soul to
Damn, supra note 25, at 393-400. His own citations to other primary organizational theory
sources are quite clear, and little would be gained by duplicating them here.
57. Coffee, supra note 2, at 1135-36.
58. Id. at 1137-38.
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the communication, further diluting its value.59 But trying to reduce
noise by "flattening" the firm's superstructure (eliminating intermedi-
ate management layers) can create informational overload at the top,
which may have even more serious consequences. 60
All these tendencies result in what Professor Coffee characterizes as
"information blockages," damming the information flow to monitor-
ing groups such as senior management and the board of directors.61
Informational blockages worsen when subordinates do not trust their
superiors, because lack of "support" from superiors increases informa-
tion suppression by subordinates.62 Further problems arise from the
organizational tendency to "bury" the difficult decision.63 Despite the
popular notion that organizational higher-ups are the ones who wres-
tle with complicated policy choices, managers and supervisors tend to
delegate the hard choices.' 4 And "persistence behaviors" complicate
the internal correction process in some organizations-subunits some-
times persist in behavioral patterns because of sunk costs, long after
the conduct has become counterproductive to the enterprise as a
whole.6" Finally, there is some evidence that group decisionmaking in
organizations undergoes a "risky shift," in which a group facing alter-
native choices undertakes one bearing a higher degree of risk than
would individual decisionmakers given the same choices. 66
These organizational observations can be seen to flesh out the
notion that, despite the easily-grasped managerial focus provided by
coordination analysis, corporate actors operate in a realm of "bounded
rationality. '67 The attempt to overcome individual or small group
limitations by creating hierarchical economic collectives (such as cor-
porations) cannot escape those human limitations, .which continue to
bedevil the organizational hierarchies these limitations make neces-
sary.68 These observations also describe sobering organizational reali-
59. Id. at 1138.
60. Id. at 1138-39.
61. Id. at 1131.
62. Id. at 1144.
63. Id at 1125.
64. Id. at 1151.
65. Id. at 1125.
66. See Coffee, No Soul to Damn, supra note 25, at 395.
67. "Bounded rationality" means "bounds on the rate at which information can be absorbed
per unit of time, limits to the information storage capacity (in an effective'retrieval sense), and
bounds on the processing ability of the decision-maker." 0. WILLIAMSON, CORPORATE
CONTROL AND BUSINESS BEHAVIOR: AN INQUIRY INTO THE EFFECTS OF ORGANIZATION
FORM ON ENTERPRISE BEHAVIOR 20 (1970). This definition is a clear departure from the
neoclassical economic model of the human actor.
68. Id. at 31.
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ties that must be taken into account in evaluating any remedial or
preventative scheme. When corporate deviance is buried deeply
within an organization, information blockages will impair the ability
of traditional corporate fiduciaries to detect and correct misbehavior.69
Fiduciary liability based on this sort of deviance would be character-
ized as a failure-to-supervise case;7° but the organizational structure
itself would tend to work against any attempts by fiduciaries to
improve their own law compliance supervisory activities. Deviance
supervision is impaired in two distinct ways. First, discovery is diffi-
cult through normal channels because it is reasonable to assume that
lower-level employees would tend to suppress criminal activity more
thoroughly than other sorts of internal "bad news." Second, attempts
to increase fiduciary involvement may result in informational overload
to those fiduciaries. For these reasons, failure-to-supervise liability
seems inextricably linked to compliance programs in large organiza-
tions-it may be unfair to expect fiduciaries to supervise directly, so
some degree of delegation to law compliance specialists may be the
only reasonable response.7' How modern duty of care standards could
stimulate appropriate fiduciary behavior regarding compliance pro-
grams presents problems of a different order, 72 and will be discussed
later in this Article.73
Another salutary effect of organizational theory is its unequivocal
reminder that corporate organizations are not monoliths: corpora-
tions, as human collectives, are made up of groups and subgroups,
whose interests may diverge and whose activities cannot be perfectly
supervised. This fragmentation means that "the corporation's best
interests" cannot always be reduced to unitary measures of net profit.
Nor can its "best interests" always be assured by uncritical, constant,
ex post deferral to the wishes of current senior management or its
supervising board of directors.
69. See Coffee, supra note 2.
70. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
71. This partially explains the ALI's receptivity to compliance programs. See infra notes
199-200, 225-31 and accompanying text.
72. There would eventually be proof problems here as an ex post litigation remedy attempts
to sort backwards through a corporate culture to evaluate whether a particular delegation was a
reasonable discharge of supervisory duties regarding law compliance. This line of inquiry would
be foreclosed if full or partial limits were adopted for all duty of care liability. See DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 102(7) (1989); see also infra notes 210, 281-83 and accompanying text (discussing
the Principles approach to the duty of care "opt-out").
73. See infra notes 199-200, 225-31 and accompanying text.
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3. Sociological Insights
Sociological studies approach corporate deviance from yet another
perspective. Using a framework derived from Robert K. Merton's
studies of organizational deviance,74 Professor Vaughan describes how
corporate deviance is generated from social structures. Briefly stated,
her assumptions are that economic success is a socially-approved
goal" and that competition is a fundamental means for reaching eco-
nomic success. 6 Deviance results from the erosion of the norms that
distinguish legitimate forms of competition from illegitimate ones.77
Several factors contribute to norm erosion, among them overemphasis
on economic success, 78 blocked access to legitimate means for achiev-
ing such success, 79 subgoal variability,80 norm mutability,81 and rapid
organizational turnover that prevents norms from stabilizing.82 These
norm-eroding factors probably are unavoidable: some firms would
experience them at least some of the time as they compete for scarce
resources in a complex modern business environment.
A sociological approach helps in understanding organizational
actors' responses to legal strictures, particularly by making clear that
law compliance is not an organizational goal for business enterprises,
74. See D. VAUGHN, supra note 39, at 55-56 (citing R. MERTON, Social Structure and
Anomie, in SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 131-60 (1968)).
75. Some degree of economic success is necessary for the survival of any economic player.
See D. VAUGHAN, supra note 39, at 56-58. However, this assumption of the legitimate goal of
economic success is not the same as a rule of absolute profit-maximization. Id. at 56-57.
76. Id at 57-59.
77. Id. at 55. As norms lose effectiveness, "innovation" (deviance) becomes a probable
response as actors pursue desired and legitimate goals by expedient but socially illegitimate
means. Id.
78. Id.
79. These blockages can occur either as a complete market exclusion because of scarce
resources, or as lack of success because of scarcity, even after obtaining market access. Id at
58-59. "Scarcity" may be due to actual shortages of inputs to production, or to prohibition by
market controllers. Id
80. This variability can happen in two different ways. One is that definitions of success can
vary at different times for a particular organization depending on its current position in the
competitive hierarchy. Id at 59. The other is that achievement of a particular subgoal is
followed quickly by a new subgoal definition. With each new subgoal declaration possibilities of
blocked access are renewed. Id.
81. To the extent that most legal regulations of organizational behavior do not codify eternal
verities and can be modified, one significant class of norms can be changed in reiponse to
pressure from the social competitors for economic success. Some norm erosion is attributable to
this mutability, and to the realization that many laws benefit some competitors at other
competitors' expense because the former have the clout to get laws drafted in their favor. Id at
61.
82. Id. at 60-61.
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it is "only" a norm.83 Because the law is "just" a norm to non-legal
organizations, groups, or individuals, the law is much less central to
their experiences. Legal rules are one norm among many others, such
as those generated by family, religious community, friends, and
coworkers. Law compliance competes with other norms, such as loy-
alty or status: any normative effect of law can be overborne, intention-
ally or unintentionally, by organizational recruiting, by self-selection,
and by fluidity of members within the organization. In extreme situa-
tions, an express hostility to legal norms can develop.84 For organiza-
tions in which law compliance has ceased to be an effective behavioral
norm, law compliance enhancement will take more than simple adop-
tion of more regulations. Instead, some reinforcement of law as a
meaningful norm must take place.
4. Neoclassical Economics and Corporate Deviance
Law and economics scholars also have shed light on corporate devi-
ance problems in two distinct ways. One line of thought analyzes cor-
porate deviance in agency-cost terms. Another line of inquiry
attempts to discern whether capital market characteristics and strate-
gies are sufficiently effective to remedy corporate deviance problems.
The agency-cost analysis assumes that corporate firms' primary
objective is to maximize profits to the extent possible within the
bounds of the law,"5 and focuses instead on the problem (or non-prob-
lem) of divergence by the manager-agent from the profit-maximizing
goals of the shareholder-principal.8 6 For these scholars, excessive
legal non-compliance by corporate actors results from non-optimal
settings of legal sanctions.8 7
83. On the other hand, lawyers (or the group that includes members of the bar, legal
academics, and judicial, legislative, and administrative regulators) are concerned about law
compliance not as a means but as an end. For lawyers, law compliance is a collective goal, not
merely a norm. A somewhat different observation about this distinction is made in Greenawalt,
A Contextual Approach to Disobedience, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 48, 49 (1970).
Section 2.01(a) of the ALI Principles was drafted, intentionally or otherwise, in a way that
reflects this distinction between norms and goals. Section 2.01 makes it clear that the corporate
objective is one of economic success, constrained by compliance with legal norms. See supra note
17 and accompanying text.
84. Most business lawyers have witnessed (or endured) expressions of business community
dislike of the regulatory state in general and lawyers in particular. See M. CLiNARD, supra note
7, at 105-07; see also E. BARDACH & R. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF
REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS (1982).
85. Even Professor Fischel restates the broad law compliance assumption before hinting at its
possible superfluity. See supra note 21.
86. See generally R. POSNER, supra note 25, at 368.
87. See generally A. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMIcS 75-86 (2d ed.
1989); R. POSNER, supra note 25, at 205-12; Fischel, supra note 21, at 1271. The neoclassical
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Judge Posner, the leading law and economics scholar, does
acknowledge a beneficial role for criminal pecuniary sanctions against
the corporation. For Posner, these criminal sanctions remedy a defect
in the ex ante contracting between shareholder-principal and manager-
agent. He assumes first that the manager is a perfect agent so that any
revenue obtained from criminal activity inures to the shareholders.
Judge Posner then suggests that failure to impose a fine on the corpo-
ration would create incentives for shareholders to hire managers will-
ing to commit crimes on the corporation's behalf."8 Even if corporate
criminal activity does not benefit the shareholders because the man-
ager diverts the ill-gotten gains, the corporation provides the means to
commit criminal acts, and shareholders must be given some incentives
to be careful in selecting managers.8 9 In this view, sanctioning the
corporation for illegal acts puts an appropriate financial burden on the
shareholders, and improves the necessary incentives to select and
supervise managers for law compliance. Judge Posner's theories of
corporate criminal liability are controversial,90 and his preference for
criminal fines against the corporation suggests a low opinion of deriva-
tive litigation as a deviance control mechanism. But his observations
approach has been criticized for ignoring the organizational dynamics within the firm and
treating the corporation as a "black box." See Coffee, No Soul to Damn, supra note 25, at 395;
see also Stone, supra note 25, at 7-10. Although neoclassicism's typically lucid reasoning is
seductively straightforward, its most prominent economically-minded critics regard the approach
as too "lean," rendering only an incomplete description of corporate deviance. See Coffee, No
Soul to Damn, supra note 25, at 395.
88. See Posner, supra note 25, at 398.
89. Id. Alternatively stated, absent some sanction against the corporation itself, shareholder
limited liability creates at least a moral hazard of corporate deviance, since shareholders are
given no incentive to be careful about whom they hire as managers.
90. Compare Coffee, A Non-Chicago View, supra note 25, at 419 with Posner, supra note 25, at
409. Crucial to this dispute are varying assumptions about the effectiveness of enterprise
sanctions in the form of corporate criminal fines, compared with individual criminal liability for
corporate actors.
If removed from the question about appropriate criminal law sanctions for corporate
misconduct, Judge Posner's analysis loses some of its force because of its initial assumption of
"perfect agency" by corporate actors. By assuming that deviant managers are perfect agents,
Judge Posner brushes aside any governance problems. Posner says, in effect, that criminal law
sanctions can cope with profitable deviance, and that unprofitable deviance will be'regulated by
other devices, most important among them the market for corporate control. What he does not
address is the possibility that shareholders willing to tolerate illegally-obtained gains might be
less forgiving of illegally-obtained losses, and whether the legal structure should include a short-
cut mechanism for removing fiduciaries or obtaining corporate compensation when deviance
results from acts by "imperfect" agents.
Judge Posner's message is best received by recognizing both the power and limitations of his
assumption about "perfect agency," and seeing that some aspects of agency-cost analysis may not
be particularly helpful in studying the governance aspects of deviance undertaken in furtherance
of the corporate interest. His analysis does suggest that, at best, shareholders would be
intermittently concerned about corporate deviance.
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about shareholder incentives to supervise criminal behavior raise an
important issue about the shareholders' role in enforcing law compli-
ance by corporate actors. If shareholders are without meaningful
incentives to supervise corporate misconduct, whether ex ante or ex
post, any corporate deviance remedy that relies too heavily upon
shareholder bargaining or enforcement will be relatively ineffective.
Judge Posner's thesis, reduced to its essence, is that corporate fines
are the most appropriate criminal sanction for corporate deviance.
Professor Coffee reaches a different conclusion about the appropriate
criminal sanction by applying a different aspect of cost analysis. Pro-
fessor Coffee suggests that corporate fiduciaries are in a far better
structural position than shareholders to reduce the risk of criminal
misconduct because they can participate in, or review, corporate deci-
sions. A fiduciary protest against illegal activity before it gets out of
hand would tend to prevent such misconduct because the protesting
director would have to dissent publicly to avoid personal liability for
the illegal activity. Particularly when assisted by a compliance pro-
gram, directors and officers are relatively more effective cost bearers if
the risk of deviance-related losses could somehow be shifted to them.9
Professor Coffee urges this observation, and others, in support of indi-
vidual criminal liability for corporate actors rather than complete reli-
ance on corporate fines.9 2 He also offers it as justification for retaining
some degree of fiduciary liability for breach of due care when corpo-
rate illegality causes corporate losses.93
Economic analysis of possible market remedies for loss-causing
deviance also suggests that shareholders will be less-than-perfect
monitors of corporate deviance.94 The modem rational shareholder,
particularly one employing a buy-and-hold strategy, maintains a diver-
sified portfolio to reduce firm-specific risk. However, since corporate
deviance episodes tend to be irregular, and prosecution of such epi-
sodes incomplete, it would be difficult to identify ex ante what sort of
firms should be included in a balanced, deviance-risk-reduced portfo-
lio. Moreover, because any criminal prosecutions that do occur typi-
cally are one-shot affairs, the market will be less able to discount based
on the likelihood of future prosecutions; consequently, shareholders
will be unable to use the price function to buy greater or lesser levels of
deviance risk (if the ability to make such purchases would be toler-
91. See Coffee, supra note 21, at 803.
92. See Coffee, A Non-Chicago View, supra note 25.
93. See Coffee, supra note 21, at 803.
94. This of course completely excludes the problem of profitable deviance: the markets will
have nothing to "remedy" if the corporation has made a profit from illegal activity.
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ated).95 These modem investment strategies remove most shareholder
incentives to pay regular attention to corporate specifics. 96 Diversifi-
cation itself thus would tend to limit shareholder monitoring of devi-
ance-related losses; in other words, if shareholders usually are not
paying attention because they are diversified, there is little chance that
they will be effective early monitors of deviance problems as deviance
problems.97 As already noted, profitable deviance might not disturb
most shareholders. Loss-causing deviance, however, would draw
shareholder attention; these losses increase the likelihood of share-
holder litigation because ex ante loss-avoidance strategies, such as
diversifying a portfolio or the price function discount, are not as effec-
tive against deviance-related losses as they might generally be against
other forms of loss.
These various economic insights do not encourage wildly optimistic
expectations about corporate governance as a general law compliance
tool, 98 especially if "corporate governance" is casually identified with
authentic shareholder activism of one sort or another. Economic
insights do suggest, however, that corporate governance and law com-
pliance could forge at least a limited alliance when deviance causes
corporate losses. Moreover, because of the corporate plaintiff's bar,
derivative enforcement of fiduciary obligation does not depend on
rational (institutional) investors. If governance rules are drafted to
exploit the plaintiff's bar as part of the governance mechanisms, a
stronger case emerges for derivative enforcement of fiduciary law com-
pliance duties.
95. See Coffee, supra note 21, at 803.
96. See generally Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288,
290-92 (1980).
97. This is different from the observation that derivative litigation should be retained in
corporate deviance situations because market remedies do not respond adequately to deviance
episodes. See Coffee, supra note 21, at 803. The effect of a diversified portfolio would tend to
diminish a general monitoring capacity in shareholders. The largest modem shareholders are
institutional and hold diversified portfolios almost without exception.
The modem institutional shareholders' investment diversification can be misleading if
extended to an assumption that all institutions are careless about profitable corporate deviance.
This assumption also excludes any additional deterrent effect that might be obtained from the
possibility that the professional plaintiffs' corporate attorney will use derivative litigation when
profitable deviance has occurred.
98. These limited expectations are shared, from a different point of view, by both Professors
Cox and Coffee. See supra note 23. Their disagreement turns on the propriety of tolerating (or
encouraging) professional plaintiffs' attorneys that pursue ex post remedies for general law
violations.
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5. Hidden Causes and Consequences
In addition to specific structural or sociological impediments to
coordinating a complex firm, corporate deviance reduction is difficult
because its effects often are hard to discover, particularly for those not
involved in the organization's day-to-day activities. Shareholders are
at considerable perceptual "distance" from internal corporate work-
ings; this is matched by legal "distance" from those workings as well,
because fiduciary liability to shareholders stops with senior manage-
ment. If this distance is an impediment to shareholder supervision,
shareholder enforcement also would be diluted because many of the
harms caused by corporate conduct may have long latency periods.9 9
Environmental and products liability problems are the most easily
identifiable examples of long-latency harms. Other behaviors, such as
price-fixing, have real but diffused effects; some effects may be so dif-
fuse as to appear to some as "victimless" wrongs.'00
A somewhat related observation is that the victims of corporate
deviance fall into distinct groups whose interests may not always coin-
cide. Shareholders, employees, suppliers, customers, competitors,
neighbors, the local community, and the public at large frequently will
have different perspectives on corporate behavior because not all suffer
identical harm from particular corporate acts.101 In other words, the
wrongdoing's "visibility" may vary, which makes the efficacy of a par-
ticular deviance preventative or remedy depend greatly on which
group is most affected by the harm in question. Finally, organiza-
tional theory and common sense both would predict that discovery
often is hindered further by cover-up behaviors, whether undertaken
for good or bad motives. 102 Altogether, these discovery problems fur-
ther complicate any attempt to rely on shareholder enforcement by
actions against corporate fiduciaries.
99. This would be especially true for environmental and product liability problems. See
ERMANN & LUNDMAN I, supra note 39, at 20-21.
100. See Kramer, Corporate Criminality: The Development of an Idea, in CORPORATIONS AS
CRIMINALS 13-37 (E. Hochstedler ed. 1984).
101. See generally ERMANN & LUNDMAN I, supra note 39, at 24-126.
102. See M. CLINARD, supra note 7, at 114-29, 153-63. Clinard's survey reveals one "good
faith" behavior with a coverup effect. Middle managers prefer to handle deviance episodes
internally, on the theory that the organization is better equipped to deal with the problem than
outsiders would be. Recognizing this managerial attitude aids in understanding coverup
behaviors; it does not determine, however, whether all those affected by corporate deviance
should be bound absolutely by managers' rosy self-assessment of their institutions as compliance
mechanisms.
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6. Summary
Corporate deviance is not a unitary phenomenon, and is shaped by
many structural and informational characteristics of the corporate
form of business organization. Legal noncompliance is not confined to
the boardroom, the shop floor, or anywhere in between. "Opportuni-
ties" for deviance are created in part by the decentralized nature of a
complex firm, and are exacerbated by information blockages and
authority leakage within the firm. Blockages and leakage may increase
with the size of the firm. Even when internal evidence of noncompli-
ance comes to light, correction can be obstructed by responsibility-
shirking conduct (such as information suppression, decision-burying,
and persistence behaviors) and by norm erosion. Shareholders may be
imperfect monitors of corporate deviance because their limited liabil-
ity and diversification reduce (but do not completely eliminate) incen-
tives to police deviance.
Organizational realities also complicate efforts to control or reduce
corporate deviance. Information blockages and authority leakage
work against supervision by higher managers and invite coordination
failures. Shareholders are in a relatively poor position to monitor
compliance if their corporate interests are unharmed by the miscon-
duct, although the stock price function would trigger some monitor-
ing, by exit through stock sale or otherwise, if the deviance is costly to
the firm. If given appropriate incentives, the plaintiff's corporate bar
might provide more predictable deviance enforcement. Appreciation
for these social functionaries is an acquired taste,10 3 however, and, at
the very least, requires abandoning naive models of shareholder
"democracy" or "ownership."
On the whole, then, the law compliance obligation enforced by
derivative litigation is a problematic corporate governance mecha-
nism. It is unexceptionable that corporate governance rules should do
nothing to encourage corporate deviance; whether corporate govern-
ance doctrine can do much more than that is harder to ascertain. It is
possible to expect too much of corporate structures. For example, if
the corporate deviance occurs deep within the organization, corporate
fiduciaries will have a difficult time in supervising corporate conduct
to prevent deviance, mostly because baseline levels of information
blockage would tend to increase as subgroups suppressed evidence of
their misconduct. Organizational and economic theory thus would
counsel relatively modest expectations of shareholder policing of cor-
103. See supra note 29.
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porate misconduct."° Nevertheless, because these theories also show
how corporate structures themselves create deviance opportunities,
they do not reject out of hand a corporate interest in reducing
deviance. '0 5
The theoretical prediction of barriers to fiduciary supervision efforts
and of weak shareholder response to general corporate deviance also
makes it likely that fiduciary law would be relatively undeveloped in
dealing with deviance problems. Because fiduciary supervision is diffi-
cult and shareholders are sporadic monitors, derivative enforcement of
general law compliance duties will be a rare phenomenon. And if
basic enforcement is infrequent, few cases would be reported on share-
holder litigation about corporate deviance. This would prevent much
doctrinal refinement at least when compared to more frequently liti-
gated questions in contract or tort. These expectations about doctrinal
scarcity are borne out in the caselaw of fiduciary obligation and corpo-
rate deviance.
B. Corporate Fiduciary Doctrine
Traditional corporate legal doctrine took its basic forms well before
the Principles were drafted, and the discussion that follows will
describe corporate governance rules more or less as they existed when
the reporters began working on the Corporate Governance Project. In
both caselaw and statutes, corporate governance rules reflect the cen-
tral role played by corporate fiduciaries in corporate affairs. These
rules also reveal the tension between managerial autonomy and
accountability because they acknowledge managerial hegemony while
subjecting it to fiduciary duties of care and loyalty. Delaware law pro-
vides a convenient example of the basic pattern:
A cardinal precept of [Delaware's] General Corporation Law ... is
that directors, rather than shareholders, manage the business and affairs
of the corporation .... Section 141(a) states in pertinent part:
104. Relatively higher levels of shareholder monitoring might occur when shareholder
interests are harmed by a general law violation, or when the corporate misconduct is so
stupendously egregious that some members of a widely-held company's shareholder class become
concerned about it. But this would leave many general law violations unsupervised by
shareholder response, a state of affairs fully intended under the Principles. See Coffee, supra note
21, at 817; see also infra notes 265-84 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 54-68 and accompanying text. Especially for this inquiry about the
ALI's Principles, it remains to be seen whether corporate governance doctrine should attempt to
create additional deterrence of profitable deviance by permitting derivative litigation about these
episodes. This litigation threat arguably would create additional ex ante incentives for fiduciaries
to avoid knowing misconduct and to supervise law compliance more carefully.
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"The business and affairs of a corporation organized under this
chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of
directors except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in
its certificate of incorporation." ... The existence and exercise of
this power carries with it certain fundamental fiduciary obligations
to the corporation and its shareholders.
106
Even this overly simplified summary shows that corporate manage-
rial power lies with the board of directors, and with the officers the
board appoints to perform actual day-to-day supervision of corporate
affairs. Shareholders exercise formal corporate decision-making
power in relatively few situations, I0 7 although shareholders as a group
are far from powerless in the corporate order.10 8 One constraint on
managerial power, among many others,"( is fiduciary duty to the cor-
poration as a whole; this binds the directors as well as the officers
appointed by the board to supervise corporate affairs on a full-time
basis.110 Corporate fiduciary duties traditionally have been enforced
by the shareholder derivative suit, in which a representative share-
holder sues on the corporation's behalf to recover for harm done to the
corporation by the director or officer who has breached a fiduciary
duty. 111
106. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811-12 (Del. 1984) (citations omitted). Aronson is not
an ordinary business judgment rule case that applies the standard to an underlying business
decision. Instead, the Aronson court was struggling to determine when demand should be
excused; but its textual description of the business judgment standards are conveniently complete
for this Article's purposes.
The Delaware Supreme Court recently reiterated this view of managerial/shareholder
relations in Paramount Communications v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150, 1154 (Del. 1990).
107. These situations include shareholder voting during directors' elections, mergers,
exceptional reorganizations, charter amendments, and voting on shareholder proposals. See
generally Ryan, Rule 14a-8, Institutional Shareholder Proposals, and Corporate Democracy, 23
GA. L. REv. 97, 104-05 (1988).
108. In addition to director election and proxy voting campaigns, shareholder responses
include institutional shareholder lobbying, institutional participation in the market for corporate
control, and the ordinary buying and selling of shares. See id. at 147-51, 155-63.
109. The Principles recognize that corporate governance is not dependent solely on legal
rules:
A variety of social and market forces... operate to hold corporate officials accountable: the
professional standards of managers, oversight by outside directors, the disciplinary power of
the market, and shareholder voting-all these mechanisms plus the regulatory authority of
governmental agencies.., constitute significant protections ....
Draft No. 8, supra note 31, at 3.
110. Id. at 3-7.
111. Id.
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1. The Business Judgment Rule
The derivative suit is hedged about by several obstacles.' 12 The
most fundamental obstacle is the business judgment rule. Returning
again to Delaware's formulation:
The business judgment rule is an acknowledgment of the managerial
prerogatives of Delaware directors [and officers] under Section
141(a).... It is a presumption that in making a business decision the
directors [and officers] of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in
good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best
112. These include the demand rule, see, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1; the contemporaneous
shareholder rule, see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 327 (1989); bond requirements in certain
states, see, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 627 (McKinney 1989); and the corporate power to
dismiss derivative litigation, see infra notes 180-93 and accompanying text.
These procedural hurdles are imposed because derivative litigation over managerial conduct
could, if encouraged, undermine managerial autonomy. The derivative suit, and recent judicial
revisions of its procedures, have generated a great deal of commentary. A representative sample
includes: Batista, Counsel Fees in Derivative Litigation: End of the Golden Harvest?, I 1 SEC. REG.
L.J. 153 (1983); Block & Prussin, The Business Judgment Rule and Shareholder Derivative
Actions: Viva Zapata?, 37 Bus. LAW. 27 (1981); Buxbaum, Conflict-of-Interest Statutes and the
Need For a Demand On Directors in Derivative Actions, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 1122 (1980); Coffee,
The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, 48 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (Summer 1985); Coffee & Schwartz, Survival of the Derivative Suit: An
Evaluation and a Proposal for Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 261 (1981); Cox, Heroes
In the Law: Alford v. Shaw, 66 N.C.L. REv. 565 (1988); Cox, Searching for the Corporation's
Voice in Derivative Suit Litigation: A Critique of Zapata and the ALI Project, 1982 DUKE L.J.
959; Dent, The Power of Directors To Terminate Shareholder Litigation: The Death of the
Derivative Suit?, 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 96 (1980); Emerson, Aronson and Its Progeny: Limiting
Derivative Actions Through Demand Requirements, 19 MARQ. L. REV. 571 (1986); Fischel &
Bradley, Symposium: The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law, 71
CORNELL L. REV. 261 (1986); Gabaldon, Free Riders and the Greedy Gadfly: Examining Aspects
of Shareholder Litigation As an Exercise in Integrating Ethical Regulation and Laws of General
Applicability, 73 MINN. L. REV. 425 (1988); Harris, Derivative Actions Based Upon Alleged
Antitrust Violations: A Trap For the Unwary, 37 BROOKLYN L. REV. 337 (1971); Jones, Empirical
Examination of the Resolution of Shareholder Derivative and Class Action Lawsuits, 60 B.U.L.
REV. 542 (1980); Kaplan, The Business Judgment Rule: Generally and As It Affects Derivative
Actions, 12 INST. ON SEC. REG. 3 (1981); Kessler, Shareholder Derivative Actions: A Modest
Proposal to Revise Federal Rule 23.1, 7 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 90 (1973); Payson, Goldman &
Inskip, After Maldonado-The Role of the Special Litigation Committee and Dismissal of
Derivative Suits, 37 Bus. LAW. 1199 (1982); Soderquist, Reconciling Shareholders' Rights and
Corporate Responsibility: Close and Small Public Corporations, 33 VAND. L. REV. 1387 (1980);
Steinberg, The Use of Special Litigation Committees to Terminate Share-holder Derivative Suits,
35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (1980); Symposium: Shareholder Litigation, 48 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. I (Summer 1985); Note, Effect of Res Judicata on Shareholder Derivative Actions in New
York: Parkoffv. General Telephone & Electronics Corp., 47 ALB. L. REV. 145 (1982); Comment,
Attorney As Plaintiff and Quasi-Plaintiff in Class and Derivative Actions: Ethical and Procedural
Considerations, 18 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 467 (1977); Note, Demand On Directors in a
Shareholder Derivative Suit When the Board Has Approved the Wrong, 26 B.C.L. REV. 441
(1985); Comment, Shareholder's Derivative Suits and Shareholders' Welfare: An Evaluation and
A Proposal, 77 Nw. U. L. REV. 856 (1983); Comment, Appealability of District Court Orders
Disapproving Proposed Settlement in Shareholder Derivative Suits, 32 VAND. L. REV. 981 (1981).
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interests of the company.... Absent an abuse of discretion, that judg-
ment will be respected by the courts. The burden is on the party chal-
lenging the decision to establish facts rebutting the presumption.
113
The business judgment rule articulates a judicial policy of extreme
deference to corporate managers; courts constantly reiterate their
unwillingness to second-guess business decisions.
114  Consequently, 115
a representative plaintiff's success on the merits in derivative litigation
against corporate fiduciaries depends almost entirely on avoiding
application of the business judgment rule to the managerial conduct at
the root of the lawsuit.1 6 The relationship between the fiduciary
duties and the business judgment rule can be articulated as claims and
defense, or as two sides of the same coin. In either expression, the
duties and the rule are inextricably bound together as the legal doc-
trine that governs the powers and responsibilities of corporate
managers.
2. Fiduciary Duties
If judicial deference and business judgment rule protection are the
normal case,1 17 actionable fiduciary breaches would be the exceptions.
Fiduciary duty in corporate law usually is broken down into two dis-
tinct duties, the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. Of the two, the
duty of loyalty's relationship to business judgment rule protection is
easier to grasp. Directors and officers breach their duty of loyalty by
failing to act disinterestedly in their corporate dealings. Under tradi-
tional reasoning, only disinterested fiduciaries may claim business
113. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
114. Judges often confess a general unwillingness to interfere with business operations as they
analyze cases under the business judgment rule:
[I]t is not [the courts'] function to resolve for corporations questions of policy and business
management. The directors are chosen to pass upon such questions and their judgment
unless shown to be tainted with fraud is accepted as final. The judgment of the directors of
corporations enjoys the benefit of a presumption that it was formed in good faith and was
designed to promote the best interests of the corporation they serve.
Davis v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 16 Del. Ch. 157, 169, 142 A. 654, 659 (1928); see also
Wheeler v. Pullman Iron & Steel Co., 143 Ill. 197, 207, 32 N.E. 420, 423 (1892) (courts of equity
will not undertake to control the policy or business methods of a corporation, although it may be
seen that a wiser policy might be adopted and the business be more successful if other methods
were pursued); Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 lMich. 459, 508, 170 N.W. 668, 684 (1919) ("The
judges are not business experts.")
115. This assumes that the plaintiff overcomes the other significant but nominally procedural
obstacles to derivative litigation. See supra note 112.
116. In modem cases, this avoidance is brought into high relief by judicial recognition of
special litigation committees used to dismiss derivative suits.
117. This certainly is the case in gross statistical terms, given the millions of corporate
managerial decisions that never provoke demand or litigation.
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judgment protection, because corporate directors and officers may not
exploit their corporate positions for personal benefit at the corpora-
tion's expense. "From the standpoint of interest, this means that [cor-
porate fiduciaries] can neither appear on both sides of a transaction
nor expect to derive any personal financial benefit from it in the sense
of self-dealing, as opposed to a benefit which devolves upon the corpo-
ration or all stockholders generally." ' 8 Although interested transac-
tions are no longer generally prohibited or void, a corporate fiduciary
may not obtain business judgment rule protection where a conflict of
interest is present, unless the transaction is approved by a majority of
disinterested directors, 119 or stockholders, 2 ' after the conflict is
disclosed.
On the other hand, the duty of care's interaction with the business
judgment rule is most easily understood by treating the duty of care
merely as an alternative expression of the business judgment rule.
Courts. frequently recite that corporate directors and officers must act
with that degree of care and skill that would be exercised by an ordina-
rily prudent person in similar circumstances.12 ' The courts have not
agreed, however, on the standard of care's precise wording. The rule
in Delaware now is that a disinterested director or officer would
breach the duty of care only by conduct equivalent to gross negli-
gence,122 although most states still impose an ordinary care stan-
dard. 1 23 The modern version of the business judgment rule avoids
linguistically confusing negligence terminology: a fiduciary who acts
on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that the
action taken is in the best interests of the company discharges the duty
of care and is entitled to business judgment protection.' 24
118. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
119. Id. (citations omitted).
120. Shareholder ratification to purge any taint of interest is authorized by the Revised Model
Business Corporations Act § 8.3 1(a)(2) (1984) ("A conflict of interest transaction is not voidable
by the corporation solely because of the director's interest in the transaction if ... the material
facts of the transaction and the director's interest were disclosed or known to the shareholders
entitled to vote and they authorized, approved, or ratified the transaction ....").
121. This form of expression can be traced even to Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 147
(1891) ("The degree of care required depends upon the subject to which it is to be applied, and
each case has to be determined in view of all the circumstances.").
122. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 (citations omitted).
123. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(Tent. Draft No. 4, 1985) 39-41 [hereinafter Draft No. 4].
124. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812; see also infra note 221. Slightly more functionalist
language permits an alternative formulation, that directors must be disinterested, independent,
and informed to obtain the protection of the business judgment rule. See Gries Sports Enters. v.
Cleveland Browns Football Co., 26 Ohio St. 3d 15, 496 N.E.2d 959 (1986).
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This summary does not begin to describe the dificulties inherent in
judicial review of corporate decision-making,125 or to recount the
recent controversies over the business judgment rule and the duties of
care and loyalty. But it does facilitate discussion of those relatively
rare cases in which courts have reviewed corporate decisions impli-
cated in acts of corporate deviance.
C. The Caselaw of Corporate Deviance as Fiduciary Breach
The cases that discuss corporate deviance in fiduciary breach termi-
nology are not confined to any one era. Instead, they have occurred at
relatively long intervals. And though deviance cases are exceedingly
rare in the law reports, those that exist do apply familiar corporate
fiduciary obligation and litigation doctrines to an easily identifiable
subclass of cases. Three distinct questions about corporate deviance
fiduciary cases will serve to introduce the practical relationship
between traditional corporate doctrines and corporate deviance. First,
because the business judgment rule is crucial in deciding state-law
claims against corporate fiduciaries, it is important to know whether
the courts have broadly invoked the business judgment rule to protect
those fiduciaries from liability when the disputed conduct involves
general law violations by corporate actors. Second, if general judicial
deference to business judgment does not immunize the underlying
conduct, the development of alternative devices for controlling deriva-
tive suits and reducing fiduciary liability is predictable and significant.
Finally, although fiduciary doctrine aims at a limited class of defend-
ants (the directors and officers), corporate deviance can manifest itself
not only in the boardroom but also in other corporate locations;
126
therefore, it is important to know whether the fiduciary caselaw distin-
guishes between direct fiduciary involvement cases and failure to
supervise cases. 127
125. Despite the problems in articulating the standards, judicial scrutiny of managerial
conduct more or less amounts to identification of those factual patterns in which a conflict of
interest situation has not been adequately purged by disclosure, recusal and disinterested
approval, or in which managers have acted without sufficient information, or in bad faith, or
without an honest belief that the actions taken are in the corporation's best interest. The disputes
arise in applying these standards to the highly complex factual situations represented by
corporate decision-making. Behind this reconstruction of judicial scrutiny in corporate cases, the
rarity of judicial departures from extreme deference helps to deter casual or half-hearted
litigation about managerial conduct.
126. See supra notes 37-53 and accompanying text.
127. See supra text following note 33.
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1. The Business Judgment Rule in Corporate Deviance Cases
Scarce as it is, fiduciary doctrine in corporate deviance cases is spe-
cial because it does not automatically apply the business judgment rule
to managerial acts in violation of law. This refusal is most clearly
articulated in Miller v. AT & T 128 In Miller, AT & T shareholders
sued derivatively and alleged that, by failing to take any action to col-
lect a $1.5 million debt for communications services provided by AT
& T to the Democratic National Committee during the 1968 Demo-
cratic national convention, AT & T's directors and officers had vio-
lated the campaign spending laws by making an illegal contribution to
the committee. 129 The trial judge invoked the business judgment rule
and dismissed the complaint. 30 The Third Circuit reversed, holding
that business judgment rule protection was inappropriate under the
circumstances:
Had plaintiffs' complaint alleged only failure to pursue a corporate
claim, application of the sound business judgment rule would support
the district court's ruling that a shareholder could not attack the direc-
tors' decision .... Where, however, the decision not to collect a debt
owed the corporation is itself alleged to have been an illegal act, different
rules apply. When New York law regarding such acts by directors is
considered in conjunction with the underlying purposes of the particular
statute involved here, we are convinced that the business judgment rule
cannot insulate the defendant directors from liability if they did in fact
breach 18 U.S.C. § 610, as plaintiffs have charged.13'
Miller's restatement of New York fiduciary doctrine accurately
reflects early articulations of the business judgment rule,132 as well as
128. 507 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1974).
129. Id. at 761. The illegal contribution was an amount equal to the "forgiven" debt.
130. The Third Circuit reversed the district court, but not because the trial judge had applied
the wrong legal standard. Although the trial judge invoked the business judgment rule and
dismissed the claims, he stated that such dismissal was proper in the absence of an allegation that
the directors' conduct was "plainly illegal, unreasonable, or in breach of a fiduciary duty."
Miller v. AT & T, 364 F. Supp. 648, 651 (E.D. Pa. 1973), rev'd, 507 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1974). The
Third Circuit reversed because the trial court had failed to give the derivative plaintiffs the
opportunity to allege and prove that the uncollected debt was in fact a violation of federal
campaign spending laws. Miller, 507 F.2d at 763-65.
131. Miller, 507 F.2d at 762. The Third Circuit identified shareholders as "within the class
for whose protection the statute was enacted," and used this observation to bolster its reasoning.
Id. at 763. However, the court did not appear to make its decision turn on this observation; and
its analysis of Roth and Abrams would not have supported this requirement because neither
Sunday closing nor "runaway shop" laws are enacted to protect shareholders.
132. In what may be the earliest business judgment case, Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132
(1891), the Supreme Court did not attempt to enunciate its corporate fiduciary standards so
broadly as to encompass corporate losses caused by illegal acts committed by corporate
fiduciaries, or condoned by them. "It is not contended that the defendants knowingly violated,
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holdings in actual fiduciary breach cases arising from corporate devi-
ance. The earliest case appears to be Roth v. Robertson. 133 In Roth, a
close corporation shareholder sued the corporation's managing direc-
tor. The director admittedly had used corporate funds to pay $800 in
"hush money" to extortionists, who had threatened to complain to
local authorities about unlawful Sunday operation of the corporation's
amusement park.134 The plaintiff argued that the defendant should
reimburse the corporation for funds expended in an illegal manner,
even if paid in furtherance of a corporate interest. 135  The court
allowed corporate recovery against the defendant director on the the-
ory that corporate fiduciaries should be held strictly accountable for
illegal payments. 136 Because the illegal transaction was "one bad in
morals," 137 the court refused to accept as an excuse the defendant's
uncontroverted assertion of his subjective belief that the payments
were in the corporation's best interests. 138
The business judgment rule is not mentioned in the Roth opinion,
even to distinguish its application. It is not likely, however, that the
rule would have shielded Robertson even if it had been cited. Most
telling is the fact that Roth imposes liability on a director with no
allegation or proof of personal profit by the director from the illegal
act. 139 Clearly, the Roth court does not analyze fiduciary liability for
illegal corporate acts in breach of loyalty terms, choosing instead to
compare the case to fiduciary liability for losses caused by ultra vires
or permitted the violation of, any of the provisions of the banking act, or that they were guilty of
any dishonesty in administering the affairs of the bank ... Id. at 145.
133. 64 Misc. 343, 118 N.Y.S. 351 (Sup. Ct. 1909).
134. Roth, 118 N.Y.S. at 352. The legal prohibition involved in Roth has a turn-of-the-
century quaintness about it. Roth was decided well before the constitutional controversy about
Sunday closing laws. Many such laws have been repealed, or have fallen into desuetude,
although certain regions of the country maintain de jure or de facto Sunday closing practices. It
appears that Roth's factual pattern furnishes part of the model for illustration 9 to § 2.01(a),
which confirms the corporate power to disregard unenforced and decaying laws to the same
extent as a natural person. See Draft No. 2, supra note 17, at 35-36.
135. Roth, 118 N.Y.S. at 352.
136. The court stated:
For reasons of public policy, we are clearly of the opinion that payments of corporate funds
for such purposes as those disclosed in this case must be condemned, and officers of a
corporation making them held to a strict accountability, and be compelled to refund the
amounts so wasted for the benefit of stockholders.... To hold any other rule would be
establishing a dangerous precedent, tacitly countenancing the wasting of corporate funds for
purposes of corrupting public morals.
Id. at 353.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Cf Di Tomasso v. Loverro, 250 A.D. 206, 293 N.Y.S. 912 (close corporation directors
who personally profited from an illegal, anti-competitive contract between their corporation and
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acts." And the court unequivocally regards outright law violations
as worse than ultra vires acts.14 1
The issue of fiduciary liability for corporate illegality reached New
York's highest court in Abrams v. Allen. 42 Abrams was a "runaway
shop" case: the defendants allegedly had caused corporate losses to
Remington Rand, Inc., by closing and dismantling profitable corpo-
rate plants "solely for the purpose of discouraging, intimidating and
punishing its employees '  and in contravention of state and federal
labor laws. 14 After noting that New York law would recognize
claims against directors for corporate damages from using corporate
property for the doing of an unlawful or immoral act, 4 ' the Court of
Appeals treated the allegations of illegality and loss as sufficient to
state a claim of fiduciary breach. 146  Like the trial judge in Roth, the
Abrams court makes no direct reference to the business judgment rule.
When these holdings are combined with the refrain in other fiduciary
cases that illegal acts are not protected by the business judgment rule,
it becomes clear that the Third Circuit, writing nearly thirty years
later in Miller, correctly restates and applies state fiduciary doctrine in
corporate deviance cases. As a doctrinal matter, courts refuse to treat
illegal corporate conduct as a species of ordinary business decision-
making that lies beyond judicial review.
another held personally liable to another shareholder/director on a direct shareholder claim),
aff'd, 276 N.Y. 551, 12 N.E.2d 570 (1937).
Hill v. Murphy, 212 Mass. 1, 98 N.E. 781 (1912), is not on all fours, but is closer to "personal
benefit" cases than "corporate benefit" cases. In Hill, directors libelled Hill, another officer and
director, by statements concerning Hill's performance of his corporate duties. Hill sued
successfully for libel, and then prosecuted a derivative action against the tortfeasing directors to
reimburse the corporation for damages paid to Hill. The opinion treats this intentional tort as an
illegal act, and one done by the defendants "to gratify their own personal ends." 98 N.E. at 782.
140. See Roth, 118 N.Y.S. at 353.
141. Id.
142. 297 N.Y. 52, 74 N.E.2d 305 (1947).
143. 74 N.E.2d at 306. This can be analogized to the shareholder proposal case involving
Dow Chemical, in which corporate executives pursued their own commitment to the Vietnam
conflict despite its negative effect on corporate profits. See Medical Comm. for Human Rights v.
SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated, 404 U.S. 403 (1972). In Abrams, the corporate
directors vented their personal animosity to new labor laws at the shareholders' expense.
144. "That the public policy of this State and nation is opposed to the closing or removal of
factories, for such purposes as are here asserted, is obvious." Abrams, 74 N.E.2d at 307 (citations
omitted).
145. Id. at 306-7.
146. Id. at 307. In upholding this pleading, the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate
Division and reinstated the trial judge's ruling that the complaint was sufficient. Part of the New
York courts' development here must be attributed to the growing acceptance of notice pleading
in mid-twentieth century.
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After Roth, Abrams, and Miller, state law would seem to favor well-
pleaded derivative suits based on corporate illegal acts undertaken by
corporate fiduciaries. At least, these suits are "favored" in compari-
son with most derivative challenges to managerial decisions, which
typically have short and unsuccessful lifespans in the face of business
judgment rule protection. This favored status is not absolute, how-
ever, because corporate deviance cases face other procedural hurdles.
2. Procedural Restraints on Corporate Deviance Suits
a. Proof of the Underlying Violation
In Miller, the Third Circuit reviewed a motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, 47 and treated the
allegations in the complaint in the light most favorable to the plain-
tiffs.' 48 Although the court considered the complaint's short-hand ref-
erence to 18 U.S.C. § 610 as an allegation sufficient to survive a
motion to dismiss,' 49 it stated that the plaintiffs could not recover on
the corporation's behalf without "prov[ing] the elements of the statu-
tory violation as part of their proof of breach of fiduciary duty."'
' 50
This burden of proof could be quite substantial in some cases, and
would depend on the nature of the violations charged.' 5 ' Miller does
not suggest, however, that derivative plaintiffs would be required to
prove the underlying violation by more than a preponderance of the
evidence.'" 2 These proof problems would be reduced somewhat by the
fact that most corporate deviance derivative suits will be brought after
criminal prosecutions or investigations by government agencies.' 5 3 In
any event, Miller's insistence upon proof of the underlying violation
accords with the leading New York cases. In Roth, the defendant
director admitted the improper payments.- 54 The Abrams court, like
147. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
148. See Miller v. AT & T, 507 F.2d 759, 761 (3d Cir. 1974).
149. IML at 763-64.
150. Id at 764.
151. As a general matter, it would be expected that strict liability offenses, for example, will
be easier to prove than intent crimes. The Miller court extensively discussed the necessary proof
of the underlying violation. See id. at 764-65.
152. There are no significant due process issues raised by permitting civil derivative plaintiffs
a lesser burden of persuasion. Derivative suit civil liability damages are not the same as criminal
penalties, which may include loss of liberties; nor are the civil derivative plaintiff and the criminal
prosecutor possessed of relatively equal resources. This aspect of the plaintiff's evidentiary
burden has not been directly addressed in the ALI's Principles.
153. The impact of issue preclusion doctrine on corporate deviance derivative suits brought
after criminal prosecutions is beyond this Article's scope.
154. Roth v. Robertson, 64 Misc. 343, 118 N.Y.S. 351, 352 (Sup. Ct. 1909).
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that in Miller, ruled on a dismissed complaint, and treated the accusa-
tions of law violations as facts to be proven at trial.1 55
b. Pleading and Proving Corporate Loss
It is almost axiomatic in civil suits that a remedy will not be pro-
vided unless the party seeking judicial relief shows that it, or those it
represents, suffered (or will suffer) injury or harm caused by the
defendant's conduct. For much of their history, derivative suits were
no exception. In fiduciary breach cases, the derivative plaintiff was
unable to recover for the corporation against individual officers or
directors without showing some damage or injury to the corpora-
tion. 56 This requirement has not been especially significant in ordi-
nary fiduciary cases involving a breach of the duties of care or
loyalty.1 57 However, the damages issue has been particularly trouble-
some in fiduciary cases arising from corporate deviance episodes. This
is so because corporate deviance can be profitable to the corporation.
Obviously, it is possible to make money by violating the law: if the
gains obtained from corporate deviance exceed the sum of all losses
attributable to the illegal conduct, it is hard to express in monetary
terms just how the corporation has been "damaged" by fiduciary par-
ticipation in illegality, or by managerial failure to prevent the illegal
conduct. 158 On the other hand, restricting derivative recovery to those
155. Abrams v. Allen, 297 N.Y. 52, 74 N.E.2d 305, 306-07 (1947).
156. See generally Note, Pleading and Proof of Damages in Stockholders' Derivative Actions
Based on Antitrust Convictions, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 174, 176 n.10 (1964). Some cases have
recognized a deterrence interest, most notably Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248
N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969), discussed infra at notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
Diamond was not decided on pure deterrence grounds because the New York Court of Appeals
did consider the possibility that the corporate plaintiff had suffered indirect damages to its
reputation and its ability to raise capital from its fiduciaries' inside trading.
157. In a run-of-the-mine duty of care case, the defendants' negligent management (under
Delaware law, their grossly negligent management) must have caused corporate losses. Because
of the shareholders' focus on stock price, the existence of threshold litigation costs, and the
corporate bar's role in selecting cases for prosecution, however, not every corporate loss triggers
a lawsuit. Instead, care cases would be initiated after a loss significant enough to draw
shareholders' or counsel's attention, and the judicial task would be to decide whether the
unhappy outcome is beyond the realm of ordinary business loss attributable to an imperfect
world. In a traditional loyalty case, fiduciaries' diversion of corporate assets or opportunities for
their own use is even more easily seen by the courts to have caused harm to the corporate fisc.
158. Individual deviance cases pose no such intellectual puzzle, because the indivisible legal
identity of individuals makes something like derivative litigation impossible. Individuals cannot
sue themselves for undertaking illegal conduct. On the other hand, intracorporate litigation over
deviance is possible because the corporate entity includes distinct subgroups like shareholders
and managers. Reduced to its essentials, the issue is whether the managerial subgroup should be
forced to reimburse the corporate collective when the collective's overall economic standing was
not damaged by the illegal activity.
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cases where corporate deviance has resulted in a "net loss" to the cor-
poration would make corporate doctrine appear to tolerate illegal
activity if the crime did pay. This tension between the derivative suit's
traditional role as a loss compensation device and its potential to pro-
vide deterrence against corporate illegality has left a confusing legacy
in the case law, and the courts have struggled with pleading and proof
of damages when a fiduciary breach claim involves illegal activity.
Once again, it is the New York courts that have addressed this
problem. The cases are not fully reconcilable, although it is possible to
identify conflicting policies that account for some of the differences in
results. The gradual development of notice pleading through the first
half of this century caused part of the confusion.159 In early deviance
cases, some lower courts insisted on specific pleading of damages' 6°
When Abrams v. Allen' 6 finally presented the New York Court of
Appeals with a corporate deviance derivative suit, the complaint con-
tained an allegation of corporate loss. 1 62 Significantly, however, the
Abrams court was satisfied with a general allegation that the corpora-
tion had suffered losses, and did not insist on specific pleading of those
losses. 163
159. See generally J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 252-57
(1985).
160. "The acts complained of... are not such that injury to the corporation would ordinarily
be inferred therefrom as the natural and probable result thereof. Facts establishing damages,
rather than a conclusory allegation of waste, should be pleaded." Diamond v. Davis, 263 A.D.
68, 31 N.Y.S. 582, 583 (1941) (affirming trial court's dismissal of derivative complaint's sixth
cause of action based on Robinson-Patman Act violations because complaint failed to allege facts
showing harm to corporation or establishing the violation; pleading the consent decree held
insufficient); see also Spinella v. Heights Ice Corp., 186 Misc. 996, 62 N.Y.S.2d 263 (Sup. Ct.
1946) (trial court dismissed fourth amended complaint in derivative action based on antitrust
violation for lack of specific allegation of corporate loss or damage in connection with the
unlawful practices; mere written allegation of defendant's nolo contendere plea and accurate oral
description of $1000 fine insufficient to show corporate loss); Hoffman v. Abbott, .180 Misc. 590,
40 N.Y.S.2d 521, 525 (Sup. Ct. 1943) (trial court dismissed derivative claims based on
monopolistic practices by General Electric for lack of specific pleading "showing damage to the
corporate defendants"). Justice Shientag decided both Spinella and Hoffman. These cases do
not acknowledge Roth's existence in the law reports, much less distinguish it.
Compare the foregoing cases to Van Schaick v. Aron, 170 Misc. 520, 10 N.Y.S.2d 550 (Sup.
Ct. 1938), and Van Schaick v. Carr, 170 Misc. 539, 10 N.Y.S.2d 567 (Sup. Ct. 1938) (derivative
suits against insurance company directors by state insurance authorities in liquidation actions,
attempting to recover amounts equal to bad investments and loans made in violation of statutory
restrictions); and to Broderick v. Marcus, 152 Misc. 413, 272 N.Y.S. 455 (Sup. Ct. 1934)
(derivative suit against bank directors by state banking authorities in liquidation action,
attempting to recover amounts equal to bad loans made in violation of statutory loan
restrictions).
161. 297 N.Y. 52, 74 N.E.2d 305 (1947).
162. 74 N.E.2d at 306.
163. Id.
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The shift to notice pleading, however, does not fully explain the
damages cases, which also reflect a fundamental disagreement about
derivative recovery in corporate illegality cases. For example, in Roth,
the trial judge imposed liability without regard to the ultimate profit-
ability of paying "hush money" to permit continued illegal Sunday
operation of the amusement park, 164 and expressly rejected the defend-
ant's attempt to assert that the questionable payment was in the corpo-
ration's best interests.1 65  Although neither party specifically
addressed whether the corporation actually would have profited by
paying its extortionists, Roth appears to reject such arguments out of
hand as a matter of public policy when the act is illegal.1 66 The trial
judge reasoned in deterrence language, citing concern about use of
"corporate funds for purposes of corrupting public morals" as justifi-
cation for imposing liability on the director.1 67 In the Roth opinion,
"waste" means an improper use of corporate funds; if given a broad
reading, the opinion denies any excuse for the guilty director based on
his attempt, successful or otherwise, to increase or preserve profits by
"investing" the hush money, seeking the long-term gain from contin-
ued illegal Sunday operations at the risk of prosecution penalties from
local authorities.168
In chastising corporate deviance, however, the Roth opinion does
not address the possibility that derivative recovery in profitable devi-
ance cases provides a windfall to the corporation. Consider the fol-
lowing possibilities. The easiest situation to analyze is one where
deviant activity, in and of itself, causes corporate losses, such as a stat-
utorily prohibited species of loan that turns out to be uncollectible.169
From a corporate compensation perspective, this sort of deviance is
similar to any corporate loss caused by fiduciary misadventure. No
windfall recovery is involved. The fact that the loss-causing conduct
164. Roth v. Robertson, 64 Misc. 343, 118 N.Y.S. 351, 352 (Sup. Ct. 1909).
165. Roth, 118 N.Y.S. at 352-53.
166. The opinion does not analyze the extent to which a derivative suit is designed to provide
compensation to the corporation for managerial misadventure, and the court does not specify
how the corporation might have been damaged by the managing director's hush money
payments. See id.
167. Id.
168. It is possible to speculate whether the director actually made some calculations along
these lines, evaluating among other things the willingness of the potential informers to stay
satisfied with their bribes, the possibility for future, additional informers, and the likelihood of
independent prosecution from the state.
169. See, e.g., Van Schaick v. Aron, 170 Misc. 520, 10 N.Y.S.2d 550 (Sup. Ct. 1938); Van
Schaick v. Carr, 170 Misc. 539, 10 N.Y.S.2d 567 (Sup. Ct. 1938); Broderick v. Marcus, 152 Misc.
413, 272 N.Y.S. 455 (Sup. Ct. 1934). These cases are discussed parenthetically at note 160,
supra.
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happens to be illegal merely makes recovery an issue for trial instead
of pre-trial dismissal on motion because the business judgment rule's
presumption of managerial propriety does not apply to managers'
knowing illegal conduct. As a policy matter, there is little point in
shielding directors and officers from derivative liability when the busi-
ness decision's poor outcome derives from knowing illegal conduct.
No corporate good has come from the illegal activity, and its illegality
reflects a social judgment that no overall social benefit accrues from
the conduct. Liability in these circumstances does not create an
"excessive" deterrent, because the conduct deterred is not "risky," it is
unlawful. In these cases, pleading and proof of corporate loss would
not be a significant problem.17
Profitable illegal conduct presents a different corporate loss situa-
tion. If a derivative suit is brought before a successful third-party civil
suit or criminal prosecution, then the corporation has not yet exper-
ienced any corporate losses directly attributable to illegal conduct. All
the illegal corporate gains would be corporate profit, though indirect
losses, such as litigation expenses or loss of goodwill, might have
accrued. Even if a successful prosecution has taken place, however,
the corporate losses from the fines and judgments imposed, together
with indirect losses, still may not exceed the illegal gains. Under all
these circumstances, the illegal activity results in a net profit for the
corporation. When this happens, the corporate compensation interest
does not justify derivative recovery: the fines, judgments, and indirect
expenses could be deemed a "cost of doing business," and no economic
harm accrues to the corporation for making these expenditures. On
this view, allowing corporate recovery without provable corporate
losses would make a windfall of corporate deviance fiduciary claims.
By emphasizing the compensation interest and refusing to counte-
nance corporate windfalls, the lower New York courts started to
develop what ultimately came to be called the "net-loss rule." Under
this rule, a corporate deviance case is pleaded successfully only when
the complaint's allegations exclude the possibility that the illegal activ-
ity resulted in a net competitive gain to the corporation 17'1-in other
words, the corporation must have suffered a "net loss" as a result of
the illegal conduct.1 72 Furthermore, the lower court cases insisted
170. Compare with the court's treatment of illegal corporate conduct in Abrams v. Allen, 297
N.Y. 52, 74 N.E.2d 305 (1947), and Roth v. Robertson, 64 Misc. 343, 118 N.Y.S. 351 (Sup. Ct.
1909), discussed supra notes 133-46 and accompanying text.
171. See Note, supra note 156, at 176-77.
172. See Borden v. Cohen, 231 N.Y.S.2d 902 (Sup. Ct. 1962), in which the plaintiff's
complaint was dismissed, with leave to amend, for failing to allege damage to the corporation.
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that plaintiff must plead and prove this net loss as a precondition to
recovery. 17 3 However, allocating this stringent burden of proof to
derivative plaintiffs is unnecessary. Windfall recoveries in corporate
deviance cases also could be avoided if the derivative plaintiff is
required to plead only that some corporate losses or expenditures have
occurred in connection with the illegal conduct, forcing the defendants
to answer that the corporation actually profited from the illegal
acts.' 74 Rearranging these pleading and evidentiary thresholds would
make it easier to sue derivatively over illegal corporate conduct that
may have caused at least some corporate losses. And the settlement
dynamics would change because the defendant fiduciaries would face
embarrassment from having to plead and prove that they should
escape individual liability because their corporation's crimes did pay.
This shift also allocates the evidentiary responsibilities more realisti-
cally to the parties' relative access to information. The defendant fidu-
ciaries have far more complete command of the financial information
that would demonstrate corporate gains or losses from the illegal
conduct.
The damages rules developed by the lower New York courts assume
that only a corporate compensation interest is legitimately protected
by derivative suits. The New York Court of Appeals may have under-
mined this assumption by its language in Diamond v. Oreamuno. '75 In
that fiduciary stock-trading case, which was pleaded under state law,
the court stated:
It is true that the complaint before us does not contain any allegation
of damages to the corporation but this has never been considered to be
an essential requirement for a cause of action founded on a breach of
fiduciary duty.... This is because the function of such an action, unlike
The court recited: "No damage is to be inferred from the conduct of corporate business which
happens to violate the Sherman Anti-Trust Act unless the acts constituting such violation also
cause independent damage to the corporation, and were against the interests and the benefit of
the corporation." Id. at 903. In so ruling, the court apparently is unwilling to regard the
$50,000 fine assessed against the defendant corporation as a corporate loss. Neither Roth nor
Abrams is cited anywhere in the opinion, so Roth's refusal to excuse illegal acts is not
distinguished. Moreover, the Borden court simply ignores Abrams' declaration that general
allegations of loss should withstand a motion to dismiss.
Other New York lower court cases have imposed a relatively strict form of the "net loss" rule.
See Diamond v. Davis, 263 App. Div. 68, 31 N.Y.S.2d 582 (1941); Smiles v. Elfred, N.Y.L.J.,
Feb. 20, 1963, at 14, col. 6 (Sup. Ct.); Spinella v. Heights Ice Corp. 186 Misc. 996, 62 N.Y.S.2d
263 (Sup. Ct. 1946). Contra Premselaar v. Chenery, Civ. No. 6141 (N.Y. County Sup. Ct. Feb.
18, 1963) (discussed in Note, supra note 156, at 175).
173. See Borden, 231 N.Y.S.2d at 903-04.
174. See Note, supra note 156, at 177-79.
175. 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969).
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an ordinary tort or contract case, is not merely to compensate the plain-
tiff for wrongs committed by the defendant but, as this court declared
many years ago .... "to prevent [wrongs], by removing from agents and
trustees all inducement to attempt dealing for their own benefit in mat-
ters which they have undertaken for others, or to which their agency or
trust relates. ' 1
76
Although not strictly a corporate deviance case within this Article's
definition, Diamond is pertinent because it treats the derivative suit as
a deterrence mechanism in general terms, and does not limit the device
simply to protecting the corporate compensation interest. By recog-
nizing a deterrence interest in derivative litigation, the courts could
abandon overly restrictive versions of the net-loss rule, and stop creat-
ing the impression that windfall avoidance somehow makes profitable
deviance episodes tolerable. The Diamond court's attitude about
deterrence is similar to the Roth court's view of corporate deviance,
and turns away from the lower New York courts' strict application of
the net-loss rule. No court has returned to this specific question to
refine the balance between deterrence and compensation in corporate
deviance cases so as to minimize possible windfall recoveries. Without
guidance on this important question, the net-loss rule's present func-
tion in corporate deviance cases remains unclear.
One particular risk from an overly simplistic view of corporate
harm is that the proof requirements could be drawn so narrowly that
no corporation other than an insolvent one could have suffered a "net
loss." On this view, a major corporation does not experience "net
losses" if its income is sufficient to cover the amount of a criminal fine
actually assessed, or of other losses attributable to the misconduct.
And the greater the earnings, the lesser the corporation's derivative
chances to recoup the deviance losses. This sort of crude accounting
for net-loss purposes assumes a monolithic corporate "interest," and
requires that corporate deviance have crippled the firm before deriva-
tive suits can be filed. Shifting the pleading and evidentiary burdens
would change this picture considerably; other changes could enhance
176. 248 N.E.2d at 912, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 81 (emphasis in original). As already noted,
Diamond was not decided solely on deterrence grounds. See supra note 156. Other courts have
criticized Diamond's specific holding of a state law fiduciary disgorgement remedy for
corporations whose fiduciaries had engaged in inside trading. See Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d
186 (7th Cir. 1978). The Principles retain Diamond, but attempt to modify its doctrine to limit
the situations under which a corporation may obtain recovery to those tied more closely to its
compensation interest. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1986) § 5.04 [hereinafter Draft No. 5].
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the derivative suit's ability to police or deter deviance-related losses. 177
The common law net-loss rule has lost some of its importance, how-
ever, because of recent developments in the directors' power to dismiss
derivative suits.
c. Directors' Power to Control Corporate Litigation
Corporate deviance derivative suits are affected by the renewed judi-
cial recognition of directors' power to control corporate litigation and
in particular by the development of the special litigation committee as
a device for dismissing shareholder derivative litigation. Derivative
suits are substitutes for direct actions by the corporation and begin
when the prosecuting shareholder and her lawyers disagree with the
board of directors about the advisability of pursuing a particular cor-
porate claim.
If the corporate claim lies against corporate outsiders, or "third par-
ties," it is quite easy to see that the decision to pursue the corporate
claim ordinarily would be committed to the directors' and officers'
managerial discretion. In third-party cases, managers should be able
to reach a reasonable decision about how to proceed on the corporate
claim. The decision to sue, in and of itself, thus would be protected by
the business judgment doctrine. 7 In third-party cases, a shareholder
normally must make demand on the board of directors before bringing
a derivative suit. If the board agrees to the demand, the corporation
itself asserts the claim and the shareholder does not bring derivative
litigation. If the demand is refused, the shareholder proceeds with its
derivative claim; its ultimate success will depend on the shareholder's
ability to plead and prove that the board's refusal to prosecute the
corporate claim is wrongful (that is, not protected by the business
judgment doctrine). The demand requirement insures that directors
have an opportunity to decide whether to bring suit on the corporate
claim, thus reinforcing the directors' normal and appropriate manage-
rial hegemony in the corporate order.
When a corporate claim lies against corporate fiduciaries, however,
the election to sue requires one group of corporate fiduciaries to deter-
mine whether to pursue litigation against fellow fiduciaries. Because
corporate managers might be less than completely disinterested when
fellow directors or officers face litigation threats, some courts began to
excuse demand in fiduciary breach cases. Demand was usually
177. The ALI's further refinements to the net-loss rule are discussed infra notes 235-44 and
accompanying text.
178. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 813 (Del. 1984).
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excused only in cases where the alleged misconduct constituted a
breach of the duty of loyalty. Until the late 1970s, demand excuse
stripped directors of their power to control corporate litigation
because their decision was not a procedural prerequisite to suit.
Because demand excuse was available chiefly in duty of loyalty cases,
derivative plaintiffs sought, whenever possible, to plead their claims as
loyalty breaches to avoid demand. Their chances of successful recov-
ery, either by settlement or on the merits, would be greatly improved if
the courts' deference to business judgment protected neither the deci-
sion to sue nor the underlying fiduciary conduct. Although corporate
deviance fiduciary breach cases are not classified as duty of loyalty
suits, early New York decisions treated them as demand-excused
cases.179 This makes sense because the courts do not extend routine
business judgment protection to the underlying misconduct in corpo-
rate deviance situations.
The late 1970s brought renewed recognition that corporate claims,
not shareholder claims, lie at the heart of all derivative litigation, and
that corporate managers should be the ones to decide whether to pur-
sue those claims unless their decision resulted from inadequate deliber-
ations. Demand-required cases always had preserved this managerial
prerogative. Courts reestablished managerial power by permitting
corporate directors to seek dismissal of derivative suits, even when
demand had been excused. 1 0 These dismissal motions are fundamen-
tally similar, although the courts differ about how much deference is
owed to the corporate decision not to sue. 8 I To obtain dismissal of a
shareholder derivative suit in a demand-excused case, the board of
directors appoints a special committee of directors who are charged to
investigate the underlying claim and report whether it is in the corpo-
ration's best interest to pursue the claim. 8 2 The board usually
appoints special counsel to assist the committee in making its investi-
gation and report. 183 If the committee recommends against pursuing
the claim, the corporation fies a motion to dismiss the derivative suit.
Taking Delaware law as an example, a trial court faced with a cor-
porate motion to dismiss a shareholder derivative suit first "should
inquire into the independence and good faith of the committee and the
179. See Roth v. Robertson, 64 Misc. 343, 118 N.Y.S. 351, 354 (Sup. Ct. 1909).
180. See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979); Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508
(S.D.N.Y. 1976); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430
A.2d 779 (Del. 1981); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920
(1979); Alford v. Shaw, 320 N.C. 465, 358 S.E.2d 323 (1987).
181. See infra text accompanying notes 184-88.
182. See. eg., Gall, 418 F. Supp. at 510-11.
183. Sea eg., id. at 514 n.12.
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bases supporting its conclusions." 184 As the moving party, the corpo-
ration has the burden of proving the committee's independence, good
faith, and adequate investigation.18 5 If the corporation sustains its
burden on these issues, a Delaware court must then "determine,
applying its own independent business judgment, whether the motion
should be granted"18 6 and the suit dismissed. Other jurisdictions treat
these motions somewhat differently: New York courts do not apply
independent business judgment, and do not extend their inquiry past
the three fundamental questions of independence, good faith, and rea-
sonable investigation,187 while North Carolina courts apply independ-
ent business judgment in all derivative cases, not just those in which
demand is excused."' Exploring these distinctions among state courts
is beyond this Article's scope. In any event, special committee investi-
gations and directorial power to dismiss derivative suits are now a
well-established feature in intra-corporate litigation.
The antitrust hypothetical used earlier to describe a deliberate act of
corporate deviance by members of a corporate control group can illus-
trate how a special litigation committee would be involved in a corpo-
rate deviance derivative suit. 89 After Western Flight is fined for
antitrust violations, imagine that a shareholder files suit against West-
ern's chief executive officer (CEO), who made the noncompetition
agreement. The shareholder asserts a derivative claim and seeks dam-
ages from the CEO, alleging that the criminal fine against Western
constitutes corporate damage resulting from his illegal conduct.
Assume further that Western's state of incorporation would excuse
demand in a corporate deviance derivative suit and would not apply
the net-loss rule to bar the claim as pleaded.
Western's board of directors designates three new directors to fill
three empty seats on the board, and appoints them to a special litiga-
tion committee to investigate the antitrust incident. The board also
names a retired state supreme court justice as special counsel to the
committee. After several months' investigation, the committee files a
long and detailed report that recommends against the derivative suit
as contrary to the corporation's best interests. The committee bases its
recommendation on three factors: the territorial allocation pact was a
first violation, and no other illegal activity was uncovered by the com-
184. Zapata, 430 A.2d at 788.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 789 (emphasis added).
187. See Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).
188. See Alford v. Shaw, 320 N.C. 465, 358 S.E.2d 323 (1987).
189. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
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mittee's investigation; Western suffered adverse publicity during the
criminal prosecution, and wishes to limit future adversepublicity that
necessarily would accompany further corporate litigation; and West-
ern did not lose money during the anticompetitive conduct because the
fines imposed did not exceed gains attributable to profits made while
the illegal policy was in effect. 1"
On these imaginary facts, it is quite possible that the court would
grant the corporate motion to dismiss the derivative suit. The corpo-
ration probably has met its burden of showing the litigation commit-
tee's independence, good faith, and reasonable investigation; in
jurisdictions following New York's approach, this would be enough to
ensure dismissal. 91 But even if the court were to apply its own
independent business judgment, it is likely, in these invented circum-
stances, that a court also would conclude that pursuing the derivative
claim is not in the corporation's best interests. Admittedly, the mis-
conduct was a species of anticompetitive behavior, and thus violated
fundamental national policies that favor a competitive market econ-
omy; however, the investigation discovered no recidivism or continu-
ing violation. Moreover, the hypothetical as written provides no basis
to contradict the committee's finding that pursuing the claim would
yield no net corporate financial benefit.192
190. This last assumption is the largest, and corresponds least to reality. The hypothetical
describes anticompetitive conduct by horizontal competitors, which is a per se violation of
federal antitrust laws. The fines and civil damages (after trebling) often are significant in these
cases and could reach well into the hundreds of millions of dollars. If the losses were that large,
it becomes less likely that a special committee would recommend dismissal. Moreover, judges
should be less willing to permit dismissal when the corporate losses are so great, for two reasons.
First, the corporate compensation interest is significant when large losses are involved; second,
the committee's willingness to dismiss a lawsuit when the damages are so large would tend to
undermine the credibility of its recommendation against pursuing the corporate claim.
This assumption also oversimplifies the hypothetical by avoiding the difficulties already
described in determining corporate loss. See supra notes 156-77. Because large corporate losses
probably would exceed the gains obtained from a particular violation, this assumption highlights
the importance of the ALI's transactional limitation in its version of the net-loss rule. See infra
notes 235-45 and accompanying text.
The purpose of this hypothetical discussion is to illustrate the power contained in the special
litigation committee device in a relatively low-stakes corporate deviance derivative suit. By
implication, the hypothetical also foreshadows subsequent discussion of the ALI's adjustments to
existing doctrine in corporate deviance cases.
191. There is some question whether New York would decide Auerbach the same way today.
It was the earliest of the state law trilogy of special litigation committee cases. See Joy v. North,
692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982) (Judge Winter, writing for the court, predicts that Connecticut
would adopt Delaware's approach in Zapata rather than New York's in Auerbach), cert. denied,
460 U.S. 1051 (1983).
192. See supra note 190.
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The committee could strengthen its report and recommendation by
endorsing disciplinary action against the CEO, or suggesting a modifi-
cation of his responsibilities. It would further support dismissal by
reporting that a compliance program had been adopted or, if already
in existence, had been reviewed in the wake of the illegal activity. But
this probably would not be absolutely necessary for obtaining a dismis-
sal. In short, existing common law patterns suggest that the special
litigation committee's power to dismiss is undiminished in deviance
cases. Within these existing doctrinal patterns, the courts could effec-
tively remove the law compliance component from the duty of care by
giving broad deference to special litigation committees, and narrow
readings to the existing corporate deviance doctrines.
19 3
The corporate deviance derivative suit's special status as one of the
rare exceptions to managerial business judgment protection would be
substantially undercut by uncritical acceptance of the special litigation
committee. If the corporate deviance derivative suit is to survive this
procedural development, corporate doctrine would have to reempha-
size that corporate deviance cases deserve special attention and must
develop rules for managerial dismissal that reflect this favored status.
But corporate doctrine should attempt to retain or restore special rules
for corporate deviance derivative suits only if it can articulate suffi-
cient reasons to justify different treatment for such suits. Like all
derivative litigation, deviance suits can seem to dragoon an unwilling
corporate majority into internal disputes it wishes to avoid. On the
other hand, granting directors' a barely-restrained power to dismiss
derivative suits as "not in the corporation's best interest" helps create
the impression that corporate doctrine is unconcerned with law viola-
tions by corporate actors. The scarce existing case law has not yet
resolved this conflict between corporate governance and corporate
deviance.
3. Are Direct Involvement Cases Different from Failure-to-Supervise
Cases?
The final question about the traditional case law is whether the
courts have recognized distinctions between cases in which corporate
193. As will be seen in Section III, the Principles address these questions directly. The
Principles should not be understood, however, as the sole bulwark against the tide of special
litigation committee dismissals in deviance cases. Judges themselves would tend to be skeptical
about claims that corporate deviance losses are indistinguishable from ordinary corporate losses,
and would hesitate to dismiss litigation involving serious criminal law violations. The Principles
build on this structural tendency inherent in the judiciary and attempt to construct a screening
device to aid judges in deciding derivative claims involving criminal misconduct.
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fiduciaries were directly involved in illegal activities, and those in
which non-fiduciaries engaged in illegal conduct but fiduciaries failed
make an effort to discover and prevent the unlawful behavior. The
identifiable corporate deviance fiduciary breach cases all were direct
involvement cases: a corporate director or officer had performed or
participated in the illegalities at issue. 9 Moreover, in Graham v.
Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co., 195 the single case directly present-
ing a claim that corporate fiduciaries were obligated to supervise and
investigate to prevent illegal activities, the DelaWare Supreme Court
refused to recognize a duty to inquire. Allis-Chalmers arose from
guilty pleas by the corporation and four non-director employees to
criminal indictments for antitrust violations. 196 After pretrial discov-
ery and pleading amendments eliminated allegations that the directors
actually knew, or were put on notice, of the misconduct, the plaintiffs
argued that the directors were liable to the corporation in damages
because they failed to take action designed to learn of, and prevent,
antitrust activity by Allis-Chalmers employees. 197 The Delaware
Supreme Court refused to hold that the duty of care included an obli-
gation to investigate and prevent law violations. 198
Although Allis-Chalmers is the only case that clearly presents this
issue, it probably is not the most reliable precedent. Corporations now
are subject to substantially more numerous general law obligations
than were in effect when Allis-Chalmers was decided. Consequently,
present day failures to monitor law compliance risk larger corporate
losses than were predictable in the 1960s. This greater risk means that
day-to-day loss avoidance now demands significant compliance moni-
toring from fiduciaries. Corporate representatives themselves recog-
nize the need for increased monitoring. 199 Moreover, corporate law
compliance has become an identifiable managerial subspecialty; it is
194. In Roth v. Robertson, 64 Misc. 343, 118 N.Y.S. 351, 352 (Sup. Ct. 1909), the defendant
managing director himself had paid the hush money. In Abrams v. Allen, 297 N.Y. 52, 74
N.E.2d 305, 306-07 (1947), the defendant directors had made the allegedly unlawful decision to
close a profitable factory out of anti-union animus. In Miller v. A T & T, 507 F.2d 759, 761 (3d
Cir. 1974), the defendant directors allegedly had approved the decision not to collect unpaid
phone bills from the Democratic National Committee.
195. 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963).
196. Id. at 127.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 130-31.
199. See The Corporate Director's Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAW. 1591, 1610 (1978) ("The
corporate director should be concerned that the corporation has programs looking toward
compliance with applicable laws and regulations, both foreign and domestic, that it circulates (as
appropriate) policy statements to this effect to its employees, and that it maintains procedures for
monitoring such compliance."); see also Draft No. 4, supra note 123, at 48.
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far more sophisticated, and yet more readily undertaken, than was
assumed by the Allis-Chalmers court."° Consequently, Allis-Chal-
mers probably is no longer good law, and the fiduciary duty of care
probably includes an obligation to supervise corporate law
compliance.
It is harder to ascertain whether corporate fiduciary doctrine ought
to create significantly different rules for direct involvement and failure
to supervise cases. No cases yet decided have done so explicitly,
although some judges could attempt to draw distinctions. Courts
exercising independent business judgment might be less willing to dis-
miss direct involvement cases than failure-to-supervise cases when a
special litigation committee recommends termination of the lawsuit.
Although mens rea and other relative moral culpability concepts
would suggest that fiduciaries who fail to supervise are less responsible
for corporate deviance than fiduciaries who themselves commit law
violations in the corporate name, it is not entirely clear that corporate
doctrine should treat supervisory failures less harshly than direct
involvement. Supervision and direction of the corporate enterprise are
the fiduciary's fundamental task, and whether compensation or deter-
rence analysis is applied, there seems to be little reason to forgive
supervision failures more readily than direct involvement in illegality.
Both types of misconduct can damage the firm economically, so
200. See generally J. SIGLER & J. MURPHY, INTERACTIVE CORPORATE COMPLIANCE: AN
ALTERNATIVE TO REGULATORY COMPULSION (1988). Other discussions of compliance
programs and related problems include: W. CARNEY, THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE
CORPORATE ATTORNEY (1982); W. COMEGYS, ANTITRUST COMPLIANCE MANUAL (1986); J.
DIMENTO, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND AMERICAN BUSINESS (1986); MANAGING THE
SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE CORPORATION (M. Anshen ed. 1974); PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE,
SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTE 511-614 (1989); PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE,
ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE IN A CHANGING LEGAL ENVIRONMENT 431-53 (1983);
PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, REPRESENTING DIRECTORS, OFFICERS, AND HOUSE COUNSEL
OF PUBLICLY HELD CORPORATIONS 135-42 (1981); E. ROCKEFELLER, ANTITRUST
COUNSELING FOR THE 1980S 164-68 (1983); M. STEINBERG, CORPORATE INTERNAL AFFAIRS
108-22 (1983); 1 J. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST COUNSELING AND LITIGATION
TECHNIQUES §§ 5.01-07 (1989); Branson, Progress in the Art of Social Accounting and Other
Arguments for Disclosure on Corporate Social Responsibility, 29 VAND. L. REV. 539 (1976);
Brodley, Compliance, in ANTITRUST ADVISER 505-65 (C. Hills 3d ed. 1985); Jaglom, How to
Develop a Corporate Antitrust Compliance Program, 31 PRAC. LAW., July 15, 1985, at 75;
Steinberg, The Securities and Exchange Commission's Administrative, Enforcement, and
Legislative Programs and Policies-Their Influence on Corporate Internal Affairs, 58 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 173 (1982); Small, The Evolving Role of the Director in Corporate Governance, 30
HASTINGS L.J. 1353, 1374-89 (1979); Tucker, Corporate Compliance and Compensation
Problems in Environmental Protection: Implications of United States v. Reserve Mining Company,
10 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 555 (1978); National Institute On Preventative Antitrust, 48
ANTITRUST L.J. 1 (1979); Structuring Corporate Compliance Programs for Pollution Control
Requirements, 35 Bus. LAW. 1459 (1980).
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neither one nor the other is a greater violation of the fiduciary obliga-
tion. In addition, treating supervisory failures less harshly may create
a perverse incentive for fiduciaries to avoid investigation of questiona-
ble activities. This incentive arises because utter lack of knowledge
would preclude any arguable claim of direct participation or tacit
approval of illegal activity. The net result of asymmetrical penalties
and procedures thus could be less supervision of corporate affairs, as
directors and officers "look the other way."
Doctrinal distinctions that facilitate direct involvement cases over
failure-to-supervise cases also could result in an inefficient duplication
of incentives: Fiduciaries directly involved in corporate misconduct
already face some deterrence from the risk of individual criminal sanc-
tions, while criminal liability is relatively less likely in failure-to-super-
vise situations. Replicating this imbalance in fiduciary doctrine would
tend to increase the risk of corporate deviance from inadequate super-
vision, and is undesirable and unjustified. All told, little would be
gained by any extensive disparities in corporate doctrinal rules gov-
erning direct involvement and failure-to-supervise cases.201 Like most
other issues in fiduciary breach cases involving corporate deviance,
this question is an open one.
. Summary
Deviance theory and common law development present an interest-
ing and complex picture. Large firms create opportunities for devi-
ance because of their size and information channels, which tend to
separate senior managers from those who implement the broad poli-
cies managers establish. As one type of large firm, business corpora-
tions also suffer from these problems, which are further complicated in
the public corporation by the separation of ownership and control.
Unprofitable deviance is an ordinary agency cost that shareholders
would tend to reduce by familiar means. In contrast, profitable devi-
ance generates little or no agency cost; this disables the agency cost
mechanism as a trigger for shareholder concern about profitable cor-
porate deviance. Two consequences flow from this latter observation.
First, non-corporate governance remedies, such as the criminal law,
would be important social controls on corporate deviance because
shareholders would ordinarily have few incentives to control such
201. Disparities between treatment of direct involvement and failure-to-supervise cases also
highlight a related problem, which is designing civil penalties for failures to supervise that are
sufficiently harsh to encourage adequate supervision. This latter problem is taken up in Section
III.
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behavior themselves. Second, this shareholder indifference would tend
to make fiduciary litigation less effective as a corporate deviance con-
trol mechanism, although the plaintiff's corporate bar can provide
some deterrent and compensatory force. Few cases report derivative
litigation over corporate general law violations, a situation that has left
several unanswered questions. The ALI's Principles attempt to
address these unanswered questions as they undertake a comprehen-
sive statement about fiduciary doctrine.
III. FIDUCIARY DUTY AND GENERAL LAW
COMPLIANCE UNDER THE ALI PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE GO VERNANCE
The ALI makes corporate law compliance obligations a prominent
feature of its formulations of corporate doctrine. The Principles artic-
ulate a corporate duty of general law compliance in section 2.01(a),2 °2
and include law compliance as part of directors' and officers' corporate
duties.2 3 The Reporters have attempted to clarify some aspects of law
compliance fiduciary doctrine, but on the whole, the Principles follow
established patterns of fiduciary obligation and general law
compliance.
A. The General Statement: Section 2.01(a)'s Corporate Obligation
Section 2.01(a) states that "whether or not corporate profit and
shareholder gain are thereby enhanced, the corporation, in the con-
duct of its business . . . is obliged, to the same extent as a natural
person, to act within the boundaries set by law." 2" Section 2.01(a)
imposes an obligation on the corporation itself,205 as distinct from a
fiduciary obligation owed by corporate officers and directors,20 6
although the Principles' formulations of the fiduciary obligations do
require corporate officials to act in a manner consistent with section
2.01(a).20 7 By its own terms, section 2.01(a)'s law compliance obliga-
tion is not merely coextensive or redundant to independent compli-
ance duties owed to third parties or the state: the corporation's duties
under section 2.01(a) run to the shareholders. 08
202. See supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text.
203. See infra notes 219-32 and accompanying text.
204. See Draft No. 2, supra note 17, at 25.
205. Id. at 26.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 27.
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Because it has been infused into fiduciary obligation, section 2.01(a)
is partially enforced by derivative suits against directors and officers;
this Article discusses the Principles' rules for corporate deviance deriv-
ative litigation in later sections. Shareholder power to enforce section
2.01(a)'s law compliance obligation directly against the corporation
itself is, however, a distinct governance device. The Principles do per-
mit section 2.01(a) direct enforcement, though the tentative drafts do
not describe in detail the shareholders' power to bring section 2.01(a)
suits for injunctive relief directly against the corporation. 209 Equally
uncertain is the shareholders' power to surrender by agreement their
collective right to corporate law compliance and refuse to act as
enforcers of general legal obligations. 210 The Principles final draft may
209. This is, at the very least, a predictable inference from the statement that the general law
compliance obligation runs from corporation to the shareholders. Direct action would avoid
managerial control mechanisms provided by Part VII of the Principles; injunctive relief could be
useful in forcing installation of compliance programs after a major deviance episode. Damages
cannot be obtained for breach of this corporate duty-no harm is done to individual
shareholders, and a corporation cannot by its own illegal "acts" justify recovery from itself back
to itself.
Comment d to § 4.01(a) states:
Directors and officers have oversight obligations... with respect to the corporation's
obligation to obey the law, and as in other duty of care situations, a failure to use the care
required by the provisions of § 4.01 will expose the directors or officers to damage actions,
either by the corporation or derivatively by shareholders, and to claims for equitable relief
(including injunctive remedies against both the directors or officers and their corporation).
Draft No. 4, supra note 123, at 21 (emphasis added). This reference to injunctive remedies
against the corporation would be more helpfully located if placed in the comments to § 2.01(a)
rather than buried in the discussion of fiduciary liability and § 4.01. In any event, this corporate
§ 2.01(a) obligation is a novelty, and its eventual impact is impossible to predict at this time.
210. It in an interesting question whether the shareholders could agree among themselves to
surrender their right to corporate law compliance by so stating in a shareholder agreement, or in
the corporate charter or bylaws. Such an agreement would not affect the corporation's law
compliance obligations to the state or third parties, but would be a shareholder decision to
remove themselves from any role as general law enforcers. The comment to § 2.01 acknowledges
that § 2.01's profit objective can be modified by shareholder agreement, but does not clearly
address shareholder power to modify the obligations and permissions contained in § 2.01(a)-(c).
See Draft No. 2, supra note 17, at 27.
Comments to § 4.01 suggest that shareholders may not reduce a fiduciary's obligation to
comply with the law. See illustration 2, Draft No. 4, supra note 123, at 18 (shareholders may not
approve a director's failure to perform official, statutory duties). And § 7.17 (1) precludes a
shareholder agreement to limit damages for "a knowing and culpable violation of law."
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONs (Tent. Draft
No. 9 1989) § 7.17 (1), at 115 [hereinafter Draft No. 9]. Absent some clarifying cross-references,
however, it appears that § 2.01's broader language would permit shareholders to agree to
abandon their enforcement role altogether.
This question implicates the ALI's model of the modem shareholder. By recognizing a
contractual capacity to abandon shareholder law enforcement under § 2.01(a), the ALI would
accept institutional investors as "model" shareholders; refusing to permit any contractual
limitation on shareholder enforcement of § 2.01(a) would retain individual shareholders (and the
plaintiff's corporate bar) as important players in corporate governance. On balance, it appears
Washington Law Review
resolve these uncertainties; section 2.01(a) caselaw development also
may settle these questions. Caselaw refinement of section 2.01(a) suits
by shareholders directly against their corporations would be consistent
with the Reporters' recommendation that section 2.01 in its entirety be
implemented by judicial decision rather than by statute.21'
Section 2.01(a) does not impose any greater or lesser duty to obey
the law than is owed by individuals.212 Consequently, corporations
may invoke concepts of necessity and desuetude when these are appro-
priate to excuse isolated legal violations.213 Corporations also may
undertake open violations of legal provisions to test their validity or
interpretation. 214 The section 2.01(a) corporate obligation is not, how-
ever, without its ambiguities about the content of general legal obliga-
tions. For example, the comments state that section 2.01(a) should be
interpreted to disregard de minimis violations, as well as nonperform-
ance of legal duties in those "isolated cases in which it is widely under-
stood that liability is properly viewed as a price of noncompliance. 21 5
However, the comments also state that corporate actors should not
engage routinely in a practice of disregarding legal obligations, even if
willing to absorb liability costs as "user fees" for engaging in the pro-
hibited conduct. 216 These comments leave some interesting problems
for judicial development of section 2.0 1(a), as judges attempt to distin-
guish between tolerable and intolerable corporate violations of general
legal obligations. Nevertheless, the comments and illustrations show
that section 2.01(a)'s authors would find few tolerable exceptions to
the general law compliance obligation.2 17
that the latter course (continued importance of the individual investor, and no ability to abandon
law enforcement power by shareholder agreement) is more consistent with the Principles' overall
design.
Comments to § 2.01 do state that the absence of a § 2.01(a) obligation does not determine
corporate obligations to the state or to third parties. Draft No. 2, supra note 17, at 34.
211. See Draft No. 2, supra note 17, at 26.
212. This recognition is placed in the language of § 2.01(a) itself. See supra notes 17-19 and
accompanying text. It is further explained in the comments to § 2.01:
Section 2.01(a) is based on the moral norm of obedience to law, and is neither intended to
suggest that corporations are less law-abiding than individuals, nor to impose on
corporations any different obligation to obey the law than that imposed on individuals.
Accordingly, the corporation is obliged to act within the boundaries set by law to the same
extent as a natural person-no less, but no more.
Draft No. 2, supra note 17, at 33.
213. Draft No. 2, supra note 17, at 33-34.
214. Id. at 34.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 32-33; see also supra note 21.
217. The Reporters denounce a general costs-benefits approach to legal obligation by
corporate decisionmakers, see Draft No. 2, supra note 17, at 32-33 [comment g]; this language
indicates the exceptional nature of permissible law violations under § 2.01(a). Id. at 34. Also
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Section 2.01(a) may be a doctrinal innovation to the extent that it
articulates a separate law compliance duty directly enforceable against
the corporation itself, though its novelty creates uncertainty about
whether it will achieve independent influence as a governance rule.
Section 2.01 (a)'s role as an aspirational guide for corporate conduct is
not exactly an innovation, but its precise operation is open to ques-
tion.218 The Principles' comprehensive nature permits just this sort of
conservative doctrinal adjustment. The ALI also invokes traditional
governance structures, however, by making section 2.01(a) a compo-
nent of (or backdrop for) the corporate fiduciary duties imposed on
directors and officers.
B. Fiduciary Law Compliance Obligations Under the AL!
Principles
The ALI's Principles' fiduciary law compliance obligation extends
to both direct involvement and failure-to-supervise cases. Recall that,
under traditional doctrine, corporate fiduciaries' direct involvement in
illegal activities is not protected by the business judgment rule and
may support an award of corporate damages if appropriately prose-
cuted.219 Under the Principles, direct fiduciary involvement in corpo-
rate illegality also is unprotected. "A director or officer violates his
duty to perform his functions in good faith if he knowingly causes his
corporation to disobey the law."22 The duty of good faith is articu-
lated in section 4.01(a) as part of the fiduciary duty of care. 2  Under
pertinent here is illustration 10's 55 m.p.h. speed limit hypothetical, which condemns relatively
low-level law violations if undertaken as corporate policy. Id. at 36.
218. Section 2.01(a) may simply be a text made necessary by § 2.01's declaration of the profit
and gain objectives of corporate activity. As such, § 2.01(a) insures that general corporate
objectives of profit and gain are not interpreted as a license to violate the law. Section 2.01(a)
also could work as a liability-excusing standard, making clear that shareholders may not sue
directors for failing to attempt to make profits even when law violations are necessary to obtain
those profits.
Professor Coffee, who drafted Part VII, clearly expects general provisions such as the duty of
care in Part IV to function as aspirational standards even if the Principles permit only infrequent
successful enforcement of the duty under Part VII's rules for derivative litigation. See Coffee,
supra note 21, at 792, 796-99. It is quite likely that he has similar expectations for much of
§ 2.01(a)'s application. See infra notes 321-26 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 128-46 and accompanying text.
220. Draft No. 4, supra note 123, at 21.
221. The section states:
§ 4.01. Duty of Care of Directors and Officers; the Business Judgment Rule
(a)... a director or officer has a duty to his corporation to perform his functions in good
faith, in a manner that he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation,
and with the care that an ordinarily prudent person would reasonably be expected to
exercise in a like position and under similar circumstances.
Id.
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section 4.01(a), then, a corporate fiduciary breaches its duty of care by
failing to act in good faith, and the business judgment rule does not
protect fiduciary decisions unless made in good faith.222 To be suc-
cessful in a direct involvement case under the Principles, the corporate
or derivative plaintiff must establish the underlying law violation as
well as the fiduciary's breach of care by its knowing involvement in the
illegal activity.223 The ALI thus expressly adopts the rule of Miller v.
A T & T, which requires proof of the corporate law violation as part of
the claim against the defendant fiduciary.224
The Principles clarify the uncertain status of failure-to-supervise
cases under existing law. As part of their supervisory duties described
in section 3.02, corporate directors are affirmatively required to over-
see corporate compliance with general legal obligations.225 This over-
sight obligation includes, when appropriate, support for law
compliance programs.226 Moreover, the Principles expressly declare
that section 4.01(a)'s duty of care includes the obligation to make
appropriate inquiry into corporate affairs;227 a fiduciary's failure to
exercise oversight or make inquiries may be actionable.228 Thus, the
Principles reject Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co. and
accept the failure-to-supervise case as part of their law compliance
enforcement mechanism.229 Section 4.01's comments and illustrations
222. Section 4.01(c) states:
A director or officer who makes a business judgment in good faith fulfills his duty under
this Section if:
(1) he is not interested ... in the subject of his business judgment;
(2) he is informed with respect to the subject of his business judgment to the extent he
reasonably believes to be appropriate under the circumstances; and
(3) he rationally believes that his business judgment is in the best interests of the
corporation.
Id. at 6-7 (emphasis added).
223. See id. at 22 (comment d to § 4.01(a)).
224. See supra notes 147-55 and accompanying text.
225. The section states:
§ 3.02(a) ... [T]he board of directors of a publicly held corporation ... should:
(2) Oversee the conduct of the corporation's business with a view to evaluating, on an
ongoing basis, whether the corporation's resources are being managed in a manner
consistent with the principles of § 2.01 ....
Draft No. 2, supra note 17, at 66.
226. Id. at 69.
227. "This duty includes the obligation to make, or cause to be made, such inquiry as the
director or officer reasonably believes to be appropriate under the circumstances." Section
4.01(a)(1), Draft No. 4, supra note 123, § 4.01 (a) (1), at 6.
228. See id. at 21.
229. See id. at 47-52. Allis-Chalmers is discussed supra notes 195-200 and accompanying
text.
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join section 3.02 in affirming law compliance programs. Under section
4.01, a fiduciary who fails to assure some sort of law compliance sys-
tem may breach its duty of care, especially when the corporation has a
history of law compliance problems.2 30 Directors put on notice by
past criminal prosecutions could well act "unreasonably" if they fail to
install some sort of law compliance device appropriate both to the law
violations and the particular firm. However, the Principles contain no
blueprint or standards for compliance efforts; judges are expected to
develop this fiduciary obligation as a matter of common law.2 31 Busi-
ness judgment protection for corporate fiduciaries thus exists to a lim-
ited extent in failure-to-supervise suits: decisions about how to
supervise, and what resources to expend for supervision, probably will
be granted some degree of business judgment protection. Neverthe-
less, the Principles do not provide failure-to-supervise cases with the
routine business judgment protection and immunity from liability that
is granted to most ordinary business decisions.
In general, then, the ALI's blueprint for fiduciary doctrine's law
compliance obligation is that no business judgment protection will be
offered for fiduciary decisions to participate directly. in illegal activi-
ties. Duty of care liability may be imposed in failure-to-supervise situ-
ations, although some business judgment protection is extended to
particular decisions about how best to achieve internal law compli-
ance. The possibly beneficial role of compliance programs is noted,
but not made an unavoidable requirement. Future judicial develop-
ment, or revised commentary, may clarify how the presence or
absence of compliance programs will be treated as a liability factor in
failure-to-supervise cases.232 The tentative drafts' commentary goes to
a fair amount of trouble to explain the interrelationships between sec-
tion 2.01(a)'s general law compliance obligation and fiduciary duties.
Despite section 2.01(a)'s obvious aspirational qualities, and the hints
of direct action against the corporation, the ALI regards fiduciary
obligation as a significant factor in achieving law compliance. Because
fiduciary duties typically are enforced by derivative suits, other ALI
230. See Draft No. 4, supra note 123, at 47-52 (comment to § 4.01(a)(1)-(a)(2)).
231. See id. at 9.
232. For example, at a company with a history of prior violations, the utter lack of a
compliance program understandably would be a factor in deciding whether the fiduciaries had
adequately discharged their duty to supervise law compliance. On the other hand, if a
compliance program had been put in place after previous law compliance difficulties, and the
program was adequately supported and a reasonably thorough response to the earlier problems,
judges probably would tend to treat this law compliance effort as species of protected decision,
and could well decide that the duty to supervise had been discharged.
471
Washington Law Review
provisions must be examined to see how corporate deviance derivative
suits fare under the ALI's general rules for derivative litigation.
C. The ALI's Net-Loss Rule in Fiduciary Litigation
As discussed earlier, corporate general law violations may either
return profits to the corporation or cause it losses. Illegal conduct that
causes corporate losses fits relatively neatly into the traditional deriva-
tive suit, in which fiduciaries occasionally are held accountable for col-
lective losses due to fiduciary misconduct.233 However, when the
illegal activities are profitable, the derivative suit's compensation
objective diverges or disappears. Derivative suits would provide deter-
rence in profitable deviance situations, but at the price of permitting a
corporate windfall: the corporation would retain its illegal gains as
well as any damages that might be recoverable from corporate fiducia-
ries found to have breached their duties by participating in the illegal
activities, or by failing to supervise adequately to prevent the law vio-
lations. This windfall problem forced the courts to struggle with dam-
ages pleading rules in corporate deviance derivative suits. The courts
produced the "net-loss rule" as a solution, and for a time seemed to
require that the plaintiff plead and prove that the corporation had not
obtained any gains from the illegal activities as a condition to deriva-
tive recovery against otherwise culpable corporate fiduciaries for law
violations."' In trying to prevent windfall recovery, however, the
common law net-loss rule created the impression that, under corporate
fiduciary doctrine at least, corporate crime was tolerable if it had been
profitable.
The ALI's Principles deal with the "crime does pay" issue by adopt-
ing a modified version of the net-loss rule. Section 7.16(c) provides:
A plaintiff bears the burden of proving causation and the amount of any
losses incurred by the corporation . . . as the result of a defendant's
violation of a standard of conduct set forth in Part IV .... The court
may permit a defendant to offset against such liability any gains to the
corporation that the defendant can establish arose out of the same
transaction.
235
Section 7.16(c) works three significant changes from the common
law versions of the net-loss rule. First, section 7.16(c) partially remits
233. See supra notes 111-24 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 156-77 and accompanying text.
235. See Draft No. 9, supra note 210, § 7.16(c), at 94. This section was tentatively approved
by the ALI at its annual meeting in May 1989. See Annual Meeting of American Law Institute,
57 U.S.L.W. 2686, 2687 (May 30, 1989).
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the plaintiff's burden of proof by permitting the plaintiff to allege some
corporate loss and shifting the burden to defendants to prove ultimate
corporate gain from the illegalities.236 Second, section 7.16(c) makes
clear that defendants' power to offset is not unlimited and that they
can avoid liability for profitable deviance only at the court's discre-
tion.237 Finally, section 7.16(c) limits any offset to gains derived from
the illegal acts alleged in the complaint, so defendants cannot avoid
liability by claiming that gains resulted from other legal or illegal
activities.238
Section 7.16(c)'s changes in the common law net-loss rule will make
it much harder to obtain quick dismissals in corporate deviance cases.
Under section 7.16(c), defendants must now assume evidentiary and
persuasion burdens. Although they might eventually prevail if permit-
ted by the court to show a net gain to the corporation arising from the
illegal activities, the defendants cannot obtain an immediate dismissal
on the pleadings merely by pointing to the plaintiff's inability to estab-
lish net corporate losses from the illegal conduct.2 39 Taken in isola-
tion," section 7.16(c) will increase the chances of a successful
derivative prosecution, and consequently will 'alter the defendants' set-
tlement strategies. Section 7.16(c)'s procedural reworking of the net-
loss rule also realigns the twin problems of windfall and deterrence by
rejecting those few New York decisions that insisted on windfall
avoidance at all costs. Other provisions eliminate any residual doubts
about whether corporate damages must be pleaded with specificity.24
236. Draft No. 9, supra note 210, at 94. Specifically, this pattern is demonstrated by the
section's allocation of pleading losses to the plaintiff and permitting defendants to offset by
pleading gains.
237. Id. The operative language here states that "the court may permit" offsetting by
defendants.
238. Id. The section's permissive offsetting extends only to those gains the defendant can
"establish" as having arisen from the same transaction.
239. Compare the state law cases that insist on a strict net-loss rule. See supra note 172.
240. This is a significant condition, because the Principles permit corporate special litigation
committee dismissals. See infra notes 246-64 and accompanying text.
241. See Draft No. 8, supra note 31, § 7.04(b), at 81, which states that allegations of fraud,
bias, or control be pleaded with particularity. The comments to this section suggest that the
normal pleading standard is notice pleading, and suggest further that specific pleading is
inappropriate where the defendants bear a pleading burden. Id. at 86-87.
Specific pleading was a part of the net-loss rule's complicated historical development.
Although the widespread shift to notice pleading has made specific pleading an exceptional
requirement rather than the commonplace, certain courts are reviving or strengthening specific
pleading requirements in an attempt to discourage certain cases. See Himelrick, Pleading
Securities Fraud, 43 MD. L. REv. 433 (1986); Note, Pleading Constructive Fraud in Securities
Litigation-Avoiding Dismissal for Failure to Plead Fraud with Particularity, 33 EMORY L.J. 517
(1984); Note, Pleading Securities Fraud Claims with Particularity Under Rule 9(b), 97 HARV. L.
REV. 1432 (1984). Specific pleading of corporate losses seems incompatible with the elements of
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But the Principles do not describe in detail the kinds of corporate dam-
ages that a plaintiff must allege to sustain its burden. The comments
state that the plaintiff must prove any "actual loss, including any
intangible losses suffered by the corporation." '242 The most coherent
interpretation of the Principles is that plaintiffs may allege all losses
causally attributable to the illegal conduct, whether these be fines,
damages, litigation expenses, impaired reputation or goodwill, or
losses incurred because the illegal activities were themselves unprofita-
ble as a business matter. In all these circumstances, the past or future
corporate expenditures would not be needed except for the corporate
actors' failure to comply with the law. Windfalls are avoided by per-
mitting defendants to offset gains derived from the illegal acts if they
wish to make the argument.243
All told, section 7.16(c) redefines the corporate windfall problem.
The new allocation of pleading and proof means that derivative plain-
a fiduciary breach claim arising from corporate deviance. The plaintiff's obligation to plead and
prove the underlying criminal violation should enable the fiduciary defendants to answer the
complaint adequately, and should provide sufficient boundaries to discovery requests. Moreover,
specific pleading seems pointless given § 7.16(c)'s allocation of the burden of proof between
plaintiffs and defendants; if specific pleading retains importance as a control on disfavored
claims, § 7.16(c)'s reduction of the defendants' ability to avoid liability would seem to indicate
that corporate deviance fiduciary suits are not to be treated with hostility by the courts. On
balance under the Principles, specific pleading of corporate losses is not the most effective way to
further the goals usually identified to justify specific pleading obligations, such as deterring
frivolous actions, protecting defendants from reputational injury, conserving judicial resources,
or giving adequate notice. See Draft No. 8, supra note 31, at 85.
242. Id. at 104. These comments make no explicit, direct reference to the older cases that
refused to consider criminal fines or litigation expenses as recoverable "corporate losses." See
supra note 170 and accompanying text. These older cases are cited in the Reporter's notes,
however. These cases are early common law attempts to refine the net-loss rule's pleading
burden. Their pleading rules about species of recoverable damages make no sense, however,
under § 7.16(c)'s division of the burden of proof, or its transactional limitation on the defendant's
power to offset gains.
243. The Exxon Valdez disaster can furnish the basis for a hypothetical discussion on
pleading corporate loss under § 7.16(c). Assume that there were $3 billion in clean-up costs, a
possible $700 million in fines, plus unascertained compensation payments and reputational
damages. These items would be pleaded as losses by a plaintiff alleging fiduciary misconduct.
Under § 7.16(c), the defendants would then have to obtain judicial permission to plead offsetting
gains. These gains must be limited to the particular transaction, which raises the possibility that
gains could be relatively minuscule in comparison to the damages. If the "transaction" is the
fateful voyage of the Valdez, the gains might be those from one tankerful of oil. This will be no
easy interpretive problem, particularly if the plaintiffs allege that Exxon's cost-cutting measures
reduced the company's capacity for compliance supervision. See Sullivan, supra note 6.
Even more troublesome in the Valdez situation is the underlying basis of criminal liability. See
Lev, Hazelwood's Acquittal Clouds the Exxon Case, N.Y. Times, March 28, 1990, at A19, col. 1;
Cushman, Exxon Is Indicted By U.S. Grand Jury in Spill at Valdez, N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1990,
at Al, col. 6; Egan, If the Exxon Valdez Spill Is a Crime, Whose Is It?, N.Y. Times, Feb. II,
1990, at E6, col. 1.
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tiffs are not expected to plead and prove facts not readily available to
them. The discretionary privilege to offset illegal corporate gains and
the new transaction test for legitimate offsets establish that the Princi-
ples do not unwittingly tolerate illegal gains. Furthermore, losses
attributable to illegal acts are no longer de minimis simply because the
organization is otherwise economically successful.
Section 7.16(c)'s most problematic aspect will become manifest as
judges attempt to develop standards for their discretion to permit or
refuse defendants' allegation of corporate gain. The comments affirm
that "section 7.16(c) is discretionary with the court with respect of
offsets, and no such offset need be permitted that in the court's judg-
ment would frustrate the policy of a statute or other clearly estab-
lished public policy." 2' Because corporate deviance derivative suits
require proof of the underlying law violation as an element of recov-
ery, the courts should permit section 7.16(c) offsets only when per-
suaded that an offset is compatible with the violated statute or public
policy at the root of the dispute. Such compatibility arguably could be
found where the corporate losses were relatively small, or where the
underlying violation was itself isolated and de minimis. Two addi-
tional factors will shape this judicial discretion to offset. One is sec-
tion 7.16(c)'s own transactional limit on the power to offset. If the
plaintiff shows actual losses arising from the corporate misconduct,
judicial discretion is not activated unless the defendant is able to claim
and eventually prove that gains are attributable to the particular ille-
gality at issue. The other factor is external to section 7.16(c), namely,
the directors' collective power to dismiss derivative litigation, which is
recognized by the Principles and will be discussed in the section imme-
diately following. For now, it is sufficient to note that courts' discre-
tion to permit an offset may affect reviews of the board's decision to
dismiss a case, since refusing to permit an offset should greatly
increase the size of the potential corporate recovery.
D. Power to Dismiss
As already noted, courts now acknowledge the board of directors'
power to dismiss derivative suits deemed not to be "in the corpora-
tion's best interests." 45 The Principles absorb this development, and
propose procedural refinements designed to reconcile the states' diver-
gent approaches. The Principles' most noticeable modification is to
require demand in all derivative cases, regardless of the nature of the
244. Draft No. 9, supra note 210, at 104.
245. See supra notes 180-88 and accompanying text.
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underlying claim-a shareholder seeking to file a derivative suit must
first submit a written demand for corrective action to the board of
directors, unless demand is excused in a particular case because of a
specific showing of irreparable corporate harm from requiring
demand. 2" This change will eliminate collateral litigation about
whether demand is excused in a particular case. It also changes the
procedural pattern in corporate deviance derivative suits, which had
been treated by some courts as "demand-excused" cases.24 7 If demand
is accepted, the derivative litigation is mooted. If the demand is
rejected, the derivative plaintiff may agree and withdraw, or may pur-
sue the litigation. If a plaintiff persists after refusal, the board almost
certainly will seek to have the derivative action dismissed, if only to
reinforce their earlier determination to refuse the demand.
In section 7.06, the Principles explicitly acknowledge the board's
power to dismiss derivative litigation "as contrary to the best interests
of the corporation." '248 This power is moderated by internal corporate
procedures necessary for a successful dismissal motion,249 and by judi-
cial review of such motions."' Before a derivative claim against a cor-
porate fiduciary251 can be dismissed as contrary to the best interest of
the corporation, the Principles' section 7.10 requires a corporate deter-
mination to forego or dismiss the suit that is based on an adequately
informed evaluation252 by the board or by a committee of two or more
directors.253 The board or committee must be disinterested in the
transaction or alleged wrong that is the subject of the shareholder
demand, and must be capable as a group of "objective judgment under
the circumstances. ' ' 254 The board or committee must be assisted by
246. The section states:
§ 7.03 Exhaustion of Intracorporate Remedies: The Demand Rule
(a) Before commencing a derivative action, a holder.., should make a written demand
upon the board of directors of the corporation, requesting it to prosecute the action or take
suitable corrective action, unless demand is excused under § 7.03(b). The demand should
give notice to the board with reasonable specificity of the essential facts relied upon by the
holder to support the allegations made therein.
(b) Demand on the board should be excused only when the plaintiff makes a specific
showing that irreparable injury to the corporation would otherwise result.
Id. at 63-64.
247. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
248. See Draft No. 8, supra note 31, § 7.06 (a) (4), at 102-103.
249. See Draft No. 9, supra note 210, § 7.10, at 33-34.
250. See Draft No. 8, supra note 31, § 7.08, at 114-16.
251. In § 7.07, the Principles distinguish between true third-party claims (pure business
judgment) and claims against corporate fiduciaries. Draft No. 8, supra note 31, at 109-110.
252. See Draft No. 9, supra note 210, § 7.10(a)(1), at 33.
253. Id.
254. Id.
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independent legal counsel, 2 5 5 and must prepare a written report in
support of the motion to dismiss.2 5 6 These requirements are the
expected minimum procedural standards, though the Principles permit
the reviewing court to accept justified deviations from them in particu-
lar cases.257
Once the committee finds that continuing the litigation is contrary
to the corporation's best interests, the corporate defendants will sub-
mit the report in support of a motion to dismiss the derivative suit.
Section 7.08 of the Principles states that the trial court should dismiss
the suit if: (1) the moving party has complied with section 7.10's stan-
dards for internal corporate review;258 (2) the court deems that the
corporate determination to terminate the litigation is a reasonable con-
clusion and is adequately supported so as to be reliable;259 and (3)
dismissal does not permit a defendant to retain a significant improper
benefit in circumstances indicating abuse of control, fraud, or unrati-
fied conflict of interest.2 ' The court may consider developments sub-
sequent to the report's preparation, 261 and should "independently
review any conclusions of law upon which the determinations... were
255. See Draft No. 9, supra note 210, § 7.10(a)(2), at 33.
256. See id. § 7.10(a)(3), at 33.
257. See Draft No. 8, supra note 31, § 7.08(a), at 114.
258. See id; Draft No. 9, supra note 210, at 213.
259. The court should dismiss if "based on adequately supported determinations that the
court deems to warrant reliance, the board of directors or committee reasonably concluded
(either in response to a demand or following commencement of the action) that dismissal is in the
best interests of the corporation." Draft No. 9, supra note 210, § 7.08(b), at 213.
In Draft No. 8, the Principles listed four factors in § 7.08(b) to be considered in determining
whether dismissal was warranted, any one or more of which would support dismissal:
(1) The likelihood of a judgment in favor of the plaintiff is remote; or
(2) The expected recovery (or other potential relief) from the defendant does not clearly
exceed the corporation's probable out-of-pocket costs if the action were to continue against
that defendant; or
(3) Before the commencement of the action, the corporation had itself undertaken
appropriate corrective or disciplinary action with respect to the subject matter of the action;
or
(4) The balance of corporate interests warrants dismissal of the action, regardless of its
merits.
Draft No. 8, supra note 31, § 7.08(b), at 114-15. In Draft No. 9, the reporters included § 7.08
for reference in discussion of § 7.10, and removed these specific items from the black letter in
favor of the language quoted at the beginning of this note. The Reporters opined that the
changed language "simply reflects a position long evident in the commentary to §§ 7.06-7.09."
Draft No. 9, supra note 210, at 212. It is uncertain how these changes will be reflected in the
revised commentary presented for final approval. It might be useful to include in the commen-
tary items one to three from the earlier formulation as indications of three nonexclusive but
"easy" cases in which dismissal can be found reasonably to be in the corporation's best interests.
260. See Draft No. 8, supra note 31, § 7.08(d), at 116.
261. See idL § 7.08(c)(i) at 115.
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based." '262 Most importantly for this inquiry, although the court nor-
mally should defer to internal corporate findings as to business matters
in duty of care cases, no such deference is required when the miscon-
duct involved a knowing and culpable violation of law by the defend-
ant fiduciary.2 63 This does not mean, however, that dismissal of direct
involvement suits is categorically inappropriate.
Corporate dismissal procedures have become a dominant and com-
plicated feature of derivative litigation itself, almost to the exclusion of
the underlying claims of fiduciary breach. Despite the helpful elimina-
tion of disputes over the "demand-excused" question, the Principles'
reforms do not drastically alter the focus from corporate dismissals of
derivative suits, if anything, the ALI may be attempting to intensify
this emphasis to force meaningful internal corporate responses to fidu-
ciary misconduct. The ALI also offers clarifications about the objec-
tives served by this procedural device, the factors to be considered in
terminating derivative litigation, and the relative roles of internal cor-
porate decisionmakers and reviewing judges. It is clear that these pro-
cedures are applicable to corporate deviance derivative suits, and it
seems that, with one exception, the corporate power to dismiss claims
against corporate fiduciary defendants arising from corporate illegali-
ties is not treated much differently from any duty of care case. The
exception is the direct involvement case, where section 7.08(c)(iii) pro-
vides for independent judicial business judgment in reviewing the rea-
sonableness and reliability of the decision to dismiss in the
corporation's best interests.2 6
What follows is a brief attempt to predict how the Principles would
affect derivative litigation over corporate deviance. This effort begins
with the Principles' effect on the decision to initiate a derivative prose-
cution against corporate fiduciaries, and then evaluates possible corpo-
rate responses.
262. Draft No. 9, supra note 210, § 7.08 (c)(ii), at 213.
263. Draft No. 9, supra note 210, § 7.08 (c) (iii), at 213-14; see also Draft No. 8, supra note
31, at 115-16.
264. See id. § 7.08(c)(iii), Draft No. 8, supra note 31, at 115-16; Draft No. 9, supra note 210,
at 213-14. As a general matter, the Principles take a stricter approach to special litigation
committee dismissals than either Delaware law (represented by Aronson and Zapata) or New
York law (Auerbach), by enunciating detailed procedural requirements for a committee report,
and explicit standards for judicial scrutiny. Because of the strong family resemblances among
the various states' special litigation committee dismissal procedures, however, there is some risk
that the ALI's subtly more demanding approach could be misread as requiring less of reviewing
judges than it actually does. This risk is present particularly in section 7.08(c)(iii), which turns
on the assumption that judges will be rigorously skeptical of corporate dismissal motions in
direct involvement deviance cases.
478
Vol. 66:413, 1991
Principles of Corporate Governance
E. Summary: The Corporate Deviance Derivative Suit under the
ALI Principles of Corporate Governance
L Choosing a Winnable Deviance Case
Under the Principles, plaintiffs (or more accurately, the corporate
plaintiffs' bar) must respond selectively to corporate deviance epi-
sodes. This is so because the ALI provisions, as they "fine-tune"
traditional doctrine, continue to recognize the significance of corpo-
rate loss as an element of derivative claims by retaining a modified
"net-loss" rule; the Principles also discount de minimis violations, and
acknowledge the board's power to dismiss derivative claims, subject to
procedural requirements. From the plaintiff's perspective, the best
chances for successful litigation would lie where the corporate conduct
violates a relatively clear and important legal obligation, and has
resulted in substantial fines or civil liabilities. Because the Principles
retain a modified net-loss rule, litigating plaintiffs and their lawyers
must search for cases with significant corporate damages. And since it
may be impossible to predict in advance whether a judge will permit
offsetting under section 7.16(c), case selection must emphasize large
damages to avoid a complete offset.
Direct involvement cases have the greatest chance to succeed. Fail-
ure-to-supervise claims are somewhat less desirable from a tactical
standpoint because, unless the corporate deviance constitutes recidi-
vism,2 65 supervisory failures simply do not yet have the visceral impact
of direct wrongdoing by corporate officials. Furthermore, if share-
holders exercised their option under the Principles to limit damages for
duty of care breaches, damages may be limited in some failure-to-
supervise cases. 2 " This limitation would discourage derivative plain-
tiffs from filing failure-to-supervise suits-lower possible damages
mean that litigation offers less chance of significant corporate recovery
net of litigation costs; early dismissal therefore is more likely after
265. See infra Part III.E.2.b.
266. See Draft No. 9, supra note 210, § 7.17, at 115-16.
It is possible that some failure-to-supervise cases might not be subject to a § 7.17 damages
limitation. When recidivism occurs, and the fiduciaries had failed to install reasonable
compliance efforts, it might be argued that the liability limitation is ineffective because this
failure showed "a conscious disregard for the [fiduciaries'] duty ... to the corporation under
circumstances in which the [fiduciaries were] aware that [their] conduct or omission created an
unjustified risk of serious injury to the corporation." See id. § 7.17 (3) at 115. This situation is
not specifically addressed by the Principles' commentary, and would be fact specific. As drafted,
it appears that deactivating the liability limitation would be unlikely unless the officers and
directors had failed to take any corrective action in response to the first deviance episode-it is
theoretically possible that a corporate deviance episode would result in no corrective action at all,
but it is improbable for most public corporations in the modem regulatory environment.
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investigation and recommendation.267 Ideally, any derivative prosecu-
tion would come after governmental action establishing corporate
criminal, or quasi-criminal, liability. Litigation in other circumstances
would be possible, but post-conviction suits would fare best under the
Principles because of the need to establish the underlying violation and
to stabilize the amount of corporate damages.268
Once the plaintiff selects its case, section 7.03 requires written
demand on the board of directors.269 In almost all fiduciary cases,
demand is unavoidable because it would be nearly impossible to show
irreparable corporate harm;27 0 this would be particularly true if the
plaintiff selects the case for large and relatively well-established corpo-
rate losses due to existing criminal or civil liabilities, because the exist-
ence of a damages remedy for past conduct probably would preclude a
finding of irreparable harm. Corporate senior management must then
determine how to answer the demand. Although management could
elect to pursue claims against their fellow fiduciaries in a direct
involvement case, it is simply not probable as a general matter. Man-
agement is even less likely to pursue the corporate claim when the
demand claims a fiduciary failure to supervise, because the potential
defendants would be members of senior management itself. For these
reasons, the following sections do not treat a managerial election to
sue as part of the corporate response to shareholder demand.
267. The following discussion assumes, therefore, that no such limitation has been adopted.
268. This delay in filing the derivative suit also might reduce the burden of proving the
underlying violation, although the Principles do not address preclusion problems. Unless the
fiduciary defendants themselves were named as individual parties in the prior proceedings, it will
be difficult if not impossible to obtain any preclusive effect from the prior judgment. Any
preclusive effect might be further reduced by the nature of the prior judgment, because consent
judgments or pleas of nolo contendere usually do not support easy preclusion. The mutuality
rule, if still in effect in the pertinent jurisdiction, would add further difficulties. Preclusion issues
are interesting and difficult, and largely beyond this Article's scope.
It would be possible to use the requirement that the derivative plaintiff prove the underlying
violation as a "sorting device" to avoid prosecution of trivial claims. Difficulties (or
impossibilities) of proof of the underlying violation would be one business reason that a special
litigation committee might recommend against continuing the derivative suit. See infra Section
III.E.2.
269. See Draft No. 8, supra note 31, § 7.08, at 63-64.
270. In an ordinary fiduciary breach claim for damages, irreparable harm simply would not
be present-the conduct in question is a past event that usually is not a continuing wrong. If
injunctive relief is sought against the corporation for ongoing criminal misconduct, however,
demand might be excused on an irreparable harm theory under § 7.03(b). Id. Direct equitable
claims against the corporation itself are discussed briefly supra note 209 and accompanying text.
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2 Responding to Demand for Corporate Action
A prudent board would attempt to satisfy the Principles' explicit
procedural requirements for special litigation committee dismissal. To
do this, the board appoints at least two non-defendant directors to
investigate the demand. Although the entire board could undertake
its own investigation if involved directors were excluded from the pro-
cess, appointing a special committee is a more likely course of action.
The special litigation committee reduces claims of "structural bias,"
and frees the remaining board members from an intense assignment
that would interfere with their other corporate obligations. The inves-
tigating directors should have no prior involvement with the miscon-
duct, and if possible should have begun their corporate service after
the misconduct was discovered. The board also would appoint special
counsel to assist in the investigation.
The Principles do permit short-form reports, because some deriva-
tive claims do not deserve full investigation.27 A plaintiff who mis-
takenly asserts a low damages claim in a corporate deviance derivative
suit, or one involving de minimis legal violations, would encounter this
short-form report, which operates as a form of confession and avoid-
ance. In these circumstances, the corporate response essentially is that
"nobody's perfect," '272 and that no derivative suit is justified.
In making the inquiry and preparing findings, the inquisitors would
make the strongest case for dismissal by emphasizing a few basic
aspects of the deviance episode. They should attempt to determine the
extent of the misconduct within the organization. They should docu-
ment the amount of harm caused by the misconduct, as measured by
identifiable actual and contingent corporate losses. They should also
attempt to identify and assess any gains attributable to the miscon-
duct, though this damages assessment is no guarantee of an independ-
ent basis for dismissal because section 7.16(c) limits offsets to the
particular illegal transaction, and makes offsetting permissive rather
than mandatory. The committee or board should estimate the litiga-
tion costs and balance them against any proposed corporate recovery.
Finally, and perhaps most crucially, the investigation should consider
strategies and mechanisms for internal corrective action. All findings
271. See Draft No. 9, supra note 210, at 37-39 (comment e to § 7.10).
272. No enforcement scheme yet devised has completely eliminated law violations.
Prosecutors in democratic societies do not have the resources to prosecute all crimes, and must
rely on selective prosecution to deter those actors who need to be deterred. In totalitarian
regimes, the objects of law enforcement are more highly supervised, but the regime and its agents
frequently become criminal out of zeal to enforce the "rules," such as they are.
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must be reduced to writing and will become the basis not only for
action by the board but also for judicial review of that decision.
Both the derivative plaintiff and the corporation face assessment
risks under sections 7.08's and 7.10's litigation review and dismissal
procedures. Both parties must accurately identify the sort of case at
issue. Mischaracterizing the law violation or miscalculating the cor-
porate damages can result in a quick dismissal against the plaintiff, or
an embarrassing rejection of a corporate motion to dismiss. The net-
loss rule's discretionary offsetting provision27 3 is something of a wild-
card in the analysis, adding further uncertainties for both sides in pre-
dicting the judicial response to derivative litigation over corporate
deviance. Because section 7.08(c) encourages independent judicial
review of corporate legal conclusions relied upon in dismissal reports,
the corporate defendant in particular risks miscalculation if it relies on
legal arguments to justify dismissal, such as by downplaying the
importance of the laws violated, or by predicting net-loss offsetting
under section 7.16(c).
The rest of this discussion assumes that the plaintiff has filed suit
over a significant corporate deviance episode, one in which the corpo-
ration violated an important legal obligation and has incurred large
fines or civil damages obligations. Prudent plaintiffs' attorneys would
avoid less egregious cases simply because the prospects for recovery
are diminished by the likelihood of a short-form report and rapid sec-
tion 7.08 dismissal, or by the reality that smaller corporate damages
mean a lower attorneys' fee award for what would be a great deal of
work.
a. Possible Recommendations in Direct Involvement Cases
The committee has two fundamental options in a direct involvement
case. Because it is assumed that the committee always would advise
dismissal,274 the difference would be the committee's recommendation
about corrective action: either the report has suggested such action or
it has not. If the committee report endorses internal corrective action,
and its recommendation is adequate, reasonable, and accepted by the
full board, the reviewing court might well dismiss the derivative suit.
In deciding these cases under the Principles, the judges will necessarily
develop standards for "adequate" and "reasonable" internal correc-
tions in response to deviance episodes. Internal corrective action has
two components--disciplinary action against the corporate defendants
273. See supra notes 235-44 and accompanying text.
274. See supra text following note 270.
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involved in the misconduct and structural modifications, such as com-
pliance programs, to prevent recurrences. Of the two, internal disci-
plinary action historically has been more rare. Corporate executives
frequently have remained in their positions, with powers and salaries
undiminished, despite direct involvement in price-fixing or question-
able payments. By exercising judicial supervision under section 7.08,
willing judges looking for these types of corrective action can use the
Principles to encourage internal disciplinary measures. This judicial
search could increase the deterrent effect on fiduciaries by prodding
corporations to impose internal sanctions. However, for some firms,
dismissal of the offending fiduciary would not be in the corporation's
best interest, particularly if the fiduciary were crucial to the underly-
ing business activities. Other disciplinary measures could be substi-
tuted, such as salary cuts or other status-reducing measures.
If the report recommends no corrective action in a direct involve-
ment case, the dismissal recommendation probably would encounter
greater judicial skepticism in a section 7.08 review, especially given the
assumption that accrued or potential corporate losses are substantial
and the illegality is significant. The corporation is, of course, free to
forego its financial claims against its fiduciaries. Realistically, large
corporate damage awards against corporate fiduciaries directly
involved in criminal law violations may be uncollectible: directors' and
officers' insurance policies frequently exclude coverage for corporate
losses attributable to criminal fines, or for damages attributable to
specified illegal acts;27 5 and the damages attributable to certain mis-
conduct, for example the billions of dollars in expenditures and poten-
tial fines from the recent Alaskan oil spill, may be so large as to be
beyond the resources of even a well-compensated corporate fiduci-
ary.276 However, realism about damages should not excuse corporate
refusals to take steps to prevent future criminal law violations. The
Principles seem to demand that a special litigation committee recom-
mendation to dismiss derivative litigation in a direct involvement cor-
porate deviance case should in most circumstances be accompanied by
specific recommendations and statements about internal corrective
action, including penalties against those fiduciaries directly involved.
The as yet unasked question here is whether under section 7.08, a
judge may deny a corporate dismissal motion when the damages are so
275. See generally J. BISHOP, LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS:
INDEMNIFICATION AND INSURANCE § 8.09 (1981).
276. Executives compensated at levels comparable to Michael Milken's annual half-billion
dollars might be able to pay very large fines and still live quite comfortably on the remainder.
These individuals are rare enough, however, to be the exceptions that prove the rule.
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large, or the violation so egregious, that she concludes that the com-
mittee's recommendation, including internal corrective measures, is
not "reasonable" and dismissal of the suit is not "in the corporation's
best interests." Section 7.08 does not mandate dismissal, in particular
because the judge is not required to defer to litigation committee
assessments of the significance of the law violation. The Principles'
designers, here again, are attempting to achieve additional deterrence
by means of this reserved judicial power to override corporate deci-
sions to abandon corporate deviance derivative suits. Although judges
probably will not often invoke this power, it does exist under the Prin-
ciples' restatement of corporate doctrine.277
b. Possible Recommendations in Failure-to-Supervise Cases
Failure-to-supervise suits are, in the main, indistinguishable from
direct involvement suits. A special litigation committee report most
likely would recommend dismissal, and would include a recommenda-
tion about internal corrective measures. Unless the corporation has a
history of law compliance problems that puts fiduciaries on notice,
both the corporate recommendations and judicial responses would
vary little from those made in direct involvement suits. Corrective
recommendations will always bolster a corporate motion to dismiss;
on the other hand, failure to recommend internal changes or discipli-
nary action should meet greater judicial skepticism. All in all, how-
ever, it may still be relatively easy to obtain a dismissal after the
investigation had been completed.278
If the firm has a history of compliance problems, the investigatory
committee will have to tell a different story in its report. Under the
Principles, a committee report should recommend internal corrective
efforts at a recidivist firm to obtain dismissal immediately after the
investigation. If the company already had undertaken a compliance
program, or other formal efforts to cope with the earlier deviance epi-
sode, the investigation and report should include some evaluation of
277. See also supra notes 189-93 and accompanying text.
278. One remaining uncertainty is the precise effect of these dismissal provisions in first-
offense, failure-to-supervise cases where the corporate losses are extremely large. If the damages
are very large, there might be less willingness by a special litigation committee to forego litigation
because of the possibility of insurance coverage for at least some of the losses as a breach of due
care not involving direct criminal misconduct by the fiduciary defendants. Furthermore, judges
reviewing dismissal motions in these cases probably would be justified in their skepticism about
the "reasonableness" of a committee decision to forego exceptionally large potential recoveries.
As a consequence, the corporate and judicial proceedings in such cases may be so controverted
that dismissal would not be obtained without considerable effort by the corporate control group
and its special litigation committee.
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existing compliance efforts, and why they did not prevent the most
recent misconduct. Even under the Principles, however, courts will
recognize that compliance programs do not guarantee perfect adher-
ence to all legal standards. Of all the corporate deviance fiduciary sit-
uations, repeated law breaking after earlier episodes puts a premium
on meaningful promises of internal corrections, and judges should
examine recidivist organizations more closely than firms having their
first brush with major law compliance problems.
3. The Litigation Pattern Under the Principles
In the abstract, the Principles' sections 7.06, 7.08, and 7.10 allow
few corporate deviance suits to survive the directors' dismissal motion
after special litigation committee action. As a threshold matter, devi-
ance suits will have to allege significant corporate damages resulting
from substantial law violations to avoid de minimis dismissals. Even if
the claimed misconduct is serious and damaging to the corporation, a
careful managerial group most frequently would be able to halt the
derivative suit after a reasonable report and recommendation. Suits
could survive these dismissal attempts if the corporation had failed to
comply with section 7.10's procedural requirements, but these failures
would be correctable by supplementation, as provided in section
7.10(b). Otherwise, dismissal would be granted more frequently than
not, unless the committee report and recommendations were unrea-
sonable and inadequate because the committee report had improperly
discounted the damages involved, the seriousness of the underlying
violation, or the need for corrective action.
Of course, the numbers of deviance suits would vary with the
observable waves of corporate scandals: some periods would see few
deviance suits, while others would experience relatively higher litiga-
tion rates. Moreover, the Principles' corporate governance rules about
corporate deviance probably are more significant for their threat of
deviance suits that might survive a dismissal motion and review under
sections 7.08 and 7.10, than for the numbers of plaintiffs' judgments
obtained under their remodelled rules. By modifying the common law
net-loss rule in section 7.16(c), and by stating clearly in section 7.08
that judges should not automatically defer to corporate findings about
underlying legal assumptions, the Principles encourage judges to scru-
tinize carefully corporate deviance litigation committee reports, and to
act to preserve the social objectives embodied in substantive regula-
tion, at least when the corporate deviance is an egregious case. So
viewed, the Principles deliver on their promise to adopt a deterrence
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model of corporate governance rules along with devices to protect cor-
porate compensation interests.
If the Principles largely reserve a successful derivative prosecution
for the most egregious cases, their mechanisms for lesser corporate
deviance situations are not as clearly drawn. It seems fair to say that
the Principles try to encourage corporate deliberation about internal
measures to reduce corporate deviance,279 albeit by the section 7.10
committee procedure supervised under section 7.08 instead of an
underlying damages threat if deliberations are not satisfactorily under-
taken or concluded. It is hard to see how corporate deviance deriva-
tive suits under the Principles will have much incremental effect on
these deliberations. Since derivative litigation largely is driven by the
plaintiffs' bar, it is not clear just how these external players would
have much impact on the internal process. The relatively faint hope of
avoiding early dismissal in most threatened derivative suits reduces
the chance of litigation success, and lowers the attorneys' expectation
of compensation. Counsel's lack of interest probably would persist
even if fees generated through dismissal were guaranteed upon a judi-
cial finding that the damages and violations were significant enough
that the corporation "received a benefit" by being forced to "think"
about the problem as its special litigation committee investigates and
reports its findings and recommendations.28 ° These cases are infre-
quent, and the preliminary work to force a special committee report
normally would not lead to the substantial billable work involved in
279. This policy of encouraging effective deliberation can be compared to Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). In Van Gorkom, the Delaware Supreme Court attempted to
encourage a "better" deliberative process than the corporate leadership had undertaken in that
case. Improved deliberation and process could be a goal of § § 7.08 and 7.10's procedural
standards; arguably, the special litigation committee and the board would have to go through
investigation and deliberation to "earn" the right to dismiss the derivative suit, and those
activities could affect corporate behavior and decisionmaking. Whether improved monitoring
will result, or simply greater expense, is an open question, one recognized by the Reporter who
drafted these sections. See Klein & Coffee, supra note 9, at 138-43.
280. The Principles appear to support a fee award when a corporation takes corrective action
after a meritorious demand, even as the corporation moves for dismissal of the derivative action.
Section 7.18 provides:
A successful plaintiff in a derivative action should be entitled to recover reasonable
attorneys' fees and other litigation expenses from the corporation, as determined by the
court having jurisdiction over the action, but in no event should this amount exceed a
reasasonable proportion of the value of the relief obtained by plaintiff.
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Tent. Draft
No. 10, 1990) § 7.18, at 155 [hereinafter Draft No. 10]. Illustration No. 1 to this section
expressly endorses fee awards when a shareholder demand results in corrective action, even if the
lawsuit is dismissed before trial under §§ 7.08 and 7.10. Id. at 161-62.
Even under § 7.18, courts will encounter difficulties in establishing the value of the corporate
benefit and the amount of a "reasonable" fee. Id. at 155-61.
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discovery and trial preparation of an egregious deviance case against
fiduciaries, or the large settlement and corporate benefit that would
justify a large fee award.
In addition, the current debate about charter provisions to "opt
out" of the duty of care has a direct bearing on that part of corporate
deviance control mechanisms exemplified by failure-to-supervise suits.
Under the Principles themselves, corporate participants may by agree-
ment limit damages for duty of care breaches (such as failures to
supervise) by directors, although the ALI's membership rejected a lia-
bility cap provision for corporate officers. 2 1 Direct involvement suits
are expressly excluded from this power.28 2 The ALI Project's Report-
ers have disagreed among themselves about the wisdom of this exclu-
sionary provision,"' though this difference of opinion may have been
resolved by limiting it to directors. Direct claims under section 2.01
for injunctive relief would not be subject either to corporate dismissal
powers under section 7.06 or to section 7.17 damages limitations, but
this is an as yet undeveloped notion in the Principles.
On the whole, then, the ALI pattern presents a mixed picture of
fiduciary duty and corporate law compliance. Section 2.01(a)'s clear
obligation to comply with general legal provisions is not carried
through as an absolutely enforceable component of fiduciary duty. It
may be surprising to work through all these provisions, with their
careful adjustments to existing doctrine about general violations, only
to reach this conclusion about the Principles.284 Inescapably, one is
tempted to ask why the Reporters have bothered with all this.
IV. JUSTIFYING A CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
APPROACH TO GENERAL LAW COMPLIANCE
As the preceding discussion shows, working corporate deviance
through the Principles' fiduciary obligation and shareholder enforce-
ment provisions is not exactly quick or simple. Reduced to essentials,
the Principles address corporate deviance by combining clear articula-
tions of corporate and fiduciary law compliance obligations with a
highly selective enforcement mechanism, the derivative suit. Section
281. See Draft No. 9, supra note 210, § 7.17, at 115-16.
282. See id.
283. See id. at 116, 139-143.
284. Actually, this result is not particularly surprising because of corporate doctrine's long
commitment to managerial autonomy and judicial noninvolvement in most interactions between
shareholders and their directors and officers. To the extent that this doctrinal result is
disconcerting, the discomfort most probably results from initial or residual expectations that
general legal obligations somehow are "different." This is taken up in Section IV.
487
Washington Law Review
2.01(a) makes a strong statement of law compliance by corpora-
tions,285 which is carried forward into the directors' and officers' over-
sight and supervision duties.286 Nevertheless, the Principles' technical
requirements for derivative litigation severely constrain enforcement
of these duties. Realistically, only significant violations have any
chance to serve as the basis for a successful derivative suit. And the
directors' power under the Principles to dismiss derivative litigation
when not "in the corporation's best interest, '287 though not unlim-
ited,288 means that suits over egregious deviance episodes still may be
dismissed without corporate recovery for significant fines or damages
caused by fiduciary misconduct. The ALI's corporate governance law
compliance mechanism is not indefensible, but it is far from intuitive
or simple.
In fact, the Principles' law compliance scheme makes one wonder
why the ALI has bothered to deal with law compliance in the first
place. After all, nothing in the corporate governance rules could mod-
ify potential criminal or civil enforcement by state or federal officials,
or limit civil suits by third parties injured as a result of corporate mis-
conduct. Concededly, the Principles may include corporate deviance
applications of fiduciary doctrine as a matter of history, or to state
doctrine as completely as possible. To the extent that the ALI adheres
to its usual comprehensive approach, its projects must attempt to
address prior doctrine, which includes corporate deviance suits as
rare, but interesting, examples of fiduciary case law. 289 These cases
are infrequent enough, however, that they might not be absolutely nec-
essary to a clear reformulation of corporate fiduciary doctrine. More-
over, neither historicism nor thoroughness fully explains why the law
compliance obligation would be stated so prominently as a corporate
and fiduciary duty, and then apparently diluted by the Principles' tech-
nical provisions.
The ALI's justification for including general law compliance in its
corporate governance formulations actually presents two distinct ques-
tions. First, why do the Principles include any form of corporate obli-
gation regarding general law compliance? Second, why do the
Principles make this obligation part of fiduciary duties to be enforced
by derivative litigation, especially since the derivative suit is a rela-
tively disfavored enforcement mechanism?
285. See supra notes 17-22, 204-18 and accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 219-32 and accompanying text.
287. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
288. See supra notes 249-64 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 128-77 and accompanying text.
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A. Reconstructing the ALI's Consensus About General Law
Compliance as a Standard of Corporate Conduct
The ALI membership tentatively approved the Principles' section
2.01(a) without much comment about its fundamental recognition of a
general law compliance obligation for corporate actors.2 90 Of course,
it is politically unrealistic to expect ALI members to dissent from a
general statement that corporations should obey the law. This does
not, however, necessarily imply uniformity of opinion among the
membership about the reasons for including a law compliance obliga-
tion in the Principles. Given the widely diverging opinions about cor-
porate governance expressed by ALI members and commentators on
the Principles,29' it is reasonable to assume that section 2.01(a) was
adopted because its general law compliance obligation makes sense
from a variety of perspectives.2 92 Identifying these perspectives with
precision is somewhat problematic: the apparent consensus about gen-
eral law compliance left a scant record in the ALI deliberations about
section 2.01(a). But it is possible to explore the perspectives on law
compliance because they are relatively easy to identify from sources
other than the record of section 2.01(a)'s tentative approval.
One view of law compliance presumes that legal prescriptions gener-
ally are something to be obeyed. This traditional, "jurisprudential"
understanding of legal obligations is reflected in the Principles' com-
mentary,293 and probably explains much of the support for recogniz-
ing law compliance as part of corporate governance. Many in the
business and legal communities take this view of law, so many ALI
members would hold it as well. From a traditional perspective, the
alternative position-namely, accepting a fundamental corporate legal
standard that expressly or impliedly condones violations of other spe-
290. See supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text.
291. See Seligman, supra note 16.
292. As an historical matter, verifying this pluralism about law compliance appears to be
foreclosed: section 2.01's apparently undisputed place in the Principles has resulted in a sparse
record, which impairs any attempt to determine the details of the ALI membership's attitudes
about the role of law compliance in corporate governance. The agreement appears to have been
so complete as to have been almost unspoken.
293. See Draft No. 2, supra note 17, § 2.01 comment g, at 33: "Section 2.01(a) is based on the
moral norm of obedience to law .. " This norm is variously expressed in Western culture, from
Plato's Crito onward, in a rich discussion that can only be briefly acknowledged here. Some
representative discussions can be found in H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961); I. KANT,
The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, in THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (J. Ladd trans. 1965);
E. RosTow, Is LAW DEAD? 45-50 (1971) (obligation to obey the law precludes recognition of
"right" of civil disobedience); Greenawalt, Conflicts of Law and Morality-Institutions of
Amelioration, 67 VA. L. REv. 177 (1981); Greenawalt, A ContextualApproach to Disobedience,
70 COLUM. L. REv. 48 (1970).
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cific legal obligations-would be self-contradictory and absurd. More-
over, a jurisprudential understanding of law and obedience to its
commands does not preclude legal sophistication. As reflected in the
Principles, the general law compliance obligation is not absolute and
corporations may seek to influence the content of legal prescriptions
just as individuals do. If the law prohibits a desired course of conduct,
corporate managers are in no worse position than other individuals
whose wills are constrained by legitimate legal commands.
Traditional jurisprudence is an entirely predictable perspective from
which to require corporate obedience to general legal norms. Other
perspectives, however, also accept legal norms as legitimate bounda-
ries for corporate profit-seeking. For example, those advocating a neo-
classical political economy of limited government and free markets
view law as declaring the "rules of the game" for the marketplace, and
recognize government's institutional role as umpire in enforcing those
rules.2 94 If this has fewer obvious "moral" overtones than a tradi-
tional jurisprudential approach, it nevertheless insists that market par-
ticipation is conditioned upon a willingness to "play by the rules" and
accept law compliance as fundamental. Nor does this view argue only
from efficiency concerns about a limited government acting as umpire
among utility-maximizing firms: neoclassical language about "playing
by the rules" implies shared notions about equity and fair competition.
Other, more controversial economically-influenced views of law sug-
gest that the common law itself reflects "gropings towards effi-
ciency." '295 From this perspective, legal violations would risk
inefficiency, and should not be encouraged.296 It is distinguishable
from the older, neo-classical approach by the relative absence of
express language stating equity concerns about "fair play" or "fair
competition." Neither economic approach encourages law violations,
however: under both economic visions of law, no less than traditional
jurisprudential views, disobeying the law is an attempt to escape or
disregard the basic order of the "good society." '2 97
From yet another perspective, business acceptance of law compli-
ance as a general obligation is explained by the close and generally
amicable relationship between the business community and govern-
294. See M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 15 (1982).
295. See R. POSNER, supra note 25, at 21; see also id. at 22-26.
296. See id. at 397-98.
297. One distinguishing feature of the economic perspective is that it measures the good
society by efficiency and freedom, both of which are organized primarily by means of the
marketplace. See Friedman, supra note 294. For a somewhat more critical discussion of the
claims of a market society, see K. POLYANI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION (1944).
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ment. This relationship exists despite adversarial rhetoric. Business
influence in the law-making process means that, as a general matter,
business groups would not be hostile to recognizing the role of law,
though specific disagreements frequently surface. From business's
vantage point, government regulators, at worst, are familiar adversa-
ries subject to political control; at best, government agencies do much
to support business interests. Moreover, to the extent that law does
declare the "rules of the game," the law serves to reduce business wor-
ries about certain marginal competitors. By outlawing certain types of
conduct, government assists those firms that have committed their
resources to "lawful" activities. Those firms unable to obtain access to
"legitimate" means of competition because of scarcity face the addi-
tional barrier of legal sanctions and the possibility of prosecution for
noncompliance. From this perspective, the law compliance obligation
in section 2.01(a) is noncontroversial because the process of law-mak-
ing itself generally is subject to great influence or control by the busi-
ness community.
Finally, the general law compliance obligation makes sense to those
who are skeptical of a corporate actor's ability to achieve utility max-
imization by acting contrary to legal norms. Prosaic observations
about any attempt to profit by deviance feed this skepticism. First, it
is axiomatic that the corporate manager thinking about profiting by
deviance cannot accurately assess the social cost its deviant behavior
will impose on others. The cost-benefit analysis is limited to a balanc-
ing of the corporation's own costs and benefits from the proposed
course of conduct. Thus, while a corporate manager might be able to
identify opportunities for profitable deviance, there is no guarantee
that overall social utility will be enhanced by the proscribed conduct.
Second, even in computing its own costs and benefits, the corporate
manager faces serious miscalculation risks. Valuation problems are
notoriously difficult. 298 And to the extent that the cost/benefit calcu-
lation involves a prediction about what the corporate manager's com-
petitors will do, or how enforcement agencies will respond, it is
entirely possible that the corporate manager's calculation will over-
state the possible returns available from undertaking the deviant
course of conduct.299
298. See Polinsky, supra note 87, at 123-26.
299. This is so because the corporate manager acts within a social system of actors that
include competitors, customers, and regulators. Under the trucking-firm hypothetical, see supra
note 27, it is clear that the trucking-firm manager may at least capture customers by undertaking
willful speeding. Until its competitors and the regulators "notice" the deviance, and respond
accordingly, the deviating manager's firm will capture customers interested in quicker delivery
491
Washington Law Review
From this skeptical perspective, then, a legal prohibition issuing
from a legislature or administrative agency is entitled to respect and
obedience because it means one of two things. A prohibition can issue
because the state has assessed the predictable social costs of the pro-
scribed conduct and found them to be unacceptably high.3° Or, a
prohibition can be a determination that the benefits to be obtained
from the proscribed conduct are relatively uncertain because of the
possibility of miscalculation. Either as a known social harm, or as a
known risk of social harm, the conduct is prohibited.
These several perspectives, any of which could stand behind the law
compliance obligation, are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The
individual ALI members who tentatively approved section 2.01(a)
might have had any one or more of these viewpoints about law compli-
ance in mind as they considered the provision. In any event, members
who might not agree with one another about the reasons for accepting
a law compliance obligation nonetheless have managed to agree that
such an obligation ought to be recognized as a standard of corporate
conduct.
B. Fiduciary Obligation and Shareholder Enforcement
Section 2.01(a) may be pluralistic in its rationales, but it is nonethe-
less unequivocal. Derivative enforcement of corporate law compliance
obligations, however, is less certain under the Principles. The ALI
does not rely extensively on derivative litigation as a primary mecha-
nism of general law enforcement, but it has not entirely abandoned it
either.
1. Reasons to Discount Shareholder Enforcement of General Law
Compliance by Corporate Actors
Derivative litigation is an expensive process, both in its direct con-
sumption of resources, and in its power to distract corporate actors
from other pursuits. The deterrence benefits from threatened litiga-
tion probably are greater than the costs actually imposed by particular
times. Because of loyalty or bonding effects, these customers will remain with the deviant firm
even after it ceases to break speed limits. This "capture effect" is not unlimited, however,
because customer loyalty may be diminished if the deviant behavior becomes controversial
enough to drive the captured customers to other trucking firms.
300. See Polinsky, supra note 87, at 82. This notion of "high cost" could work in one of two
ways. First, the direct social costs of the prohibited activity might be too high, as would be the
case when toxic waste is dumped in the public water supply. Second, although the social costs of
the prohibited activity might not be especially high (arguably the case with gambling or
prostitution in themselves), the allocation of benefits necessarily goes to the "wrong people," who
might use returns from this activity to finance more harmful conduct.
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fiduciary lawsuits, but in corporate deviance cases this deterrence usu-
ally would be partially duplicated by other threatened prosecutions,
whether by regulators or injured parties.
A realistic attitude about the likelihood of derivative enforcement
also restrains enthusiasm for the derivative suit mechanism. In most
cases, the plaintiffs' corporate bar controls derivative litigation. These
lawyers perform a socially useful function by facilitating occasional
challenges to corporate misconduct, especially when corporate funds
have been redirected improperly by corporate fiduciaries to their own
pockets. The plaintiffs' bar carries no special brief for general law
enforcement, however. Moreover, fiduciary profiteering is not always
present in deviance cases. Instead, deviance episodes frequently are
profitable for the corporation itself, which makes it harder to articu-
late ex post a tangible corporate economic benefit from derivative liti-
gation over corporate deviance.
Shareholders themselves will be even less frequent litigants over cor-
porate deviance episodes.3"1 Corporate limited liability for investors
insulates public corporation shareholders from any direct threat of
criminal or civil liability to the state or third parties. Furthermore,
most prudently-diversified institutional and individual shareholders
see no significant negative change in their investments' stock market
prices because the deviant firm should be but one component in their
portfolios. And if the deviant corporation is healthy, and the illegal
conduct is profitable, that particular stock price will not drop until
market participants learn of the misconduct and begin to assess the
likelihood of expensive prosecutions. Most modern shareholders con-
cerned about corporate deviance episodes would not file a fiduciary
breach suit as their first course of action.30 2 But even if the deviance
causes corporate loss, a diversified shareholder in a going business still
could find it less risky to bear the distributed loss than to undertake
litigation expenses. 3  Hence the modern recognition that the deriva-
301. This may be but another way of saying that it is a mistake to consider derivative
litigation to be legitimate solely because it has one shareholder (an "owne" in earlier
terminology) attached to it; derivative litigation is legitimized by other factors, such as its
deterrent or compensatory functions. Furthermore, derivative litigation must work its deterrent
and compensatory functions even though it is relatively rare given the sheer size and numbers of
firms that are organized under the corporate form.
302. See supra note 29.
303. The passive role of actual shareholders in derivative litigation is not so much a
consequence of diversification, see Cox, supra note 23, at 746-52; rather, it has to do with the
problems of collective action described by Professor Olson. See generally M. OLsON, THE RISE
AND FALL OF NATIONS (1982); M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTIoN (1965). Since
most shareholders hold a minority position, undertaking derivative litigation would confer most
of the benefits obtained on others, the "free riders." The plaintiffs' bar and contingency
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tive mechanism virtually depends on the plaintiffs' corporate bar.
Indeed, to some extent the common law net-loss rule's focus on corpo-
rate loss may reflect an older but ultimately unreliable regulatory judg-
ment that shareholder suits, on balance, provide relatively little social
benefit in profitable deviance derivative cases.
2. Reasons to Retain Some Possibility of Shareholder Enforcement
of General Law Compliance by Corporate Actors
Despite these reasons to doubt that derivative enforcement is an
effective mechanism for controlling corporate deviance, the ALI has
chosen to include the mechanism as part of its corporate governance
scheme. As already noted, this might be partly attributable to the
nature of the ALI's Corporate Governance Project, and reflect the
ALI's concern for historicity and completeness in doctrinal develop-
ment.3 " The derivative enforcement mechanism, however restrained,
also acknowledges the shareholders' traditional place in the corporate
conceptual order. Occasional corporate rhetoric describes the share-
holders as the "true owners" of the corporation. This description does
not accurately reflect current understandings of shareholder func-
tion,3°5 so mere formalism can be discounted as the controlling expla-
nation. A less naive explanation is that the ALI actually does envision
some shareholder role, however small, in corporate governance: no
one else among the traditional internal corporate players ultimately
can supervise fiduciary performance,30 6 and to deny shareholders any
power to object to corporate deviance episodes would commit too
arrangements with corporate reimbursement of successful actions address most of these free rider
problems. See generally authorities cited supra note 29.
From a collective, compensation perspective that recognizes the ultimate corporate source for
duty of care recoveries, see Coffee, supra note 21, at 805-07, opting out of the duty of care would
make sense even when corporate deviance is involved. If the social utility from these suits is
relatively low, shareholders might be willing to avoid drains on the corporate structure from
direct and indirect litigation costs from defense; these drains are attributable to another
shareholder's miscalculation, either by alliance with the plaintiffs' bar or by underwriting (in the
rarest of cases) litigation costs. In failure-to-supervise suits, for example, the fiduciary
misconduct is one of management and supervision, just as in ordinary due care situations.
However, from a deterrence perspective, duty of care opt-out may not make as much sense. If
the conduct is prohibited, there is a social judgment that no overall social benefit can be obtained
from the conduct. Unlike ordinary due care liability, there is little chance that deviance liability
would create a disincentive to engage in risky, but, on balance beneficial conduct. The Principles
recognize this, at least partially, by disabling a duty of care opt-out when fiduciaries have been
directly involved in illegal activities. See supra notes 281-83 and accompanying text.
304. See supra note 289 and accompanying text.
305. See W. KLEIN & J. COFFEE, supra note 9, at 98-102.
306. This is so because the other traditional corporate roles are filled by directors and officers,
themselves the corporate fiduciaries charged with maintaining law compliance.
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heavily to an "investor model""3 7 of the modem corporate share-
holder. In this view, even limited shareholder enforcement powers can
work to limit deviance, along with other mechanisms of corporate
control.
Derivative enforcement also would be efficacious in particular devi-
ance situations, despite its unreliability if it were the sole mechanism
for encouraging law compliance. The Principles expressly adopt a plu-
ralistic approach to controlling corporate behavior, and acknowledge
that corporate governance doctrine works with other social controls,
notably the labor, product, capital and corporate control markets.3 8
Consequently, it is a mistake to assume that the ALI expects all its
mechanisms to apply in every situation. The corporate deviance deriv-
ative suit must be applied as appropriate, such as to egregious law
violations involving large damages, which already have been
described.30 9
The deviance derivative suit also would be useful when the corpora-
tion has been put into severe financial distress, in part by deviant
behaviors that have cost the corporation substantial sums of money.
In receivership or straight bankruptcy cases, especially, the ultimate
risk bearers would benefit from an increased ability to seek corporate
compensation from managers who contributed to corporate insolvency
by illegal conduct. When fiduciaries directly cause the corporation
illegality losses, or fail to supervise to prevent such losses, most of the
reasons for discounting shareholder enforcement do not apply. An
insolvent corporation means that it no longer is in the corporation's
best interest to "forgive" the illegality losses. Instead of relying on a
future income stream to offset any damages, the insolvent corpora-
tion's "interest" would be to recover as much as possible to pay off
creditors or begin a restructured business. In insolvency, the plaintiffs'
corporate bar would not be the sole actual protagonist; instead, the
creditor and insolvency bars would play a greater role. Moreover,
shareholder "exit" from this sort of situation is not necessarily more
"rational" than litigation: the market price of this troubled stock
would be heavily dependent on the likelihood of assembling as many
corporate assets as possible for distribution or restructuring. Corpo-
rate deviance derivative suits may improve the stock price of distressed
corporations by increasing the corporate asset pool. This particular
application is tied to the corporate compensation interest, and has
307. See M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS
(1976); see also Ryan, supra note 107, at 171-82.
308. See supra notes 10-11, 109-10 and accompanying text.
309. See supra notes 265-73 and accompanying text.
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been reported in the caselaw.31° It also might be appropriate when the
business cycle turns downward. The 1990s promise a winnowing of
the heavy deal-making activities in the 1980s, and may also bring to
light further financial scandals. If unsuccessful business deals can be
tied to illegal activities by corporate participants,31 compensation
suits over corporate deviance could play a role in assembling corporate
assets for the next business upsurge.
C Interpreting the ALI's Law Compliance "Text"
By balancing the apparent consensus favoring corporate general law
compliance against the limitations of a shareholder enforcement mech-
anism, the Principles have delivered an intriguing and tension-filled
statement about corporate deviance. In so doing, the Principles take a
stance that is largely, but not exclusively, aspirational in tone and
character, at least with regard to all but the most egregious corporate
deviance episodes. The Principles articulate a clear law compliance
obligation3" 2 and take steps to encourage preventative or corrective
measures, 31 3 but do not rely much on derivative enforcement as law
compliance "insurance." Viewed entirely from a skeptical, instrumen-
tal perspective, this approach can seem to be little more than an empty
doctrinal exhortation to "play fair." A skeptical reaction to the Prin-
ciples is a defensible one, particularly since the ALI provisions depend
heavily upon judicial implementation; the Principles' impact cannot be
fully assessed until after judges have time to respond to the ALI's doc-
trinal rehabilitations.
In the meantime, other, more sanguine interpretations are possible.
Admittedly, the Principles' blend of pragmatic idealism creates some
conflicting overtones in the tentative drafts: the broad language about
the general law compliance obligation and fiduciary duties in Parts II,
III and IV can create a misleading impression about corporate devi-
ance derivative suits if not read in connection with Part VII's technical
provisions governing shareholder litigation. If utterly unenforceable
by some corporate actor, however, section 2.01(a)'s general obligation
and its insertion into fiduciary duty would become a "phantom," eas-
ily disregarded as a meaningful corporate governance principle, even
in aspirational terms.
310. See the liquidation cases cited supra note 169.
311. This doctrine may have some application during the economic shaking-out that will
follow the savings and loan scandals, the HUD problems, Operation Ill Wind's effect on defense
contracting, and Drexel Burnham's insolvency. See supra notes 3-4.
312. See supra notes 17-22, 204-18 and accompanying text.
313. See supra notes 225-38, 279 and accompanying text.
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This is a partial explanation of the ALI's somewhat ambiguous
statements about law compliance. Another partial explanation is that
the Principles' tentative drafts have been prepared by three different
Reporters across a period of several years. The gains from hybrid
vigor may be slightly offset by differences in authorial tone during the
interim periods, but this should dissipate as the drafts are combined
into final form over the next several years. The Reporters have not
always agreed, especially about the implications of a "soft" contrac-
tual model of the corporation.314 Working out the tensions between
the firm declarations of duty and the much less certain shareholder
enforcement provisions may bring some disagreements to light as final
consolidations are made.
The uncoordinated doctrinal development of the general compli-
ance obligation and the derivative suit mechanism also may have
added tension to the drafts. Corporate deviance derivative suits are
rare, and have worked out the fiduciary obligation regarding law com-
pliance mostly by means of the Roth-Allen-Miller315 line of authority,
which has issued at long intervals since the beginning of the twentieth
century.316 Derivative enforcement doctrine, however, has changed
drastically during the last fifteen years: several prominent cases in
more than one influential jurisdiction have reworked the rules applica-
ble to nearly every derivative suit.317 This developmental imbalance
between the general law compliance standard of conduct and one of its
enforcement mechanisms may have something to do with the Princi-
ples' complexity regarding law compliance.
Another way to read the Principles" statements about general law
compliance begins with the notion that the Corporate Governance
Project is an attempt to generate a unified textual statement about cor-
porate governance doctrine at the beginning of the twenty-first cen-
tury. Although it is possible to read the law compliance obligations as
a distinct aspect of corporate fiduciary duty, it also is useful to con-
sider these statements as textual signals about other significant aspects
of fundamental corporate doctrine. The clearest example is section
2.01(a), which uses general law compliance to temper the Principles'
declaration of profit-seeking and shareholder gain as the primary cor-
314. One small example of possible disagreement already has surfaced over the question of
whether shareholders can elect to opt-out of the power to enforce the duty of care against
corporate fiduciaries in most applications. See supra notes 281-83 and accompanying text.
315. See supra notes 128-46 and accompanying text.
316. Roth was decided in 1907, Allen in 1947, and Miller in 1973.
317. See supra notes 180-92 and accompanying text.
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porate objective.318 Another example is the relationship between the
general law compliance obligation and the Principles' recapitulation of
the business judgment standard, which limits judicial review of corpo-
rate decisionmaking. This standard mirrors the United States' eco-
nomic system of private ordering largely unfettered by direct
governmental interference in business. The business judgment stan-
dard is remarkable as a recurring judicial refusal to inquire into the
vast majority of corporate business decisions, which allocate signifi-
cant economic resources and affect the welfare of many. In these cir-
cumstances, the law compliance language declares one boundary of
judicial neutrality and of legitimate business activity: judges will take a
hard look at business decisions when the alleged misconduct involves
general law violations. The Principles' law compliance language thus
defines institutional roles. It also sends a subtle signal that, despite
corporate governance's overwhelming concern with process,319 at
some delicate points a process orientation must give way to concern
about the results of corporate behavior.
Finally, any discussion of the Principles' general law compliance
rules must assess them as aspirational standards and consider their
potential influence on corporate fiduciary behavior. To be truly mean-
ingful, an aspirational standard must have some ex ante effect on busi-
ness decisions. In making decisions, corporate managers react to
information presented to them. Admittedly, these managers "see"
only an incomplete picture of the current situation and the likely
effects of the decision about to be made, which explains why the con-
cept of "bounded rationality" has such significance in organizational
theory.32 ° Managers evaluate data by means of decisional standards.
One crucial standard linked to organizational survival is the need to
obtain corporate profit as a result of business decisions.32' Managers
have some discretion in their choices, however, because several profita-
ble courses of action frequently may be pursued at any given time.
Moreover, because uncertainties abound, an ex ante decisional stan-
dard that demands the most profitable course of action is not as useful
as it might appear in the abstract. In short, managerial discretion
exists and is unavoidable.
In this discretionary realm, once the decisional minimum of profit-
ability is established, managers will need to supplement their deci-
318. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
319. See Branson, Intracorporate Process and the Avoidance of Director Liability, 24 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 97 (1989).
320. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
321. See supra notes 75-84 and accompanying text.
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sional standards. One supplementary standard is managerial self-
interest, which is problematic only if that interest diverges from the
institutional interest.322 Another, more general standard deeply
embedded by socialization is to identify "the right thing to do under
the circumstances." This is an extensive and flexible standard.323 The
corporate managers using it are dealing with what might be called
"moral maps" for making decisions.324 Because the profitability stan-
dard does not fully eliminate managerial discretion, corporate manag-
ers invoke these maps far more frequently than many of them would
admit. These moral maps can be illusory. By invoking moral lan-
guage, a decisionmaker frequently can persuade itself that its decision
is the right thing to do; this self-persuasion is suspect because of
rationalization processes, by which humans convince themselves that
what they want to do is the "right thing to do."
Section 2.01(a)'s aspirational standard can have influence as a cor-
rective to corporate managers' invocation of rationalized moral maps.
Legal obligations are not coextensive with morality, but general legal
prohibitions frequently do indicate that among profitable courses of
action, some avenues may have been marked off by social decision as
illegitimate, even if profitable.3 25 Section 2.01(a) operates as a
reminder that profitability is not decisive (because of residual manage-
rial discretion), and that rationalization processes cannot justify all
managerial preferences. The law compliance obligation shapes the
managerial response, in a given situation, as the manager makes
bounded choices among several opportunities presented in a complex
milieu. It reinforces legal standards as a decisional norm, and for
most managers will connect to the trained impulse to respect the law,
which is a fundamental characteristic of most moral maps among
those socialized in the United States. Section 2.01(a) thus reinforces
existing moral maps. Not all corporate decisionmakers would need
this influence, or would be susceptible to it, so the aspirational compo-
nent of the Principles is not a complete solution to corporate deviance.
322. When such divergence occurs, managerial self-interest no longer supplements a
decisional standard in choosing among profitable alternatives. Rather, upon this divergence,
managerial self-interest conflicts with maximum corporate profits.
323. Making an organizational profit usually is part of "the right thing to do," and will not be
separately considered because it has been treated as the typical minimum qualification for a
business decision. Also, the concept is flexible enough that it encompasses more specific conflict
standards: for example, acting in self-interest can be regarded as the "right thing to do," as moral
arguments constructed from The Wealth of Nations demonstrate. See A. SMITH, supra note 47.
324. I am indebted to my colleague Dennis Honabach for a fruitful discussion about moral
maps as they might apply to § 2.01(a)'s aspirational function. The standard caveats apply here-
all errors are my own.
325. See supra notes 293-300 and accompanying text.
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Because other control mechanisms exist outside of corporate govern-
ance doctrine, however, section 2.01(a) need not aspire to complete-
ness, and does not attempt to function as the ultimate answer to
corporate deviance.
V. CONCLUSION
The ALI Principles recognize general law compliance as an impor-
tant value in the conduct of corporate affairs, but do so without utiliz-
ing enforcement mechanisms that grant shareholders or the plaintiffs'
bar a roving commission to police general law compliance by other
corporate actors. Some might denounce this approach as cowardly-
one could argue that general law compliance is so important that
shareholder interests must be given uncontrolled authority to do some-
thing about corporate deviance. From this point of view, the ALI's
failure to "unleash" derivative enforcement reflects a lack of convic-
tion about the seriousness of the corporate deviance problem. On the
other hand, it is possible to assert that general law compliance is not a
corporate governance matter at all. To these observers, the ALI fal-
ters by refusing to eliminate general law compliance language from its
corporate governance standards. In both views, the Principles have
collapsed into muddled compromise about corporate deviance and
corporate governance.
An alternative explanation of the ALI approach is to recognize that
corporate deviance is a special sort of corporate law problem, one that
reveals doctrinal boundaries. From an external point of view not con-
cerned solely with the utility and internal consistency of corporate
governance mechanisms, it appears reasonable to expect that corpo-
rate governance doctrine should "do something" about corporate devi-
ance. A basic social premise is that corporate actors should not make
use of their corporate situations to profit by violating the large and
small social agreements reflected in general laws and regulations.
How this expectation fits into corporate governance standards is less
clear. It is one thing to say that corporate governance mechanisms
should do nothing to encourage law violations, but quite another to
suggest that these mechanisms can be used effectively to discourage
law violations. To be sure, external observers can be influenced by
commonplace, if outdated, rhetoric about the shareholders' supposed
status as broadly dispersed individuals who are the "true owners" of
the corporate enterprise; this rhetoric could create expectations that
shareholders are ordinary, law-abiding citizens who somehow would
be reliably active in reducing illegal corporate conduct. The modern
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institutional investors' dominance in the equity markets shatters this
rhetoric, as do current understandings of corporate order, most of
which reject a naive ownership model.
Nonetheless, external hopes for shareholder response are more justi-
fied if illegal corporate misadventure causes corporate loss, or creates
the risk of such loss. One way or another, shareholders are highly
sensitive to corporate losses, and may take a variety of steps in
response to significant losses. If the corporate deviance were profita-
ble, however, institutional shareholder activity might not be triggered
in any but the most spectacular cases, which would also have brought
the scrutiny of other law enforcers.326 This realism about corporate
governance and corporate law compliance is not comforting to exter-
nal observers. Profitable deviance by corporations is a recurring social
bogeyman, and brings to mind Progressive and Populist images of
giant corporations tearing at the social fabric while pursuing profit at
all costs. By itself, corporate governance doctrine cannot dispel this
collective external nightmare. Corporate governance doctrine is a
complex but limited set of rules that are part of the larger social con-
trols on corporate activities. Its limitation is the fundamental corpo-
rate reality that shareholders have limited ability to influence the day-
to-day conduct of corporate affairs. By no means are shareholders
powerless; but the power they exert is not the power of on-site supervi-
sion and detailed decisionmaking.
This doctrinal boundary is further illustrated by considering
whether corporate losses caused by deviant behavior somehow are dif-
ferent from ordinary corporate losses. The divergence between inter-
nal and external points of view provides one answer. To an external
point of view, these losses have distinctly different characters. Ordi-
nary corporate losses are "part of the game" and are a matter of con-
cern but are left with some confidence to market mechanisms.
Deviance-caused losses are different because they involve law viola-
tions, which are problematic whether the corporation makes or loses
money from the illegality. To internal corporate players like share-
holders and managers, however, losses are losses, and are to be
avoided whenever possible because they reduce corporate profit and
shareholder gain. Deviance-related losses thus are doubly negative
when considered from both internal and external perspectives.327 This
326. Eventually, however, the plaintiffs' bar would become active once large fines or
judgments were imposed, and would argue against offsetting deviance-related gains and
corporate losses. Judicial application of § 7.16(c)'s net-loss rule would then become critical.
327. To continue this line of analysis, profitable lawful conduct would be double-positive-
both lawful and profitable-and not a matter of concern. There are two combinations of mixed
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may partially explain why these losses are treated differently by corpo-
rate doctrine, which removes business judgment protection in certain
cases.
328
In the main, the Principles reflect an internal point of view, which is
predictable since they are being drafted and criticized by corporate law
specialists. In contrast to external expectations of shareholder owner-
ship as a corporate deviance control, the internal approach is a subtle
melange of situational, sparse applications of the litigation mechanism
and section 2.01(a)'s delicate influence on corporate managers' "moral
maps" as they decide among various profitable courses of conduct.
But the ALI's version of corporate governance doctrine is not utterly
self-contained. Section 2.01(a) discloses one boundary of corporate
governance, by refusing to reduce modern doctrine completely into
technical problems of intracorporate process. The general law compli-
ance obligation works to remind internal players that results do matter
in the real world. This obligation, and the corporate deviance problem
itself, fix a boundary for corporate governance doctrine. They mark a
point where internal governance rules meet fundamental social stan-
dards in the form of general legal obligations. At such a point in the
universe of legal concepts, it is unlikely that either internal or external
approaches would be independently satisfactory.
positive-negative. One group is lawful losses, which typically are not a corporate governance
issue nor an external issue, and are left to market mechanisms and social stigmatizations attached
to failure. The other is illegal profits, which are a major external issue but a weak internal
problem because of the internal mechanism's fundamental concern with profits.
328. See supra notes 128-46 and accompanying text.
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